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Abstract 
This thesis examines the ways in which user-generated content (UGC) has 
been used by BBC journalists to cover the conflict in Syria, and how journalistic 
working practices have altered. The data collection methods included a content 
analysis of news reports about Syria which aired on BBC World News TV from 
2011 to 2014, staff interviews and newsroom observations. Syria has been a 
challenging story to report as often news organisations have had very little, if any, 
presence in the country, forcing journalists to rely on UGC produced inside the 
country to depict events. Results show the task of sourcing UGC and putting it 
through a verification process involved a steep learning curve for many BBC 
journalists during the Arab uprisings and remains a complex process. Journalists and 
producers had to adapt to new ways of locating content, particularly on digital 
platforms, developing new skills to enable them to carry out ‘social media 
newsgathering’. In doing so they harnessed expertise from across the BBC, including 
BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring. These changes have happened as the BBC has 
created more digital news products. However, there were systematic failings in the 
ways that BBC News passed on information about the UGC used in its news reports 
to its audiences, particularly verification warnings and the crediting of content. While 
journalists have become more social media and technology savvy, UGC is still not 
fully understood by BBC newsrooms, though it is regularly used to cover breaking 
stories and news. This thesis contributes to a body of literature examining how UGC 
is used by news outlets and also revisits established theories to consider the extent to 
which journalists continue to be information gatekeepers or ‘gatewatchers’ when 
audiences have access to news on numerous social, mobile and digital platforms.  
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Introduction 
Nearly five years ago, Syrian schoolchildren in Der’aa in the south-west of 
Syria were arrested for painting graffiti on to a wall. It was thought they had been 
inspired by scenes of protests and uprisings they had seen in the media, from Bahrain 
to Tunisia. Who would have thought that the subsequent protests in relation to the 
arrests would be followed by major demonstrations across the country, orchestrated 
activism, civil unrest, violence and, ultimately, the fleeing of more than half of 
Syria’s population from the places they called home? At least 250,000 people have 
been killed since that day in March 2011. Yet many of the events of the past five 
years have happened behind closed doors, with major restrictions in place for 
journalists trying to portray what is happening in Syria.  This means that, at times, 
news organisations have had to turn to those witnessing events inside the country’s 
borders, using content they have captured and posted onto social media platforms, to 
tell the story of the uprising and conflict. 
This research examines journalistic practices related to newsgathering carried 
out by BBC News staff covering the conflict in Syria. Using a mixed methods 
approach - which includes in-depth interviews, newsroom ethnography and a content 
analysis of BBC World News Television reports - it aims to identify how user-
generated content (UGC) has been used by the BBC to depict events happening in 
Syria since the uprisings began in 2011. Drawing on the data gathered, the research 
also aims to outline the ways in which the role of the journalist has changed during 
the research period in order to process and use this content. The two overarching 
research questions being asked in this research are: 
 
Q1. How have BBC News journalists used UGC to cover the Syria 
conflict? 
Q2: In what ways has the role of the BBC journalist changed to utilise 
UGC in news output?                    
11 
 
 
Thesis structure 
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters, over and above this 
Introduction. Chapter 1 outlines the key literature related to the research. Chapter 2 
outlines the theoretical framework in which the research is situated, drawing on 
literature to explain the theories of gatekeeping and gatewatching as outlined by 
Lewin (1947) and Bruns (2003, 2005, 2011). The Methodology chapter (Chapter 3) 
provides details of the main methods of data collection: qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis, in-depth interviews and a newsroom ethnography. Results from the 
content analysis of news reports which were broadcast on BBC World News 
Television are provided in Chapter 4. This chapter is divided into two parts, with the 
findings from the quantitative content analysis forming the first part. The second part 
is an in-depth document content analysis, which draws on information from 
documents found on the BBC’s internal database system (ENPS). ENPS is a database 
used by BBC News which stores information about news programmes, contributors, 
UGC clips and the verification process undertaken by journalists checking content. 
The system is also used by different outlets across BBC journalism to develop 
‘running orders’, from which live programmes go to air.  
Findings from the qualitative interviews and newsroom observations which 
took place at the UGC Hub, where UGC is checked and processed, and BBC Arabic, 
which was at the forefront of newsgathering throughout the Arab uprisings, are laid 
out in Chapter 5. These observations took place during 2013 and 2014. The 
Discussion chapter (Chapter 6) critically analyses and discusses the main findings 
from this research and sets them within the context of other field studies, as well as 
providing some key recommendations for BBC News and the wider industry. The 
Conclusions chapter (Chapter 7) provides a closing summary of the main findings, as 
well as discussing the implications of these findings for the research field and 
recommendations for further study.  
This Introduction seeks to outline the key issues considered when 
undertaking this research. The conflict in Syria is a complex and fragmented war, 
with many different elements affecting what happens in the country on the ground. 
An understanding of events which happened prior to the uprisings across the Arab 
world in 2011, as well as developments since then, will help us understand the value 
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of and need for this research. Therefore, part of this Introduction provides both 
historical and contemporary accounts, which aim to add context to the evolving 
conflict in Syria, in terms of access, the media landscape and humanitarian matters.  
In addition, this chapter will also depict structural details relevant to BBC 
News. An explanation of the way the world’s biggest broadcaster is organised and 
run - and a ‘potted history’ of developments within the News division - will 
hopefully help aid understanding of the research which seeks, among other things, to 
examine the BBC’s handling of UGC related to the conflict in Syria at what is a time 
of change within the journalistic landscape. 
Contextualising the research 
The events that led to the wave of uprisings across parts of the Middle East, 
known as the Arab Spring, have been well documented. What began with the 
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia in December 2010, spread across the 
region and led to revolts and the fall of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan 
Governments, as well as demonstrations in Bahrain and Yemen. While the 
background to each uprising, and subsequent downfall of the respective regimes, 
played out differently in each country, what they do have in common is that the 
initial events lasted a relatively short period of time. In Egypt the main activity which 
toppled President Mubarak lasted 18 days, in Tunisia the initial period of unrest went 
on for around a month. 
Protests in Syria began in Der’aa in March 2011 after schoolchildren, thought 
to have been copying what they had seen happening in other countries that had 
witnessed the Arab uprisings, daubed graffiti onto a wall. These children were 
arrested by Syrian police and, when their families protested at their incarceration, 
they were shot dead (BBC 2013c). This sparked a serious of further protests and then 
violent unrest across Syria, and the situation remains unresolved more than four 
years later. This is not like the ‘quick fix’ conflicts that happened in other countries. 
A rebel uprising began, an opposition in exile was briefly established and many 
civilians are still caught up in the crossfire. That crossfire was originally between 
government forces and those opposed to President Bashar al-Assad, but now 
involves many different and fragmented groups, including those affiliated to 
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radicalised Islamist organisations and jihadists from Islamic State (IS), who have 
gained control of large areas across both Syria and Iraq. A full timeline of events in 
Syria since 2011 appears in Appendix 1. 
The timescales and series of events are very different to those in Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square and Libya’s Green Square, but Syria is also different from a 
journalistic perspective. For a large part of the conflict there have been attempts to 
impose a long term media blackout, with most foreign journalists banned from 
entering the country. The timing of the beginning of the Syria conflict, in March 
2011, also meant that many organisations were initially stretched with regards to 
deployment to the country, as they were covering the Arab uprisings in other parts of 
the Middle East. Arguably, this may have hampered initial coverage (BBC Trust 
2012). Since then, some foreign press - including staff from the BBC - have been 
allowed visas, but they have been strictly controlled in terms of what they can film 
and how they move around the country. Other journalists have smuggled themselves 
into the country in a bid to report events. Often this means their safety is 
compromised and time reporting in the region is limited, as is what they can show. 
The high profile death of Sunday Times journalist Marie Colvin in February 2012, in 
Homs, highlights the dangers that professional correspondents, as well as the ‘man 
on the street’ citizen journalists, face in trying to get information about events 
happening in Syria. Paul Conroy, the photographer working with Colvin at the time 
of her death, described what he saw as “the next Rwanda, the next Srebrenica” (BBC 
2012). 
 Sadly, journalists and those who help facilitate their movements in Syria 
remain at risk while trying to report in the country. There have been a number of 
high profile beheadings of western journalists such as James Foley, Steven Sotloff 
and others, by groups affiliated with Islamic State. Syrian journalists have also been 
captured or killed, allegedly by Syrian government forces and those working with 
‘the regime’, as well as militant groups.  These developments suggest that, until the 
regime falls, there will be major restrictions on the movements of journalists in and 
out of Syria, and those who try to disseminate news of unrest from within the country 
to the rest of the world will be risking their own lives in the course of doing so.  
From the start of the violence in March 2011, for a period of around six 
months, the BBC was not able to send journalists into Syria officially. There was a 
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BBC Arabic journalist based in Damascus, but her movements and reporting were 
seriously restricted. International correspondent Lyse Doucet was the first BBC 
journalist to be given a visa to enter Syria. Since then, the few reporters officially 
reporting have had restrictions imposed on them. More details of the situation are 
detailed in the Literature Review. Lack of reporter presence in the country means 
that events, including widespread violence, have been challenging to report 
accurately – that is with objectively verifiable ‘facts’.  For this reason, news 
organisations have had to rely heavily on content generated inside the country and 
forwarded on by citizens on the ground to find out what is going on inside Syria. 
This includes accessing content from their own audiences. In this respect, some 
consumers have become producers or, as Bruns refers to them, ‘produsers’, both 
users and producers (Bruns 2003). 
 In other breaking news situations where media outlets have had to rely on so 
called citizen journalism initially, it has been in tandem with scrambling crews and 
reporters to the location, e.g. the Boxing Day tsunami in South East Asia in 2004 and 
July 7 bombings in London in 2007 (Allan and Thorsen 2009). Syria is different in 
that, for the majority of the time, media organisations are relying on eyewitnesses as 
the newsgatherers and are reporting on a country where they have no official 
presence. In this respect, I believe the Syria situation is unique and is a research topic 
worthy of further analysis and investigation. 
Situating the research 
This thesis outlines, among other things, the ways in which journalists have 
overcome challenges associated with covering events in Syria when it has been 
impossible to access the country safely. The findings show that journalists often 
relied on content from eyewitnesses and activists. However, it is also important to 
highlight that this research has been undertaken as the situation in Syria has 
continued to evolve. What started out with protests in 2011 became a fragmented and 
bloody civil war, and is now not only a complex conflict involving jihadist groups, 
ethnic fighters and Syrian and Kurdish armies, but also an international crisis 
affecting neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. It has, in turn, 
become a geo-political battle involving diplomatic efforts from the UK, US and 
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Russia, with foreign powers also carrying out airstrikes in Syria and arming rebel 
groups. Keeping abreast of these developments is certainly challenging from both a 
journalistic perspective and that of a researcher.  
Researching this thesis meant trying to chart what is an ongoing conflict both 
in the Middle East and on the global stage, alongside the associated journalistic 
developments, and this has also been demanding. As with many wars, there have 
been varying developments on the ground, but the media’s responses to these events 
have also changed throughout the lifetime of the conflict. Aspects of reporting about 
Syria which were hugely important four years ago may seem less relevant when 
compared to events happening at the time of writing.  
For example, the long term use of UGC, arguably seen as a game changer in 
international newsrooms in 2011, has now in many respects been accepted as a 
source of content to illustrate events in hard to reach places, with certain caveats. The 
findings illustrated here are based on a content analysis from 2011 to 2014 and 
changes in journalistic practices which are documented up to 2015. The thesis also 
depicts changes in the offerings made available by the BBC during this time period – 
with a greater focus on mobile, social and digital platforms and content than there 
had been in the past.  With the crisis ongoing, there will undoubtedly be other 
diplomatic developments and military responses and, in turn, journalistic practices 
will most likely continue to evolve. This thesis picks out the most relevant findings 
from what has been a period of great unrest for the people of Syria, as well as those 
covering events happening in the country. However, as this remains a conflict in 
motion, it is impossible to say that there will not be further changes to the media 
landscape and that these are concrete findings for the future. That is not to say that 
the research topic has not yielded important conclusions, which will continue to be 
relevant to both academics and media practitioners alike beyond the research period. 
Socio-political history of Syria 
When Bashar al-Assad took power after the death of his father in 2000, it was 
hoped that this would change the way the country was run - including its dealings 
with the press and media - as he was viewed as a reformist with modern ideas. 
Traditionally, Syria’s government had ruled over the media with an iron fist in terms 
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of control over ownership and regulation (Salama 2012). Emergency laws which 
control published content, from surveys to books and advertising, had been in place 
for the best part of 50 years. President Assad did initially come across as being in 
favour of modernisation when he sanctioned the release of hundreds of political 
prisoners and allowed dissidents to speak openly, as well as easing media 
restrictions. As a former member of organisations such as the Syria Computer 
Society, President Assad initially seemed keen to bring the country into the modern 
age. The internet was introduced in Syria in 2000 and, though mainly used by young 
people for gaming and web surfing, political discussion by political groups were 
generally tolerated, as were gatherings which saw these group meetings in person.  
However, within the first year of Assad being in power, this initial progress - 
referred to now as the ‘Damascus Spring’ - had stopped. It is argued that the 
government chose the position of ‘liberalised authoritarianism’, giving the 
impression of freedom while retaining overall control (BBC 2015g). The Press Law, 
introduced in 2001, was aimed at printed media such as newspapers, magazines and 
other periodicals. It banned writing on a wide variety of topics, including reports that 
touch on what authorities consider to be “national security” or “national unity” 
(Freedom House 2007, 2012). 
While the internet was somewhat restricted from 2003 as a result of the Iraq 
war and fears over cyber security, there has now been a large uptake in the use of the 
internet in Syria – a massive 4,900 percent increase in seven years, compared to the 
global growth rate of 249 percent (OpenNet 2009). There are now an estimated 4.5 
million internet users in Syria and 67,235 broadband users (MVF 2015).  Syria’s 
youth has come to experience the wider virtual public space afforded by the internet 
and its social media websites and seem eager to transfer the freedoms of cyberspace 
to the real political sphere (Kilo 2011). While it could be argued that Syria saw an 
internet ‘boom’, the extent of mobile phone use in Syria is considered relatively low, 
at 50% in 2011 (MVF 2015). Only two telecoms companies (Syria MTN and 
Syriatel) currently operate in the country. However, as phones have increasingly 
been used to capture, upload and send video and other content since the start of the 
uprisings, this suggests usage, particularly of 3G services, is on the up. This, 
however, has had a knock on effect, with the government being accused of switching 
off 3G networks and blocking websites such as Facebook and YouTube from mobile 
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and broadband users during the conflict. In fact, Facebook and other social media 
sites were blocked for several years in Syria and only made ‘legal’ in early 2011, 
though people did use proxy servers to get around this problem (Starr 2012).  
Response to the protests 
Following a month of protests triggered by the Der’aa killings, President 
Assad announced in April 2011 that he was lifting the 1963 Emergency Law; he 
declared that there would be new legislation to dilute the monopoly of the Baath 
party in the political system, a new modern press and media law, and a law which 
would regulate demonstrations, whereby protesters would be protected by police. 
Outside observers have described these as conciliatory measures (Salama 2012). In 
August 2011, a new law was approved which aimed to stop ‘any monopoly in the 
media sector’ and urged responsible freedom of expression, yet failed to further 
clarify what was ‘reasonable’. The new legislation stated that an attack on a 
journalist would be treated as an attack on a Syrian government official, yet citizen 
journalists and foreign media have died during the uprising, reportedly at the hands 
of the regime, making this law “ridiculous and schizophrenic...borders on the absurd” 
(Reporters without Borders 2011). 
The new law also contained several anti-press clauses, including barring the 
media from publishing content that affects ‘national unity and national security,’ or 
inciting sectarian strife or hate crimes. Again, it has been argued that there are no 
clear examples of such content. It also forbids the publication of any information 
about the armed forces and holds editors in chief, journalists and spokespeople 
accountable for such content, meaning they could face prison or fines of up to one 
million Syrian pounds ($21,000). Despite these measures and the fact the media 
landscape in Syria is now varied, some state owned or privately owned pro-
government outlets run as they always did. The unrest, however, has sparked a large 
number of different publications and opposition outlets across many platforms, so 
varied that in modern Syria “it is difficult to speak of a single media environment” 
(BBC Monitoring 2014:1). The following section seeks to give a brief guide to the 
media operation in Syria, at a time when the country is considered one of the most 
18 
 
 
dangerous places in the world to be a journalist (Committee to Protect Journalists 
2015). 
Media in Syria in context 
Though Syria still has one of the most regulated internet and telecoms 
sectors in the Middle East, demonstrators could take shaky footage on 
camera phones, once an expensive gimmick but now cheap and 
ubiquitous, and upload it for free onto video sharing sites. 
(Noueihed and Warren 2012:45) 
While the Syrian government said that it wanted to have a free and 
independent media in 2006, contracts to operate newspapers were awarded to 
companies run by those connected to the regime. For example, Baladna Arabic and 
Baladna English editions were owned by the United Group, run by Majed Souliman, 
whose father was Syria’s Head of Internal Security in the early 2000s (Starr 2012). 
Syrian state television is considered to be the mouthpiece of the government and the 
Arabic newspaper Tishreen is also state-run. Following the uprisings in 2011, many 
legacy news publications closed. Some were axed due to lack of revenue; others 
came under pressure to report certain angles and were seen as either too soft or ‘part 
of the opposition’, such as Forward magazine. (Starr 2012). 
In 2015 there are a variety of different outlets, from the state owned 
newspapers and broadcasters to the private sector - which is generally pro 
government - as well as a new media environment, which sees rebel-run FM radio 
stations, weekly newspapers and websites used to disseminate information. 
Television remains the most popular medium in Syria, with more than 20 Syrian TV 
channels in the country and abroad, and some of these are now private channels with 
an opposition voice, such as Orient News, Suriya ah-Ghad TV and Dayr-al-Zur TV 
(BBC Monitoring 2014). Much opposition content is also broadcast by radio – there 
are at least 12 stations broadcasting in areas considered to be ‘rebel-held’. These 
stations are available via the FM frequency and via mobile apps, while some are 
broadcast from abroad, allowing opposition groups to disseminate information and 
present their interpretation of events outside of the conflict zone. 
The BBC Monitoring report into the Syrian media environment was last 
updated in 2014. It outlines that within Syria there are now three main papers: Al-
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Ba’ath, which is the Ba’ath party publication, Al’Thawarah, a government paper 
which translates as ‘The Revolution’, and the aforementioned Tishreen. In addition, 
there are now a number of websites and weekly handouts created by those in 
opposition, but the risks to journalists in distributing or writing such material is 
considered high, therefore there are few solid circulation figures. BBC Monitoring 
outlines, however, that Tilina Alhurriya is printed once a fortnight and has a print run 
of several thousand. The outlet is affiliated to the ‘Local Co-ordinating Committees’ 
(LCCs), media action teams that are run in each major town and city in Syria, with 
the aim planning and organising events on the ground within their own communities. 
In 2015 there were 14 LCC’s across the country. In addition, Syria Hurriayt -which 
was Syria’s first opposition paper - had a website with an English section until it 
ceased publication in May 2013, and Inab Biladi (www.enab-baladi.org) is a weekly 
Sunday newspaper published since 2011 from Darayya town, south of Damascus, by 
local activists (BBC Monitoring 2014).  
While publicising content opposing the Syrian government can carry great 
risk, the crackdown on journalists is not a new phenomenon. Eight journalists and 
‘cyber-dissidents’ were imprisoned in 2006 and dozens of people who had spoken 
out or were suspected of opposition to the government were detained. This shows 
that legislative crackdowns are not simply the result of the recent protests in the 
country. However, the rise of violence in the country has led to a further tightening 
of laws and scores more journalists have been captured and held. Therefore - based 
on reports from BBC Monitoring and the Committee to Protect Journalists, which 
rates Syria as the number three on its Global Impunity Index - it seems that, despite 
announcements of changes in the law to make the media more accessible, the reality 
is that the Syrian government has not changed its approach. Testimonies suggest that 
the government still wishes to control media coverage, both from its own media and 
from non-state media, citizen and foreign journalists, with many being arrested 
should they speak out (Committee to Protect Journalists 2015). 
Newspaper and radio are important for the opposition voice, but Syrian 
activists have also harnessed social media to criticise the regime and rally protesters 
(Noueihed 2012). Since the first protests in 2011, the opposition has become heavily 
reliant on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and video-sharing sites 
such as YouTube, as a way to put across the variety of different viewpoints. BBC 
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Monitoring’s 2014 guide speaks of a new “virtual ownership” of the media, thanks to 
Syrians’ access to these platforms (2014:6). Some of the most widely distributed 
content is seen online, despite internet penetration in Syria being just 22.5% of the 
population in June 2012 (BBC Monitoring 2014:30). Opposition outlets such as 
Shaam News Network, Ugarit and the Shabha news agency run YouTube accounts, 
their own websites and usually Facebook pages, ensuring that all their moderated 
content can be seen on any platform. 
There continues to be much debate about whether there has been a ‘Twitter 
Revolution’. Sullivan (2009) argues that the moment came in Iran in 2009, following 
the elections; Morozov (2012) strongly disputes this, putting forward that we are 
blinded by ‘cyber utopianism’, and that the crackdown by various regimes and 
monitoring of activists suggests that the usage of the internet does not always bring 
freedom. While this discussion is ongoing, what is clear is that protest movements 
seen elsewhere in the Middle East quickly took hold in Syria, not long after the 
initial ‘Arab Spring’ and, while the internet didn’t necessarily create the uprisings, it 
was certainly a way of articulating what was happening. 
2011 onwards: humanitarian cost 
As the situation has continued to degenerate, increasing numbers have 
also been killed by anti-government armed groups, and there has been a 
proliferation of serious crimes including war crimes, and – most probably 
– crimes against humanity, by both sides. Cities, towns and villages have 
been, and are continuing to be, devastated by aerial attacks, shelling, tank 
fire, bomb attacks and street-to-street fighting                                
(UNHCR 2013:online) 
Protests on the streets and virtual dissent during 2011 coincided with the rise 
of rebel forces against Assad’s regime, and later led to the formation of the 
opposition in exile, which the UN now recognises in the form of the Syria National 
Council (SNC). However, the SNC have no official presence in Syria. While other 
leaders caught up in the Arab uprisings were willing to change laws or to step down 
eventually, President Assad has made it clear that he plans to remain in power, 
leading to fighting.  The conflict in Syria is ongoing and at present President Assad 
remains in power. He rarely speaks out, but in an interview with the BBC’s Jeremy 
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Bowen he would not be drawn on claims he has used barrel bombs as well as other 
tactics to kill his own people (Bowen 2015).  
  Bloody violence in the country from both sides has led to more than 250,000 
deaths and over a million people injured (OCHA 2015), with Syria engaged in a civil 
war. More than 11 million of the Syrian population have been forced from their 
homes. The uprising and subsequent war have also had a major impact on Syria’s 
neighbours, where tensions are growing. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are now 
hosting refugee camps. 4.1 million Syrians had fled abroad as of September 2015, 
according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA 2015). Within Lebanon alone, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there will be at least 1.8 million 
registered Syrian refugees by December 2015 (UNHCR 2015). The UNHCR has 
now called for a display of international solidarity and support for Lebanon, which 
has received more Syrian refugees than any other country in the world. Within Syria 
itself, more than 7.6 million people are displaced, risking torture or death at the 
hands of government forces or jihadists; some communities have been specifically 
targeted because of their religion, sect or background (Human Rights Council 2015). 
There are 12.2 million people inside the country in need of humanitarian assistance 
as the conflict continues into a fifth year, yet these harrowing numbers do not take 
into consideration the number of Syrians risking their lives trying to get to Europe, 
nor those who are not registered as refugees and lack documentation (UNHCR 
2015).  
With no end in sight, the Syrian conflict has continued to intensify. 
Civilians, Syrians of all backgrounds, have been the subject of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, as well as other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and gross violations of their human rights. 
These transgressions are massive in extent and scope…Civilians are 
suffering the unimaginable, as the world stands witness. 
(Human Rights Council 2015:1) 
Currently, in 2015, reports of sectarian violence and testimonies from those 
smuggled out of the country suggest that the humanitarian cost of this conflict is far 
greater than anything else the Middle East has seen in recent times. Only by 
verifying what social media and citizen journalists on the ground tell us or show us 
via UGC can we hope to fully understand what is happening in Syria.  
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Rise of Islamic State  
There are thought to be more than 1,000 different armed opposition groups 
operating across Syria (BBC 2013b) and some of these groups have formed alliances. 
For example, more than 30 groups - including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) - now 
operate under the Supreme Military Council, while the Syrian Islamic Liberation 
Front (SILF) is a loose alliance which was formed in September 2012 between 
around 20 rebel groups (BBC 2013b). Other groups have become fragmented and 
broken off from their original organisations. For example, Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-
Sham and the Kurdish Islamic Front have come together under the umbrella of 
Islamic Front. This particular group does not include the likes of the Al-Nusra Front 
of Islamic State, which was established as part of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a 
militant umbrella group that includes al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (BBC 2013b).  
However, they are all jihadist groups and have close links and common origins.  
Violence and fighting which began in Syria is now spilling over the border 
into Iraq in the form of bomb attacks, killings and torture by jihadists from Islamic 
State, which now claims a caliphate across a wider region of both countries. 
Although it was established in the early 2000s, the group in its current form first 
came to light in April 2013, when the head of the ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
announced that his group and Al-Nusra would merge, creating the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), also known as Islamic State (IS). This move, however, 
was rejected by Al-Nusra's leader, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, who promised 
allegiance to al-Qaeda's overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri (BBC 2015b). Since then, 
Al-Nusra and IS have operated as separate entities but both are considered to be 
foreign terrorist organisations (US Department of State 2015). 
As well as fighting against Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian Army, many of 
the opposition and rebel/terrorist groups detailed here have ended up fighting each 
other when they have not shared a similar agenda. For example, in 2013, members of 
the Islamic State killed a prominent member of Ahrār ash-Shām and have clashed 
with those from Ahfad al-Rasoul in Raqqa, where Islamic State has a major 
stronghold. These tensions between some rebel groups have resulted in ethnic and 
sectarian conflict, with Islamic State targeting Shia and Alawite civilians in 
particular, although across the country all civilians are in danger (BBC 2013b). 
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Noueihed and Warren (2012) suggested the evolving and escalating situation 
with opposition groups as one reason why - other than sending observers in, as it did 
in 2012 and 2013 after the alleged chemical attacks in Ghouta - the UN may have 
been keen to avoid intervention in the country, “particularly given what had 
happened in Iraq and Lebanon” (Noueihed and Warren 2012:235). 
The Kurdish and Syrian forces, once fighting the FSA and opposition groups, 
are now fighting Islamic State. Islamic State is a terrorist organisation which - unlike 
other rebel groups, including jihadist affiliations - is well organised and well-funded. 
It has a slick social media strategy, using techniques from gaming, Hollywood films 
and mainstream news channels to illustrate their videos, with the aim of attracting 
young radicalised people from the western world to join them (see Veilleux-Lepage 
2014, Rose 2014). Among its digital tactics, Islamic State uses quick updates on 
Twitter, offering posts and imagery well as targeted hashtags, aiming to radicalize 
and spread its message. Berger (2014) outlines that Islamic State’s approach to social 
media is sophisticated and differs greatly from the previous digital endeavors used by 
radical groups. Islamic State has also developed an Arabic language app called 
‘Dawn of Glad Tidings’, which subscribers register with in order to get updates 
about advances made by the group. The app is based on having active users in its 
audience rather than passive consumers (Ryan 2014), and posting activity tends to 
increase during offensives, such as the 2014 battle for Baghdad.  
 Video footage by Islamic State itself is now being used by media outlets, 
whether it be to depict the violence they spread or to showcase their control in 
particular areas of Syria (see Sommerville 2015). While this thesis does not seek to 
explore the specific use of extremist footage in news reporting, an understanding of 
the socio-political situation and the presence of such an organisation within Syria and 
Iraq is important, given the risks journalists are taking in reporting their content and 
Islamic State’s own way of using social media as a place to publicise its activities.   
As well as violence involving fragmented groups within Syria, the diplomatic 
situation and military offensive from outside sources remain a concern. In September 
2015, Russian and US forces participated in airstrikes across Syria. There were, at 
this time, allegations from the US that Russia’s forces were aiming for rebel groups 
and not necessarily striking Islamic State targets (BBC 2015d).  
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Given the current situation, it is also evident that until the regime falls, or 
there is a course of action from the international community in tackling Islamic State, 
there will be major restrictions on the movements of journalists in and out of Syria. 
In turn, those who try to disseminate news of unrest from within the country to the 
rest of the world will be risking the lives while doing so. Certainly, the humanitarian 
cost of this conflict is far greater than anything else the Middle East has seen in 
recent times. There has also been a cost to journalism, in terms of many missing and 
dead journalists. Therefore, other than international journalists taking major risks to 
get into Syria, the only way for news organisations to understand what is happening 
in the country is to rely on what social media and citizen journalists on the ground 
tell them. This also poses editorial risks, as some content may be fed by those 
wishing to publicise a certain angle or agenda in relation to the conflict. This raises 
issues of balance, which will be discussed. Those who engage in eyewitness 
reporting, including activists, operate under constant threat and fear for their safety 
(Human Rights Council 2015). 
Understanding UGC at the BBC 
One of the first instances in which the BBC was forced to rely on UGC or 
content which was the product of ‘citizen journalism’ (Allan and Thorsen 2009, 
2014) was on Boxing Day December 2004, when a tsunami hit many countries in 
South East Asia. Correspondents were unable to get to the site and instead mainly 
used eyewitness testimony to cover the event. This, in some cases, included footage 
captured by holidaymakers on their cameras and mobile phones as the tsunami took 
hold. As Allan and Thorsen (2009) outline, this scenario saw journalists travelling to 
airports, not to go out and engage in parachute journalism, but to collect eyewitness 
footage from holidaymakers who had been caught up in the disaster and were flying 
home. 
Partly in response to this, BBC News set up a small team within the 
Interactive online division to look at ways to process audience content. This was 
tested just six months later with the 7/7 bombings in London. The BBC’s reaction to 
those events has arguably shaped the way the corporation has dealt with content 
found across social media ever since. From this small pilot grew the BBC UGC Hub.  
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Facebook and Twitter were yet to be launched to the public, so at the Hub the focus 
was on getting content from audiences rather than looking to third party providers, as 
well as moderating comments placed on online news stories.  In terms of using third 
party providers as a PR tool, at this stage BBC content was usually only published on 
the BBC news website rather than being placed anywhere else. Fast forward to 2015 
and the BBC has a major social media presence across Twitter, Facebook, Instagram 
and the video sharing website YouTube. These sites are used as places to disseminate 
news content in tandem with making it available on TV, radio, online and via the 
BBC News app, which provides news alerts on smartphones. A more detailed outline 
of the development and remit of the UGC Hub and the processes involved in 
checking the accuracy of UGC will follow in the Literature Review (Chapter 1) and 
the results chapters, (Chapters 4 and 5), but this brief overview seeks to give a sense 
of the speed at which the environment in which journalists using UGC and social 
media has evolved. 
Justification for this research 
The conflict in Syria has resulted in media organisations such as the BBC 
relying on the eyewitnesses as the news-gatherers while reporting on a country where 
they have had no official presence since 2011. I believe the situation in Syria in 2015 
remains unique and is a warranted research topic. My own experience as a media 
practitioner working within BBC World News also suggests that, throughout the 
research period, there was an increased reliance on social media content and UGC 
from activists and eyewitnesses as a source of information and footage related to 
events in Syria.  A study of how content made available by those previously 
considered as passive consumers of media content is also a useful measure of the 
dramatic changes and challenges in the ever evolving world of journalism. 
There has been some examination of content from social media sites and 
audience-captured content being used by news outlets to cover the Arab uprisings 
(Harkin et al 2012, Aday et al 2013, Hänska-Ahy 2014). The footage, however, has 
generally been used in addition to traditional news-gathering techniques by 
journalists (Van Leuven et al 2014). Indeed, when carrying out research into the 
relationship between producers and the audience at BBC Persian and Arabic, 
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Hänska-Ahy and Shapour acknowledged there was “somewhat of an empirical and 
theoretical blindspot” (2012:3). Claire Wardle, who has authored a number of reports 
about the BBC’s use of UGC herself, acknowledges the limitations of her initial 
research, stating that by the time the 2008 study was published the findings were, to a 
certain extent, already outdated (Wardle and Williams 2008). 
Wardle’s newer pieces of collaborative research (Wardle et al 2014) are 
based on content analyses, but unlike this research do they not have the benefit of the 
insider perspective and access to internal documents - fuller details of which are 
explained within the Methodology chapter. This examination of the importance of 
UGC for TV news and UGC’s impact on journalistic practice uses mixed methods, 
with good access to BBC archives, and shines a light on how newsgathering is 
undertaken in the 21st century at the world’s biggest newsgathering organisation. An 
assessment of how journalistic practices and coping strategies have evolved could 
have implications for how broadcast news and UGC are approached by media outlets 
in the future. On an organisational level, the findings could help inform the 
development of policies on the use of social media and UGC in the news at the BBC 
in the future. 
The research goals of this thesis have been to understand and examine how 
reliant BBC News has been on UGC in its reports and how the processes for getting 
it ‘on air’ - including liaising with content creators - have changed newsroom roles 
and practices. For the BBC, these changes have come about while attempting to 
maintain accuracy, with trust being one of the BBC’s core values. The findings also 
highlight the major issue of failures to give warnings or make caveats about the use 
of UGC, a concern which is echoed in Edward Mortimer’s findings in the BBC Trust 
Report on the impartiality of the BBC's coverage of the Arab Uprisings (2012). 
While Mortimer found that the BBC’s coverage of events in the Middle East was 
“remarkable given the challenges involved and was generally impartial” (2012:6), he 
also highlighted the need to make caveats or advisories to the audience about social 
media content used in broadcasts, particularly in Syria, given the lack of presence in 
the country. This research, too, suggests that the process for verifying such content 
could be better explained to audiences. An examination of the importance of UGC 
for TV news and an assessment of how it can impact on news-gathering could have 
far reaching implications for how broadcast news is approached in the future.  
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This Introduction has sought to give an overview of the main objectives of 
the thesis and the data collection methods used to carry out the research. The thesis 
focuses on the use of UGC in TV news reports and the changing journalistic 
practices of journalists working with and processing this content. This chapter has 
situated the research questions in the wider context in relation to changes within 
news reporting, geo-political developments in Syria and the threats to security across 
the Middle East. Situated within the field of production studies and newsroom 
ethnography, this research aims to provide recommendations for future strategy 
related to UGC and social media newsgathering, and for further research in a field 
where news consumption and use of different social media platforms to disseminate 
content are continually evolving. To understand the current position, however, it is 
important to outline the developments related to using UGC and the roles of 
journalists working with this content across the industry. This and other themes will 
be addressed in the following chapter, the Literature Review.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
This chapter outlines some of the main literature linking this thesis to the 
wider world of academic research. It aims to give the reader an overview of the 
research field as it relates to this study, taking in key works from journalism, 
sociology and media and communications studies. While there will be additional 
literature published about the research topics of UGC, production studies and 
journalism routines which have not been included here, this chapter looks to give an 
insight into what is already known about the topics and, moreover, how this thesis 
fills any current literature gaps. 
The first section outlines key literature relating to the BBC and other media 
outlets, expanding on what has been detailed in the Introduction in relation to the use 
of social media and UGC at the BBC, together with developments since the UGC 
Hub was first formally established in 2005. It considers literature pertaining to 
journalism roles and routines and the challenges faced by news production staff as 
they undertake their work. The second section explores literature relating to the 
broadcasting of the events which took place across the Middle East in 2011. This 
thesis refers to these events as ‘Arab uprisings’, though they are also commonly 
known as ‘the Arab Spring’. This section considers the ongoing conflict in Syria in 
particular. It also looks at important works relating to the BBC and the Arab 
uprisings, drawing on content analyses as well as qualitative studies. 
The final section discusses the concepts and terminologies used in studies 
relevant to this thesis, analysing what is written about the concepts of citizen 
journalism, UGC and networked journalism, among others, before outlining which 
terms have been used in this research and the justification for this. 
 
Section 1: Life at the BBC 
BBC guidelines state that any non-professional content submitted to the BBC 
should be verified before it is put to air (BBC 2014f). That job rests with a team 
within the BBC newsroom known as the UGC Hub. The Hub harvests content posted 
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online and processes text, videos and photographs submitted to the BBC from 
audience members. The staff also have a role in moderating comments on BBC 
stories posted online, and finding voices to go ‘on air’ relating to specific news 
stories, which are selected on a daily basis. As was detailed in the Introduction, this 
division of the newsroom was initially set up as a pilot project after the Boxing Day 
tsunami in 2004, as part of the Interactive division (see Belair-Gagnon 2015). The 
Hub arguably had its watershed moment in 2005 when the 7/7 bombings took place 
in London. Media correspondent Torin Douglas proposed this moment marked the 
“first time such material had been deemed more newsworthy than the professionals” 
(Douglas 2006:online). While the point about content being “more newsworthy” may 
be debatable, the 2005 attacks were different from previous events in a number of 
ways. While there have been many occasions when eyewitness footage has been used 
as part of news reporting, frequently this has been in tandem with professional 
newsgathering.  Due to the physical constraints of actually getting to the bomb sites 
across London, filming by BBC crews was severely restricted and, by contrast, the 
volume of UGC coming into the BBC was immense. Within six hours of the attack 
the BBC had received more than 1,000 photographs, 20 videos, 4,000 SMS and 
20,000 e-mails (Sambrook 2005).  The following night a package featuring only 
audience material was aired on the BBC’s evening news bulletin, marking the start of 
a collaboration with the audience. There has been an increased interest in researching 
content from non-traditional sources since then, echoing Gillmor’s prediction that 
journalists’ relationships with the audience would evolve to become more like a 
conversation (Gillmor 2006).  
As the UK’s national broadcaster, and with a global presence across all 
platforms, it is not surprising that the BBC has been the subject of much scholarly 
research. A great deal has been written about the BBC’s use of UGC, but this has 
often related to its online platform and blogs (Barkho 2011, 2007, Fornaciari 2012, 
Hermida and Thurman 2008). Considerably less study has been carried out in 
relation to how UGC is used by television news. 
Since 2005 the Hub has significantly expanded. In 2013 it employed 29 staff, 
although this number has changed as parts of the newsroom have moved and 
evolved. For example, since July 2015 staff from the UGC Hub have been embedded 
with the World News TV team and BBC News Channel. While its original focus was 
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to moderate online content, the scope of the Hub’s remit has also changed and the 
Hub itself has become further integrated into the newsgathering process (Harrison 
2010).  New BBC guidelines introduced in 2011 included advice on working with 
UGC and social media platforms for the first time, suggesting the BBC understands 
that the media ecology it is operating in is evolving and that it must adapt to succeed 
(Bakhurst 2011). This next section outlines what research has been undertaken in 
relation to the BBC and UGC, taking into consideration how this content is 
processed and perceived. 
UGC at the BBC 
Arguably the most comprehensive study of UGC in relation to the BBC is 
Wardle and Williams’ 2008 work, ‘ugc@thebbc’.  The research used mixed methods 
including 115 BBC staff interviews, participant observation and content analyses 
across radio, TV and online platforms, as well as audience studies to understand how 
UGC was used by the BBC and their journalists and how audiences perceived it 
(Wardle and Williams 2008). The study covered all elements of UGC, and the 
authors broke these down into different types of ‘Audience Material’, highlighting 
that “the complexities are sometimes lost because of the reliance of the catch-all term 
‘UGC” (2008:10). They categorised the material using the following typology: The 
category of Audience Content incorporated the sub-categories of Audience Footage, 
Audience Experiences and Audience Stories (Wardle and Williams 2008:11). 
Audience Footage referred to photographs and videos which were relevant to 
breaking news, Audience Experiences included case studies and contributions in 
relation to news stories, and Audience Stories included information or ‘tip offs’ 
about certain stories that either the BBC was not aware of, or were not previously on 
the news agenda. The category of Audience Content and the associated sub-
categories are of particular interest as these are elements which will be measured in 
this research project using content analysis. 
The other types of Audience Material included Audience Comments, such as 
those added at the end of stories on the BBC website, or comments made in response 
to a ‘call to action’ on the website or from a presenter or programme. An example of 
a call to action would be a request for contributions to a ‘Have Your Say’ debate on 
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radio or on TV. Other categories included those that involved a greater level of 
interaction with the public, such as Collaborative Content. The Video Nations 
project, which saw BBC journalists provide training to the audience who then 
produced an end product, would be an example of this. ‘Networked Journalism’ was 
classified as another type of material, and related to collaboration with the audience 
to improve programmes. However, Wardle and Williams said this category was 
included mainly because it was “used by senior executives to describe initiatives at 
the BBC which explicitly attempt to tap into expert communities within the 
audience” (2008:11). Network journalism as a concept itself, arguably coined by Jeff 
Jarvis (2006), will be discussed later. The final category was Non-News content, 
which included a whole range of non-journalistic content. This ranged from the 
‘snow pictures’ which were sent in by the audience and uploaded as a gallery on 
BBC online, to recommendations for a particular town’s facilities which would 
feature on a local BBC website.  
Wardle followed up the 2008 research in 2014 with an industry-wide project 
looking at how UGC was used by global news organisations. The aim of the project 
was to “provide the first comprehensive report about the use of user-generated 
content (UGC) among broadcast news channels…to understand how much UGC is 
used on air and online by those channels” (Wardle et al 2014:1). This study into 
broadcasters’ use of UGC spanned eight 24-hour news channels and looked at TV 
and online coverage. The first stage of the work, a content analysis, highlighted red 
flags in terms of the absence of credited UGC; only 16 percent of UGC included in 
the study had actively been given a credit by the newsrooms. The researchers found 
this was an industry-wide issue, though some broadcasters could be considered 
worse offenders than others: “Fifty-three percent of the content broadcast by CNN 
International was credited, compared with 15 percent by euronews, and 1 percent of 
Al Jazeera English’s content” (Wardle et al 2014:80). The results showed BBC 
World only credited 9% of UGC used in its TV broadcasts – compared to 49% used 
online. The authors called for an improvement in crediting practices, warning “it will 
not be long before an uploader takes a news organisation to court for using content 
without permission or for failing to attribute due credit” (Wardle et al 2014:3). 
In terms of usage, the study found that UGC was used by newsrooms every 
day. In many cases this enabled journalists to cover stories which could not 
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otherwise be told. That said, UGC was usually only used when other images were 
not available; for example, in the initial period after a breaking news event, or when 
access was restricted to the area where events were happening, as continues to be the 
case in Syria. The research also found failings across the board in terms of telling the 
audience when UGC was included in broadcasts and methods of labelling varied. 
This finding was separate to that of crediting those who had captured the footage. 
The authors called for an improvement in both these practices (Wardle et al 2014). 
Journalistic roles 
Measuring how journalistic roles have changed as UGC has been 
incorporated into newsroom work, and newsroom attitudes to this content, are 
explored by a number of studies (Belair-Gagnon 2015, Wardle and Williams 2008, 
Williams 2010, Harrison 2010). While it is clear new technology has affected the 
pace and ease of accessing news material, leading to a vast increase in the amount of 
content submitted to the BBC, the general consensus was that UGC itself had not 
“changed the reliance on traditional journalism practices” (Wardle 2008:22). In fact, 
most journalists involved in Wardle and William’s research considered UGC as “no 
more than grist to the editorial mill, another source of raw material among many to 
be processed by them into journalistic news output” (2008:42).  
A study by Valerie Belair-Gagnon (2015) focused on the way that the BBC 
used social media in its crisis reporting and how this reportage informed journalistic 
practices and norms in crisis reporting. Fieldwork for this research involved 
observations and interviews with 50 BBC staff in 2011. Examples of crisis reporting 
from 2005 to 2011, including the death of Osama Bin Laden, the Saffron revolution 
in Myanmar and Iran election protests in 2009, served as illustrative tools to depict 
changing journalistic practices. Results indicated the “emergence of new structures 
within the newsroom and the new generation of tech-savvy journalists defining social 
media in BBC journalism” (Belair-Gagnon 2015:6). The data collection took place 
before BBC divisions moved from Television Centre and other locations to work 
together at New Broadcasting House in Central London, and this move has altered 
some of those aforementioned structures. It is hoped this research project can build 
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on the findings of Belair-Gagnon’s work, though Belair-Gagnon herself notes that 
the Syria conflict is of as much interest now as it was during her fieldwork in 2011. 
Working with UGC is not without its pitfalls, not least because of the large 
volume of content which comes in to the BBC every day which members of the UGC 
Hub then have to check and moderate. Indeed, former Global News director Peter 
Horrocks admitted that while there was a lot of ‘chaff’ for the staff to wade through, 
it was often worth it to get the few ‘gold nuggets’ of information that could lead 
BBC journalists to cover a new story, or investigate a new slant on an existing one 
(Horrocks 2008). For some staff, however, there were concerns that they were 
moderating content and little else, and senior BBC managers also warned of the risk 
of treating content, particularly audience comment, as representative of the whole 
audience. By contrast, Harrison’s participant observations found that UGC was 
“being absorbed into established newsroom routines” (2010: 244), and this happened 
without it having an impact on news selection by BBC journalists. 
In terms of journalistic practice, Belair Gagnon’s research also looked at the 
structures and staffing within BBC News, and highlighted the benefits gained from 
the “centralisation of social media in the UGC Hub” (2015:91). The research also 
looked at the ways in which day-to-day journalistic roles had changed and found that 
in terms of checking and using social media, “sets of questions asked in lateral and 
technical checks are specific to social media uses…these practices are not new, what 
is new is the combination of those practices in social media contexts” (2015:40). 
Overall Belair-Gagnon concluded that BBC journalists used social media in two 
ways: firstly, as a newsgathering tool, and then also as a means for audiences to 
participate in news production. 
Other studies suggest that in the years since the UGC Hub was established the 
BBC has “wholeheartedly embraced” this type of content (Williams 2010:4). 
Williams drew on newsroom ethnographies from the 1960s and 1970s to illustrate 
the importance of institutional practices, concluding that “audience material is firmly 
embedded within the long standing routines of traditional journalism practice” 
(2010:85). However, similarly to the theories of Tuchman (1978) and Gans (1980), 
Williams also stated that he found journalists retained a sense of autonomy when 
selecting the news, so even if they did incorporate audience content it would be the 
content they selected themselves on merit. In summary, while audience content was 
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important, in terms of news production “journalists have remained journalists and 
audiences are still audiences” (Williams 2010:96). Drawing on the literature outlined 
here, final decisions still appear to be made by the editor in a 21st century newsroom. 
However, the literature also suggests that certain ways of working with outside 
content are likely to change, and indeed have done since 2005.  The research being 
undertaken as part of this thesis starts from the position that journalists’ goalposts 
have moved, and “the journalist’s role as gatekeeper will be eroded by some forms of 
audience material” (Wardle and Williams 2008:43). Harrison also came to a similar 
conclusion after her 2010 research findings suggested that gatekeeping barriers 
within the BBC had evolved, allowing UGC to spark new stories. Harrison was 
cautious not to overstate UGC’s impact on gatekeeping practices, however, as this 
content was usually very heavily moderated to stay in line with the BBC values of 
trust, accuracy and impartiality (Harrison 2010). Similarly, at times in her research, 
Belair-Gagnon pointed to “increasing ‘collaboration’ between journalists and 
‘ordinary’ citizen witnessing in news production” (2015:46.) However, in her 
concluding remarks about media logic in the period after the 7/7 attacks in London, 
she acknowledged that journalists remained gatekeepers, although, as Harrison 
highlighted, there has to be more transparency in terms of accuracy and impartiality. 
A fuller discussion and reference to literature related to the theory of gatekeeping 
follows in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2). 
Having consulted representative literature on the subject, it is clear that there 
is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to UGC. This is further demonstrated in the 
different ways this content has been categorised by those studying it and how it is 
used by the BBC. Harrison devised four categories of UGC, taking into consideration 
how news producers related to the audience: 
 
1. UGC as a form of unsolicited news story 
2. UGC as a form of solicited content for specific extant news stories 
3. UGC as a form of expeditious content for specific items and features 
4. UGC as a form of audience watchdog content 
Harrison (2010:244) 
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Harrison decided on these classifications of UGC but also related them back 
to her newsroom observations, stating that BBC staff defined UGC as “where the 
audience does it for the BBC”, while citizen journalism was defined as “where the 
audience does it for themselves” (2010:255). Of these ‘types’, UGC as a form of 
unsolicited news story is perhaps the most relevant to this research. Harrison 
believed it encompassed visual material and eyewitness accounts which would be 
submitted to the BBC in a breaking news scenario, “where the audience is pro-active 
and participatory and the BBC and news journalists are reactive” (2010:245). 
However, it could also be argued that Harrison’s second category is relevant as, 
when a story breaks, there are frequently calls to action from BBC journalists and 
requests for content to be sent in. Indeed, over the lifetime of the Arab uprisings, this 
research proposes that the type of content being ‘sent in’ has become less accidental 
and more organised. Also, journalists are more likely to be soliciting and harvesting 
content from online sites than relying on their audience to come to them. Harrison 
also acknowledged other classifications, such as Wardle and Williams’ five different 
types of audience material, which were explored earlier.  This variety only adds to 
the debate about whether there is a need to establish a clearer definition of what 
audience content actually is. The issues surrounding this type of content and how it is 
understood will be discussed later in relation to terminologies used in this research. 
Do Assad’s troops wear trainers? 
As content is increasingly posted to social media sites rather than submitted 
to the BBC directly, it has become even more challenging for journalists to contact 
the content creators and comb through UGC footage to ensure the content is accurate 
and real.  The reality is that, unlike traditional content which is generated by BBC 
staff or received via wire services, journalists cannot always be certain of the origin 
of UGC, and verification is now a major issue for all news outlets, not just 
broadcasters.   
As the role of the UGC Hub has evolved, the way its journalists go about 
verifying content has “become much more forensic in nature” (Murray 2011:online), 
and the BBC introduced social media guidelines in 2011 in a bid to help staff 
understand the steps content should go through before it is transmitted on air (BBC 
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2011a).  However, the events of 2011 referred to as the Arab uprisings were 
unprecedented in terms of the volume and type of content they produced, particularly 
in Syria, where there was no journalistic presence for a considerable period. In this 
respect UGC Hub staff experienced a steep learning curve during the Arab uprisings 
in 2011 and beyond. Alex Murray, a broadcast journalist at the BBC, has 
documented the processes journalists go through in a bid to find out of content is 
what it claims to be (Murray 2011). Searching for the original source of the upload is 
crucial, but Murray and his colleagues working within the UGC Hub readily 
acknowledged that drawing on the expertise within the building, specifically 
colleagues in BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring, to analyse accents and language 
played a massive part in verifying UGC for BBC use. Now anything from the clothes 
people are wearing, to significant buildings, the weather and flowers on the 
landscape are used to deduce whether content is a truthful portrayal of events (see 
Murray 2011, Barot 2014, Browne 2014). One instance which former UGC Hub 
editor Trushar Barot used to highlight this expertise was a video of a man allegedly 
being buried alive (Belam 2013, Turner 2012). This incident was also brought up 
during data collection in this research as an example of where the verification 
process worked effectively. The video allegedly showed Assad’s troops shovelling 
dirt over a man with only his head visible poking out of the ground. The clip stopped 
abruptly after the man’s face was covered. The ‘soldiers’ were wearing trainers, 
which sparked questions about military footwear and whether this was an indication 
the video was not authentic (Turner 2012). In fact, soldiers in the Syrian army often 
wear trainers as army issued boots are notoriously uncomfortable, something a non-
Syrian would not necessarily know. What made the BBC exercise caution were the 
audio levels on the video, which seemed to be the same for the solider as the man 
being buried under dirt in the ground, whereas journalists expected the victim’s audio 
levels to be lower and less clear. Therefore, the BBC did not use the footage (Browne 
2012).  
An interesting development during the lifetime of the uprisings in the Middle 
East, which go beyond the 2011 period usually referred to as the Arab Spring, is that 
the type of UGC submitted to and encountered by the BBC altered. Rather than a 
single long shot it was common to see sequences edited together (Murray 2011, 
Silverman 2014), or for sequences to include signposting such as dates or filming of 
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key landmarks (Hänska-Ahy and Shapour 2012). These changes in practice were 
thought to be an attempt to make the content easier to verify. While this could be an 
example of content creators on the ground becoming more sophisticated and 
recognising the needs of mainstream media outlets, it could also be an indication of 
them trying to push a certain narrative. 
While the BBC has developed a verification process to deal with UGC, there 
is no guarantee that all content will go through the UGC Hub. In fact, certain outlets, 
such as the BBC World News ‘World Have Your Say’ television programme, 
actively sought out contributors and video content which other programmes had not 
used. This can have an impact on what checks and balances are done, and the Arab 
uprisings - as previously mentioned - were considered unprecedented in terms of the 
content coming in versus journalists on the ground who could supply footage. When 
examining BBC Arabic’s and BBC Persian’s approaches to UGC, Hänska-Ahy and 
Shapour found that early in 2009, “nascent verification and processing practices were 
only partially integrated into established routines” (2012:10). In contrast, by 2011, 
staff attitudes towards UGC in these departments had improved. This finding echoes 
those of earlier studies on journalistic roles at the BBC in relation to UGC and the 
verification process (Wardle and Williams 2008, Williams 2010, Harrison 2010). As 
the role of the UGC Hub has altered from monitoring incoming content to harvesting 
footage posted on social media, becoming “semi-conventional newsgathering with a 
Web 2.0 twist” (Turner 2012:10), the risks associated with using this content have 
increased. Mistakes regarding verification have happened, highlighting the 
difficulties for journalists working in a digital age, who are often covering events in 
places they only access through the virtual sphere (see Buttry 2014, Browne 2014).  
For example, in May 2012 the BBC News website illustrated the massacre in 
Houla with a photograph of rows of wrapped-up bodies. The picture had circulated 
on Twitter and the BBC put it online, with the caveat it could not be independently 
verified (Figure 1.1). However, it quickly emerged that the picture was not from the 
Houla massacre, as those who had posted it suggested, but was from Iraq in 2003 
(Furness 2012).  
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(Figure 1.1: Screenshot of BBC News online as featured in Silverman 2012) 
 
The shot was taken by professional photographer Marco Di Lauro, who got in 
touch with the BBC. Following the incident, the BBC’s Social Media editor Chris 
Hamilton admitted, “the extent of the checks and the consideration of whether to 
publish should have been better. It was a mistake - rectified by the removal of the 
image as soon as it was spotted - and we apologise for it” (Hamilton 2012:online).  
The BBC also resolved to tighten its verification process. This incident further 
highlights the risks associated with using the content and the need to be cautious. 
Another more widespread hoax, which highlighted the challenges in finding 
out what was happening in the real world via the virtual world, was the case of the 
blog ‘A Gay Girl In Damascus’. The ‘Gay Girl’ blog was believed to be written by 
Amina Abdallah Araf al Omari, who claimed to be a 35-year-old half American, half 
Syrian lesbian living in Damascus. The blog’s contents were taken up by mainstream 
media as an authentic voice. It was only following a blog post on 6 June 2011, 
purported to be from Amina’s cousin, claiming she had been captured, that doubts 
crept in. Through a “collaborative investigation and verification process facilitated 
by online networks” (Bennett 2011:191), it was later revealed that the blog author 
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was in fact Tim McMaster, a 40-year-old American studying at Edinburgh 
University. The fact that this blog was cited globally and used across all platforms 
could be considered a failure by media outlets in terms of their verification 
processes, but it is also a good illustration of the problems journalists dealing with 
content of this nature encounter every day. Undoubtedly a reporter on the ground 
would be preferable to dealing with contacts you cannot meet face-to-face, but the 
‘Gay Girl’ hoax is “emblematic of the more fundamental challenges facing 
journalists reporting the Arab Spring” (Bennett 2011:193).  Bennett also suggested 
that journalists would have to use a networked approach in the future when working 
with such content. Here he echoes the discourse of Shirky, proposing that “this is 
what the future of investigation looks like in an age when people publish and share 
first, then gather, filter and verify” (Bennett 2011:192).  The literature and these 
examples only serve to highlight the pressure that is on journalists in breaking news 
environments, where there is demand for instant updates and in some cases an 
approach which is ‘tweet first, verify later’ (see Bruno 2011).  
Another illustration of the risks and dangers associated with using such 
content is the high profile case of the Syria Hero Boy video (McPherson 2014). In 
this situation, a viral video showing a young boy rescuing a girl as they came under 
fire in a Syrian town was posted to YouTube. It was used by many news outlets, but 
it later transpired that the video was the work of a Scandinavian film maker creating 
a fictional portrayal of life in Syria. On this occasion the BBC did not use the content 
(see Hamilton 2014).  
Overall, the literature and case studies outlined here demonstrate that 
journalists have challenges every day in terms of determining what content depicts 
and what they should show. Past treatments and usage of content also serve as 
warnings to journalists who may encounter people in the virtual sphere wishing to 
push a certain narrative. In some cases, mistakes have led to media outlets reviewing 
their verification policies, with the Guardian newspaper stating, after the ‘Gay Girl’ 
blog incident, that it would “redouble its efforts in establishing not just methods of 
verification, but of signalling to the reader the level of verification we think we can 
reasonably claim” (Elliott 2011:online). 
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Labels and warnings 
The issues of appropriate labelling and caveats for UGC have prompted much 
debate in newsrooms and across academia. In the BBC Trust’s report into the Arab 
uprisings, author Edward Mortimer suggested more caveats should be made when 
showing UGC footage and the verification process should be better explained to 
viewers (BBC Trust 2012). A two-week content analysis of mobile phone footage 
used by UK news broadcasters noted crediting was unusual (Hadland et al 2013), 
while Lorenzo-Dus and Bryan (2011) found a lack of attribution of content used by 
the BBC. Such findings can “only fuel concerns and debate around the authenticity 
and integrity of the material used” (Hadland et al 2013:23). 
As of 2015 even UGC which has come from official sources, such as the 
news agencies Reuters and Associated Press (AP) and ‘social media news agency’ 
Storyful, may be subjected to the same BBC checks as a clip which a UGC Hub 
journalist has found on YouTube. This is partly because different agencies provide 
information and vet content in different ways. Reuters, for example, doesn’t include 
source information in the same way as AP (Wardle et al 2014). AP will always verify 
content before distributing it, but will not include details of the uploader, which 
prevents accurate crediting of content. These additional checks can mean that it will 
take longer to verify UGC footage. This in itself can be problematic when the 
demand from news outlets for useable content is high. Staff involved in this research 
reported feeling pressure from editors to verify content quickly which, given the 
nature of the footage, was not always possible.  
Wardle et al’s 2014 research into the use of UGC by TV and online news 
channels found there was a major reliance on agency content report events, 
particularly those in Syria. The content analysis carried out by Wardle and the other 
researchers found BBC World used 254 pieces of UGC over the research period – an 
average of 12.11 each day (Wardle et al 2014:21). The study also recorded that the 
main types of stories where UGC was used were conflict or war stories, which made 
up 44% of the total clips on TV across all channels. In terms of specific stories, 
results showed Syria was the story that used UGC the most on TV. A total of 842 
items relating to Syria were used across the news channels being studied, which may 
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have been down to journalists’ limited access into the country, which was discussed 
in the Introduction to this thesis. 
Throughout our sampling period, all channels used content from activist 
groups to report the Syrian conflict. Indeed, for some news organizations 
Syria was the only story that included any type of UGC, and our 
interviews emphasized the news organizations’ total reliance on content 
from Syria because of the difficulties in using their own correspondents. 
(Wardle et al 2014:21) 
Given the demands of newsrooms, but also the risks associated with 
unverified content for the UGC Hub, “if it says it comes from the social media 
sphere, we question it until we are happy that the claims being made stack up” 
(Murray 2011:online). This is a further indication of how seriously the BBC is taking 
the verification process and how crucial agency and eyewitness content is to 
covering events, not just those related to the Arab uprisings, but conflicts generally; 
from fighting in Ukraine to bombing attacks in Afghanistan. 
This section has reviewed some of the main studies related to UGC and 
events during the Arab uprisings, how it is used and perceived at the BBC, as well as 
some of the challenges encountered when using this content, and the steps taken to 
ensure it is fit to be broadcast. As documented earlier, some of the greatest lessons 
learned by journalists were as a result of content uncovered during the initial period 
of the Arab uprisings. The next section aims to highlight research into content which 
emerged during this period and how it was used and processed, particularly by the 
BBC, but also by other outlets.  
 
Section 2: Understanding the Arab uprisings 
The uprisings which began in the Middle East in 2011 have unsurprisingly 
garnered great attention. There has been huge debate about the extent to which social 
media platforms played a role in inciting protests in various countries, and this 
discourse has been examined in scholarly research (see Castells 2012, Howard et al 
2011, Khondker 2011, Tufekci 2011). With the idea of a ‘Facebook Revolution’ and 
a ‘Twitter Revolution’ bounced around by scholars; some hailing the concept and 
others disregarding it, it is perhaps no surprise that there has been interest in studying 
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how the Arab uprisings have been depicted by the media.  For example, Fornaciari 
(2012) used framing theory and content analysis of online content to examine the 
way in which Al Jazeera English (AJE) and the BBC framed the protests in Egypt. 
The debate has also prompted study into how social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter have been used as sources of information or content for 
activists, citizen journalists and professional journalists (Hermida, Lewis and Zamith 
2013, Goodman 2012), as well as examinations of how old and new media have 
worked in partnership with each other (Robertson 2013). 
The aim of this research was not to discuss whether social media platforms 
were responsible for sparking the revolutions. Rather this thesis investigated, among 
other things, how available UGC was used by the BBC to report what was going on 
in Syria - a country which was largely shut off from the western media. This next 
section looks at what research has been carried out into the way that BBC TV News 
has covered the Arab uprisings and the Syria conflict in particular.  
The BBC and the Arab uprisings 
It is clear that UGC has played a key role in helping the BBC cover crises and 
conflicts in recent years, from the Asia tsunami to the Mumbai attacks and, of course, 
the London 7/7 bombings, where mobile phone footage dominated broadcasts in the 
first hours (Belair-Gagnon 2015).  While, as Harrison (2010) has argued, there are 
those who may be reluctant to use this additional news source, for reasons as varied 
as concerns over credibility to preferring to have their own boots on the ground, it is 
clear that the existence of UGC and the use of social media platforms to distribute 
this content cannot be ignored. In fact, Hänska-Ahy and Shapour (2012) believed the 
turning point in acknowledging the importance of UGC, certainly at BBC Arabic and 
Persian, actually came during the Iran elections in 2009, rather than 2011. The 
authors found there was a shift in how UGC was perceived and treated by journalists 
in the two-year period between these events. Staff reported feeling “uneasy about 
how best to use UGC” when the Iran crisis happened (2012:6).  By contrast, 
“Everyone the authors interviewed in 2011 seemed far happier, more confident and 
at ease about using UGC than journalists interviewed 16 months earlier in 2010” 
(2012:7).   
43 
 
 
Their research also revealed that the original way of processing UGC at BBC 
Arabic and BBC Persian in 2009 was chaotic and “lacked a systematic approach” 
(2012:11). By 2011 workflows had improved and UGC was used as a main source to 
cover the Arab uprisings. Interviews also indicated that some journalists believed 
these changing practices had the potential to shape the news agenda. This is in sharp 
contrast to the findings of Harrison (2010), who reported that the content did not 
have an impact on news selection (2010:244). According to Hänska-Ahy and 
Shapour, journalists also claimed “output has changed markedly, and UGC has 
become far more prominent within that” (2012:12). The finding is one hypothesis for 
this research project, which looked specifically at Syria.  
In addition to scholars researching how the BBC has utilised UGC, the 
corporation itself commissioned studies, notably the BBC Trust Report, on the 
impartiality of the BBC's coverage of the Arab uprisings (BBC Trust 2012). As 
previously mentioned, this work remarked on the importance of caveats when airing 
this content. The review by Edward Mortimer was accompanied by a content 
analysis study carried out by Loughborough University (BBC Trust 2012a), focusing 
on BBC news output across TV, radio and online. The research sample consisted of 
44 days of coverage across November 2011, December 2011 and January 2012, 
though 28 of those days were agreed with the BBC Trust retrospectively as they 
included significant events. The sample also included two hours of rolling news 
coverage from the BBC News Channel and BBC World News on the day Libya’s 
President Gaddafi died. The results suggested that while the use of UGC had 
“increased substantially” since the Iranian protests of 2009, only a “small minority” 
of reports from the sample contained UGC material. For example, of the coded 
material, only 30 clips were clearly identified as mobile phone footage out of a 
sample of 985 news items (2012a:55). However, the authors contended that most 
UGC clips were probably generated that way. 
It was used primarily in conflict situations where journalists struggled to 
access events and sources. The most frequent uses of UGC were moving 
images shot using low quality cameras such as those found on many 
mobile phones. Where it was not clear that these images had been 
recorded on a phone as opposed to some other low quality device it was 
coded as “Other/not clear”. It is most likely that, given their ubiquity, the 
vast majority of images came from mobile phones.             
(BBC Trust 2012a:55)  
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Interestingly, the content analysis findings echoed Mortimer’s own concerns 
about the BBC (BBC Trust 2012), highlighting the verification process, as there were 
no caveats about authenticity or representativeness in 74% of the sample. This figure 
surprised researchers, who “expected that when it [UGC] was used it would be 
accompanied by caveats either about authenticity or representativeness or both. This 
occurred only in a minority of cases” (2012a:55). 
Similarly, Robertson (2013) compared television coverage of the Arab 
uprisings by four different outlets, including the BBC, and found that only a small 
proportion of their on-air content was made up of UGC clips.  For example, when 
coding BBC World News, there were 395 items in the sample yet only 11 were 
considered content which had come from social media platforms (2.7%) and four 
news items were coded as having social media as a theme in the story - just 1% of 
the overall sample. By comparison, in Al Jazeera English’s sample (617 items), there 
were 24 ‘social media items’ or clips (3.8%) and four news pieces where social 
media was a theme in the news story (2%) (2013: 338). However, that still adds up to 
less than 4% of all news items featured on the channel in January 2011. 
Overall Robertson’s work indicated that “social media do not play the 
prominent role in global television discourse one might expect, that their prominence 
and deployment vary from one channel to another” (2013:325). However, while 
social media content might not have been used on air in Robertson’s sample, that is 
not to say that this content did not play a part in some of the journalistic processes 
related to covering the Arab uprisings, either providing intelligence on which reports 
were based, or as a prompt for journalists to follow a lead elsewhere. 
Robertson’s (2013) finding that less than four percent of on air items included 
UGC or social media is similar to Hadland et al’s finding for mobile footage in 
general (2013). It would be expected that most UGC from the Arab uprisings would 
probably be mobile footage, though interviews carried out for this research suggested 
that some activists got and/or gained access to more sophisticated portable broadcast 
equipment, such as ‘Bgan’ (Broadband Global Area Network) terminals. These 
terminals connect a laptop computer to satellite internet services and are frequently 
used in remote locations. They have been used by activists to upload their content, 
which is shot using flipcams and other small video cameras rather than smartphones.   
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By contrast Wardle et al’s findings in 2014, when they researched use of 
UGC by global news channels, showed Syria was a story where UGC was used 
extensively, almost every day that they looked at over a three-week period. In fact, 
40% of all the UGC analysed as part of the research related to the Syria conflict, 
“And for some organizations, it was the only story for which they integrated UGC” 
(2014:13). 
Issues of labelling 
There were some similarities in the findings of Wardle et al (2014) and 
Robertson (2013), particularly in relation to differences in the ways that news 
channels labelled UGC that they used. Robertson reported that the BBC only 
‘explicitly’ acknowledged amateur footage as a source five times in the sampled 
items, even though coverage of the Arab uprisings, in particular events in Egypt and 
Tunisia, formed 15% of the coverage (65 items) within that sample. In contrast CNN 
“clearly stated the origin of material” (2013:331). The way the topic of social media, 
in particular its use by those involved in the uprisings, was approached by the 
channels also varied. For example, in Robertson’s research sample of 140 
programmes broadcast from January 2011, while the BBC referred to the fact the 
internet had been switched off by Egyptian authorities, the BBC presenters made no 
‘on air’ references to the use of Twitter, or comments made on Twitter at all. CNN, 
however, dedicated a period of time to discussing how activists in Egypt had made 
use of Twitter and the use of proxy servers to bypass the blocking of the internet by 
the authorities (Robertson 2013).   
Wardle et al (2014) reported similar failings: on average, across networks, 
72% of the UGC broadcast on television had no label or description. The study went 
on to include recommendations that, within the industry, the following main areas 
needed to be tackled: workflow, verification rights clearance, crediting, labelling and 
responsibilities. In terms of labelling there needed to be a minimum standard: 
“Newsrooms know that for reasons of transparency it is important to label UGC, but 
they are not sure how to do this appropriately and consistently” (Wardle et al 
2014:6).  
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Looking to Syria 
One issue which arose in a number of studies into the use of UGC in news, 
and in relation to the Arab uprisings in particular, was a lack of, or inconsistency in, 
labelling and crediting of footage when it was used.  Harkin et al (2012) looked at 
how Al Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic used UGC and social media in their 
coverage of Syria across three key dates at the start of the uprising. Results showed 
that at the time of the study neither channel mentioned whether any of the UGC 
shown on air was from a credible source. “The common on air explanation of ‘this 
footage cannot be verified,’ was absent in all of the content evaluated for this study” 
(2012:31). Harkin et al found similar results from their comparative work on AJE 
and the BBC. 
Of the 64 pieces of UGC (of varying format and length) used in the 
programs surveyed, the majority (nearly 75%) provided no information 
for the audience about the source of the images, either through the 
presence of an on air logo for the source or through on air announcements 
by presenters. 
Harkin et al (2012:31) 
Harkin et al evaluated the procedures for dealing with UGC at both outlets, 
and suggested the lack of announcements was at odds with both channels’ editorial 
guidelines. The researcher argued that “UGC best practice in use at the network level 
at both the BBC and Al Jazeera might not be in place in the Arab newsrooms of 
those networks” (2012:34). However, the research also revealed that both channels 
set up ‘Syria desks’ and established improved processes to deal with UGC after the 
initial study was carried out. Indeed, the article suggested signposting by activists 
and those providing footage had become more common, which may have helped this 
process. This particular theme was found across the literature, including from content 
analyses on TV news use of UGC as well as qualitative research (Hänska-Ahy and 
Shapour 2012) and practitioner testimony (Barot 2014, Murray 2011). These studies 
also depicted a steep learning curve for journalistic staff in relation to checking and 
using UGC footage from the Middle East.  
 Harkin et al’s comparative study of the two Arabic outlets, overviewing their 
policies versus those of their English channels is significant. It was, however, only 
focused on three key dates from March to July 2011, whereas this thesis focused on 
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content broadcast across the conflict, with the aim of finding out whether the use of 
UGC by BBC TV News had altered throughout the duration of the conflict. Looking 
to the future, based on Harkin et al’s method, a further study taking in the 
verification processes, editorial policies and a longer term content analysis of BBC 
and Al Jazeera output across both their English and Arabic channels, would 
undoubtedly yield interesting results, as early indicators suggest that they are not 
always singing from the same hymn sheet. In fact Wardle et al’s full research report, 
which included interviews as well as a content analysis, suggested that in terms of 
challenges for journalists, verifying UGC was considered one of the most pressing 
issues “particularly in the pressured context of breaking news” (2015:9). Verification 
was a theme throughout all of the interviews the team carried out; journalists were 
not always sure of the processes and were also worried that the use of warnings or 
caveats would frustrate the audience and undermine trust, “as it suggests that 
verification checks have been completed inadequately, and fails to communicate the 
checks and internal newsroom conversations that have taken place in deciding 
whether or not use content” (2014:60). 
It has been widely documented that at the beginning of the Arab uprisings 
many journalists were dispatched to Egypt and Libya, and Mair (2011) proposed this 
focus may be one reason why broadcasters were slow to pick up the Syria story. 
With Syria largely closed off to international journalists, covering the conflict from 
the outside has been at the best challenging and at worst impossible. Therefore, 
journalists across all platforms - TV, print radio and online - have been at a 
significant disadvantage in covering events going on inside the country. This 
research focused on TV news and included an examination of how UGC from Syria 
was presented to the audience, in terms of giving context, caveats and/or details of 
how the footage was verified. However, an understanding of how footage, usually 
obtained from online platforms, is processed by BBC staff for use across all 
platforms is useful. If processes have changed over the period of the conflict, this 
could also mark a change in terms of journalistic roles within newsrooms and also 
the level of engagement journalists have with activists producing the content. The 
latter is an element which has already generated scholarly interest and will be 
discussed later. 
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Referencing ‘video’ 
Aday et al (2013) carried out content analysis of articles from newspapers 
and three wire services across 18 months of the Syria conflict. The study was 
described by the authors as “the first systematic, empirical analysis of the use of 
online videos from Syria media” (2013:2). This research is relevant as, while written 
articles were coded rather than content analysis of actual broadcast footage 
undertaken, it helps highlight the importance of video to journalists across all 
platforms. The sample comprised 359 articles from 1 January 2011 to 31 August 
2012 which contained ‘Syria’ in the headline and ‘video’ in the text, with fields such 
as the video source and framing (non-violent and violent) coded for each article. 
Coders found that YouTube was the most mentioned site, referred to in 29.2% of the 
articles.  In nearly half the cases (47.9%) no source was given for video at all. A total 
of 33.7% of the articles mentioned activists or rebels, these were catalogued as 
‘nonspecific sources’, which meant only 18.5% of the articles gave “a definitive 
group or individual as a source of the first video they mentioned” (2013:25). Given 
many activist groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Local Co-ordinating 
Committees (LCCs) - not to mention mainstream outlets and Syria’s own state 
broadcaster - have channels on YouTube, a reference to the website alone could be 
problematic in terms of sourcing and verification of content.   
In terms of categorising content, Aday et al suggested certain patterns 
emerged, with more violent scenes in August 2012, which coincided with UN envoy 
Kofi Annan stepping down and an increase in reported deaths (2013:23). In fact, the 
study highlighted that in August 2012 there were twice as many articles describing 
videos of a violent frame with hostages as there were throughout the rest of the 
research period combined. The research concluded that the increase was “consistent 
with the gradual abandonment of nonviolence as a tactic and an intensification of 
fighting and other violent tactics” (2013:23). The fact that the rise coincided with the 
start of the civil war suggests this hypothesis is correct, but the authors also 
quantified that the frame change might have been a result of a change in tactics by 
those posting the footage, some of whom became more reliable over time. This 
echoes the findings of Hänska-Ahy and Shapour (2012) who, as mentioned earlier, 
reported that activists became more sophisticated at posting content; however, as 
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previously discussed, there is always a risk of activists wanting to push certain 
narratives and suppress others. Aday et al’s work has certain limitations given that it 
is a textual analysis of written articles describing video, rather than the footage itself. 
It doesn’t tell us anything about how video was incorporated into broadcast or TV 
coverage of events inside Syria, but does inform us about the use of video as a source 
of information.  
Engaging with activists 
The ability to engage with activists and tap into their expertise has been 
harnessed by journalists attempting to cover the Syria conflict in a way which differs 
from their coverage of other countries in which Arab uprisings took place. Andén-
Papadopoulos and Pantii (2013) used qualitative interviews across three countries to 
investigate how the Syrian diaspora related to mainstream media, and concluded they 
had three roles. These included linking the outside world to activists inside Syria, 
bridging the gap between social media and traditional media, and working alongside 
journalists in a bid to give context to mainstream media coverage, thus helping 
audiences understand the conflict more in-depth. The large number of Syrian 
contributors to the BBC and other outlets who are living in exile, such as members of 
the Syrian National Council (SNC), is impossible to ignore. Indeed, research as part 
of this study identified that these individuals have played a key part in coverage, 
whether it be helping establish contacts within Syria or verifying footage collated by 
the UGC Hub.  
Often these were individuals who had fled from Syria and who wanted to 
highlight the plight of those back home, who themselves could not speak out, to 
outsiders. These individuals may fit into Zuckerman’s description of 
‘bridgebloggers’, that is those who “seek to mediate between...cultures and 
languages...connecting these disparate spheres of conversation and argument 
together” (2008:47). Citing Iraqi blogger Salem Pax as the first major 
‘bridgeblogger’, Zuckerman explained that these individuals were not writing for 
those inside the country, but rather their contributions targeted an international 
audience. While blogs do not feature heavily in this research, an understanding of 
how journalists engage with activists inside and outside of Syria is helpful. Often 
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these relationships not only dictate the content which is used in news programming, 
but can also have an impact on future programming through the snowball effect of 
gaining new contacts via existing ones. This is an element which has proved crucial 
to the BBC’s teams as they continue to cover Syria without a continuous presence in 
the country. 
This section has examined the existing literature and research into the use of 
UGC in relation to the Arab uprisings by TV news, with a particular focus on the 
BBC and research related to the Syria conflict. It has also reflected on the debates 
surrounding the Arab uprisings and social media’s role, as well as the importance of 
working with credible content and sources. Until now, the term UGC has been used 
throughout this literature review, but in order to outline exactly what is researched in 
this project. The next section looks at the concepts and terminologies used 
throughout academic research and examines scholars’ differing interpretations of 
them.  
 
Section 3: Terminologies and Concepts 
Citizen journalism (Rosen 2008), user-generated content, (Wardle and 
Williams 2008) participatory journalism (Nip 2010, Singer et al 2011), or networked 
journalism? (Beckett 2010).  For those attempting to study the ever-changing media 
landscape, these terms have often been used interchangeably. Moreover, the same 
phrase can mean different things to different individuals, making for a confusing 
research field. What they do have in common is that they are all terms of expression 
used to describe new forms of participation by ordinary people in journalism, or in 
the case of UGC, the end product of a certain level of participation. To understand 
how citizen journalism, UGC and all the other ‘types’ of participatory journalism 
have affected the newsgathering process and how stories are covered, it is important 
to understand what each of the terms means. This section examines literature and 
debates the ways in which each ‘type’ of journalism is defined, both by academics 
and by professional journalists. The intention is to provide a greater understanding of 
the terms which have been used in this particular research project.  
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Definitions: Citizen journalism 
When the people formerly known as the audience employ the press tools 
they have in their possession to inform one another, that’s citizen 
journalism” (Rosen 2008:online)  
Certainly one element of citizen journalism is individuals engaging with each 
other, often without intervention from professional journalists. This idea is echoed by 
Gillmor, who referred to citizen journalism as people being entirely responsible for 
gathering content and producing and publishing news production (2006). However, 
having spoken with many working in mainstream media, this description does not fit 
into what their idea of citizen journalism is. As a concept citizen journalism is 
arguably more complex than Rosen sets out. There is not a ‘one size fits all’ ideology 
or any set boundaries, (Lasica 2003).  As Outing suggests, it has “many potential 
variations...from dipping a toe into the waters of participatory journalism to 
embracing citizen reporting with your organisation’s full involvement” (Outing in 
Allan and Thorsen 2009:260) 
Goode (2009) believed that citizen journalism could refer to a whole variety 
of online activities that involved ‘ordinary’ users taking part in journalistic practices. 
He highlighted however that, alongside the process of content creation (for example, 
eyewitness footage and commentary, which we might most readily associate with the 
term), this included acts that don’t contribute to the news process directly, such as 
tagging and sharing videos and photos on social media sites. 
In other breaking news situations ‘citizen journalism’ has been employed in 
addition to scrambling news crews to the location, for example, following the 2010 
Christchurch earthquake, or the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (Allan and Thorsen 
2014).  In Syria however, media organisations are frequently relying on their 
audience to be newsgatherers and the situation is ongoing, not ‘breaking’.  
Citizen witnessing 
In relation to citizen journalism, Stuart Allan has proposed that “there is no 
singular, essential definition awaiting discovery” (Allan and Thorsen 2009:17), 
though he contends that it is frequently linked to crisis reporting, such as during the 
2004 Asia tsunami, but also more recently the Iran 2009 election protests and, of 
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course, the Arab uprisings. Here, citizen journalism can be understood as everyday 
people rather than professionals bearing witness to events. Allan has since introduced 
the concept of “citizen witnessing” (2013:208), a term which has not been used 
widely in academia and, when it has, its rightful definition has prompted great 
debate. While Allan referred to its use across online platforms, he also argued that 
citizen witnessing in terms of covering crisis events existed long before the web – 
with the filming of Rodney King’s death and the footage of the shooting of JFK 
being prime examples. In exploring the concept of citizen witnessing as separate 
from citizen journalism Allan draws on the work of Frosh and Pinchevski (2009), 
who wrote about “the witnessing performed in, by and through the media. It is about 
the systematic and ongoing reporting of the experience and realities of distant others 
to mass audiences” (2009:1). While they were predominantly talking about media 
witnessing, Allan illustrated the citizen concept using the example of Sohaib Athar, 
who Tweeted about helicopters flying late at night near his home in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan, only to later discover that he had in fact “live blogged” the raid in which 
Osama bin Laden was killed (Allan 2013:2).  
Much has been written about citizen journalism as a concept, and also the 
concept of user-generated content. In fact Wardle and Williams (2008) found that 
BBC staff at times used the terms interchangeably, so it is important to understand 
the broader concepts. In attempting to understand citizen journalism and other 
associated terms, some academics have considered that different degrees of input by 
journalists apply in each case. To illustrate these ‘types’ of journalism, it is helpful to 
consult Nip (2010) who established five models of audience participation: traditional 
journalism, public journalism, interactive journalism, participatory journalism and 
citizen journalism. The model of participatory journalism is of particular relevance 
here. 
Nip distinguished participatory journalism as separate from citizen journalism 
because, in the former, the audience plays a role in newsmaking framed by 
journalists. By contrast, in citizen journalism Nip perceived that people were entirely 
responsible for gathering news content and producing and publishing it without 
professional help. However Nip also acknowledged that UGC often replaced both 
participatory and citizen journalism. 
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User-Generated Content  
The term user-generated content (or UGC) is sometimes, confusingly, used 
interchangeably with citizen journalism, social media or participatory media. Back in 
2008, Wardle and Williams found the term problematic, as they believed it referred 
to such a variety of media material. They therefore defined five types of UGC, which 
have been outlined in this literature review already. In the case of the BBC, the 
broadcaster studied in this research, UGC is defined as media content “produced by 
our audiences as opposed to content made by the BBC, independent production 
companies or individual contributors commissioned by the BBC” (BBC 
2013:online). This includes video and images, but the BBC extends this definition to 
also incorporate mobile text messages, blogs, message boards, emails and audio 
submissions sent in. To help contributors understand, their website states that, “UGC, 
as referred to in these FAQs and covered by the BBC's Terms of Use, includes any 
content produced by our audiences/users which is submitted to or shared with the 
BBC either directly or indirectly” (BBC 2013:online).  
Wardle et al’s 2014 work highlights researchers’ frustration that, six years on 
from the first study into UGC at the BBC, there are still no set definitions for the 
different types of UGC being used by journalists. The term is perceived as an 
unpopular ‘catchall’ for all sorts of content: from texts to online comments, activist 
videos and now even Tweets. For their industry wide study in 2014 Wardle et al 
defined UGC “as photographs and videos captured by people who are not 
professional journalists and who are unrelated to news organisations” (2014:15).  
They also went on to state that the definition was not extended to comments 
integrated into coverage. In this sense, the 2014 definition is much narrower than that 
which referred to audience material and was used by Wardle and Williams in 2008, 
which, as previously mentioned, had “a typology of five different types of UGC” 
(2014:15). The 2014 definition is also more closely aligned with the focus of this 
piece of research.  
In determining different levels of engagement with professionals, Nip also 
highlighted seven different models of “citizen connect” (2010:136), some examples 
of which are interpreted below: 
 
54 
 
 
1. Professional incorporation: journalists sought out audience comments
 from those who would not be accessible publicly and brought them into their 
reporting. 
2. Professional co-option: where journalists followed up citizen content 
such as existing blogs and used them as sources.  
3. Citizen response: Comment boxes, such as those moderated by the 
BBC are considered a form of citizen response.  
4. Guided professional reporting: readers sent in story suggestions but 
journalists were responsible for doing the work.  
5. Guided citizen reporting: citizens produced the work, but journalists 
acted as guide. The BBC’s Video Nation Project would be an example of this. 
6. Citizen submission: solicited content by asking eyewitnesses to get in 
touch with footage, or if they had a story. Nip uses MSNBC’s First Person as an 
example.  
7. Citizen journalism: this model does not involve professional input into 
content, and Nip uses this term over UGC because of its connections to public life. It 
could include community websites, blogs, etc. 
 
In all of these cases, with the exception of citizen journalism which has been 
discussed already, different degrees of professional input applied. The level of input 
dictated the mode or category Nip thought content fell into, although there is 
undoubtedly some crossover. For example, individuals arguably submit comments on 
their own initiative, yet Nip also featured the model of ‘citizen submission’ which 
would incorporate soliciting content by asking eyewitnesses to get in touch, 
something the BBC does frequently. By applying the same criteria, content from 
sites such as Korea’s OHMYNEWS! would be considered under the umbrella of 
‘citizen submission’ because the site has editors - entries are solicited and might have 
journalistic input. If we take Nip literally, it means the 2010 England riots footage - 
which audience members sent into a news outlet of their own accord - could be in the 
same category as footage or comment solicited for the BBC’s Have Your Say 
programme, or online postings asking ‘Have you got a good story?’. 
Overall, when depicting different levels of connection between citizens and 
journalists, Nip operated from a viewpoint that audience members participating in 
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newsmaking were doing so partly as a democratic gesture. This would be consistent 
with the goal of public journalism. Public or civic journalism was a movement which 
emerged following the 1992 US elections, which had the lowest turnout since 1921 
(Rosen 1999). US TV networks and newspapers wanted to reach out to the public - 
their viewers and readers - to “find a way of doing journalism that helps reconnect 
people to public life” (Rosen 1999:73).  The theory was that, by involving citizens in 
various initiatives, a journalist could become a “conductor of social debate and a 
broker of social consensus” (Bardoel in Tumber 1999:388).  Drawing on Nip then, it 
could be argued that public journalism is the predecessor of these other categories of 
journalism which had the aim of “enhancing democracy” (2010:136). 
Networked journalism 
When examining the debate about audience engagement with journalism, as 
well as wider issues related to an online society and democracy, we must consider 
the concept of networked journalism. Beckett and Mansell saw networked journalism 
as something different from Gillmor’s ideology of citizen journalism, a conversation 
which has been discussed already. For Beckett (2008, 2010), digital and online 
production are key to the process of networked journalism, which is itself strongly 
collaborative. And, while the journalist retains some traditional roles such as 
reporting, analysing and disseminating content networked journalism results in 
greater interaction between audiences and newsmakers, with the journalist 
“becoming more of a facilitator of on and offline news production for media 
institutions” (Beckett and Mansell 2008:92).  
This ‘bottom up’ approach, where non-journalists contribute, is closely linked 
to the idea of horizontal communication across society, highlighted by the likes of 
Shirky (2010). Applying the horizontal communication concept, networked 
journalism can be understood as an element in an emerging conversation, which 
marks out the importance of collaboration using non-traditional outlets. It could also 
be considered a move away from the centralised practices employed in traditional 
newsrooms.  Therefore, perhaps networked journalism could be best categorised as 
“where the public help inform and direct professional journalists...a way for 
journalism to meet the challenges of the digital era” (Sambrook 2010:43). Jeff Jarvis 
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also acknowledged that journalism had evolved to become more collaborative, with 
“professionals and amateurs working together to get the real story, linking to each 
other across brands and old boundaries to share facts, questions, answers, ideas, 
perspectives” (Jarvis 2006:online). In fact, Jarvis went on to say that what he and 
journalism scholar Jay Rosen previously considered to be citizen journalism may 
actually be better referred to as networked journalism which “recognizes the complex 
relationships that will make news. And it focuses on the process more than the 
product” (Jarvis 2006:online). 
Will the real citizen content please stand up? 
Having drawn on the literature, it appears any scholarly discussion about 
what can and cannot be perceived as citizen journalism throws up disagreements, and 
that is before the roles and opinions of professional journalists are considered. But if 
we are to take Rosen’s idea literally, then Twitter Feeds from the London Riots (Vis 
2013), blogs on newspaper websites (Hermida and Thurman 2008), internet updates 
about the 1994 Northridge earthquake (Wall 2012) and alerts following the 
Wenchuan earthquake (Nip in Allan and Thorsen 2009) could all be considered 
citizen journalism. Then there is the ‘accidental journalism’, which happens when 
someone unwittingly captures a moment, such as the previously mentioned live 
blogging of the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden (Allan 2013), or the footage 
captured by the individuals caught up in the Asia tsunami in 2004, who filmed the 
waves coming in on their mobile phones. Allan suggested the latter event was “the 
decisive moment when citizen journalism became a prominent feature on the 
journalism landscape” (Allan and Thorsen 2009:18).  Arguably, 2004 could be 
considered the watershed moment for such content, and it is also the year the UGC 
Hub was created within BBC Interactive. However, the practice of using audience 
material, whether it be ‘letters to the editor’ or eyewitness footage, is not new.  In 
fact Charles and Stewart believed the term ‘citizen journalism’ was first used in the 
New York Times offices in 1976 (2011:83). 
However, the above does not explain what citizen journalism is, or what a 
citizen journalist does. In fact it is feasible that, like the media ecology itself, the 
phenomenon of citizen journalism is ever evolving. This means that the boundaries 
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between the different ‘types’ of journalism are becoming blurred; Kperogi’s research 
into CNN’s iReport site suggests that the distinction between citizen journalism and 
mainstream media itself is becoming harder to define (2011). Understanding the 
debate around using different terms in relation to media coverage is crucial, and 
Deuze suggests that these different ‘types’ of journalism should be studied in their 
own right and also as “pathways towards future configurations for cultural 
convergent models of journalism” (Deuze in Allan and Thorsen 2009:261).  Omar 
Al-Ghazzi (2013) proposed that theory related to citizen journalism and its actual 
definition needed to be reviewed if it was to be applied to the Arab world. He argued 
that the idea of citizenship was used in a different context in the Arab world and that 
there was ambiguity as to what actual acts of journalism entailed compared to in the 
West, where journalism was widely held to be closely linked to democracy. He said: 
“citizen journalism is conceived without an exploration of personal agency and 
without a clear understanding of what acts within it are part of journalism” (2013:5). 
Incorporating old ideas and new content 
There is an argument that in this digital age, where journalists cannot be 
first with the news, but have to be accurate, collaboration with citizen 
journalists rather than trying to compete with them is the only option. 
(Doucet 2012) 
Regardless of what you call the content or the process, the media landscape 
has undoubtedly become more collaborative and interactive. Audience participation 
at all levels is now a consideration for journalists. As Scott, Millard and Leonard 
(2014) suggest, “The process of producing news has changed significantly due to the 
advent of the Web, which has enabled the increasing involvement of citizens in news 
production” (2014:1). Their research found that online news systems were “complex 
and interdependent” (2014:1) and may involve citizens, but this varied depending on 
outlets and on circumstances. In terms of events where news crews cannot capture 
what is going on, developments in the media ecology mean newsrooms have access 
to more content and, arguably, more information. It is then for the journalist to make 
sense of it all.   
As previously stated, engaging with the audience is not new. This section has 
sought to confirm that new technologies have shaped the media landscape, thus 
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allowing the public to capture content that can be taken, shaped and used by 
journalists. The benefit of being able to engage with citizens has been highlighted, 
and as Allan and Thorsen (2009, 2013) and Belair-Gagnon (2015) argued, it is often 
most apparent in relation to crisis events, or the aftermath of events happening where 
there is limited or no journalistic presence. The relationship between journalists and 
citizens has changed in some ways from being ‘bottom up’ to horizontal, a ‘many to 
many’ approach rather than the traditional ‘one to many’ ideology.  
Journalism still has an end product, but journalism has been depicted here as 
a collaborative and continually evolving affair on a variety of interactive platforms. 
Journalists undoubtedly still have a role to play, but they have extra tools which help 
them reach sources and vice versa. There is an argument put forward, however, again 
by Beckett and Mansell (2008), that this change means journalists have different 
practicalities to consider and are no longer the gatekeepers of what news people 
access and when. Rather, they curate and moderate conversations.  
This research focused on what is categorised by Nip as being closer to 
participatory journalism and citizen submission. The submission of footage to the 
BBC in the wake of the 7/7 bombings, which Jon Silverman describes as “adding 
more to the understanding of the event” (Silverman in Charles and Stewart 2011:55), 
is an example of ‘citizen submission’. However, because this research included some 
works that were solicited rather than submitted, and included footage captured and 
uploaded by potential activists, this term is problematic. While the term, ‘citizen 
generated content’ better describes the footage being coded and researched in some 
respects, again this raises more questions. 
 This research focused on the use of non-professional content used by the 
BBC to cover events in Syria from 2011 to 2014. As the war continues, it has 
become apparent that often some of those sharing content are doing so along political 
lines. Many are activists, with a certain narrative they wish to portray, and the risks 
associated with this have already been discussed. With this in mind, it would be 
understandable if journalists and academics alike were uncomfortable with the term 
‘citizen generated content’. Indeed, much of the discontent around the term ‘citizen 
journalism’ initially was that it suggested journalists themselves were not citizens 
(Allan 2013).  
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This research does not seek to identify who those submitting the content are, 
in terms of their political affiliation. Also, given the records kept by the BBC and the 
restrictions resulting from data protection rules, it would be impossible to say with 
certainty which clips used were examples of ‘activist generated content’. However, 
this does not alter the fact that the term ‘citizen generated content’ is still not an 
entirely accurate portrayal of content being used on air. As this research focused on 
content that was created by non-professionals, and curated or sent into BBC staff, 
based on previous research, UGC remains the most flexible term to use. The 
definition set out most recently by Wardle et al (2014), which excludes comments 
but includes still images and video, is the most accurate description for the content 
which has been analysed in this study. UGC is indeed a catch-all as previously 
suggested, but the content is certainly ‘generated’ by someone who ‘used’ a device 
either to capture or upload content. Realistically, “no one has managed to create an 
alternative that adequately describes the phenomenon” (Wardle et al 2014:15). 
This section has examined some of the concepts and terminologies which 
have prompted great debate, both in academia and in newsrooms, about how content 
from non-professional sources should be described. Drawing on relevant pieces of 
literature and research, it also considered whether different levels of engagement 
with amateur content producers or media platforms could be depicted as different 
‘types’ of journalism. It is hoped that reflecting on the different arguments, together 
with highlighting how these terms will be used throughout this study, will allow for 
greater understanding of the processes which will be measured and help explain how 
they fit alongside other scholarly work. 
This chapter has outlined the main works relating to journalism practice, social 
media research and production studies which are relevant to this research. The thesis 
focused on how BBC World News TV used UGC to cover events in Syria from 2011 
onwards. It also researched the ways in which journalistic practices changed as a 
result of this usage. This research sets itself within the field of newsroom studies, 
taking in a number of different data collection methods which are examined in 
Chapter 3 (Methodology). Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical framework within 
which the research was situated, again drawing on literature to explain the 
approaches to the theories of ‘gatewatching’,  ‘gatekeeping’ and also the sociology of 
news.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
The primary theories considered in this thesis are gatekeeping theory, the 
more recently conceived theory of gatewatching and the sociology of news.  In 
considering the theoretical underpinnings of this research, this section seeks to 
outline both the theory of gatekeeping and the process of gatekeeping that journalists 
actually apply in newsrooms. As the research considers the roles of journalists, 
journalism routines and newsroom hierarchies, the thesis also examines the sociology 
of news and the concept of news as a social construction. This chapter proposes that 
the role of the journalist, arguably the gatekeeper of certain news information, 
remains relevant (Singer 2009). In a rapidly evolving media landscape, 
newsgathering has changed and this thesis proposes that the relationship between 
journalists, their sources and their audiences are a key part of that evolution. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider theory linked to this approach.  
Newspapers have gone online, and circulation of their printed editions is 
dropping in the UK, other parts of Europe and elsewhere. In some places this is 
resulting in job losses. Despite this, journalists are still telling stories, albeit in 
different and often interactive ways. This can be seen in the online efforts by 
publications such as the Guardian newspaper, which now sees itself as ‘digital first’ 
(see Thurman and Walters 2013). Likewise, while people might discover news via 
Twitter and Facebook, often the original source is an article by a journalist. 
According to Petrovic et al (2013), Twitter is no replacement for a newswire service, 
nor is it always quicker. Their study concluded that, “while Twitter can break news 
before newswires in limited cases, for major events there is little evidence that it can 
replace newswire providers” (Petrovic et al 2013:4).  
In a breaking news situation some stories may seem to ‘break’ on social 
media (see Browne 2014), and that may well be where people find out about stories, 
but this may be due to news outlets and others sharing information on these 
platforms. Even when a story seems to emerge on social media, it will attract more 
interest once picked up by news outlets’ social media threads, be they legacy or new 
media platforms (see Hong 2012). Indeed, it is understood that, even when the 
audience does find out details of news via social media, they frequently return to 
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trusted outlets such as the BBC - and traditional platforms such as radio and 
television - to get more in-depth information and analysis. For example, in 2013, 
10% of the Guardian’s online web traffic was generated through clicks from social 
media, with Twitter being central to these efforts (see Macmillan 2013). Journalism 
may be changing, but at this point it could be argued that the role of the journalist is 
still relevant and journalists are still needed to bring expertise and context when 
stories are pushed onto social media platforms. Therefore, gatekeeping and the newer 
idea of gatewatching as a theoretical framework work well for this research, as these 
theories could also be said to relate to several different evolving concepts. 
Outlining the theories 
This chapter is broadly divided into four sections. The first section gives an 
outline of the basic principles of gatekeeping theory and the relevance and 
importance of it as a theory. It then draws on literature to depict the process or act of 
gatekeeping, and the decision making associated with it, as outlined by Shoemaker 
and Reese (1996, 2014) in terms of hierarchies of influence, and Shoemaker and Vos 
(2009) in their five levels of analysis. The chapter uses section two to look at how the 
sociology of news theory fits into the framework of this research and complements 
the other theories. Understanding the foundations of the sociology of news literature 
is important as this research examines journalistic routines and practices in an 
evolving media environment, with ever-changing sources, techniques and 
responsibilities. This section also looks at other concepts linked to the sociology of 
news, which are important to newswork such as transparency, verification and 
newsroom structures. 
In the third section of the chapter we explore how gatekeeping theory has 
evolved historically, and the debate about whether there it is distinctly different from 
the newer theory of gatewatching (Bruns 2003, 2005, 2008 & 2011). Gatewatching is 
a theory which has been devised in response to the development of new 
communication technologies and networks, which in turn have resulted in once-
passive consumers taking on a role as active producers (Lotan et al 2011, Strömbäck 
et al 2013). This development has arguably had an impact on the way that news is 
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both produced and disseminated in the modern media landscape, and this particular 
issue was examined within the Literature Review in Chapter 1. 
Given these changes in the media ecology, this theory chapter then has a 
fourth section which considers how relevant and effective gatekeeping theory, which 
was devised in the mid-20th century, actually is. This consideration is important, not 
just for this research project, but for other studies investigating content created by 
individuals operating in a 21st century networked society, with a shared space for 
both journalists and non-journalists. The chapter will conclude by exploring the 
challenges and dilemmas faced by journalism scholars in using the sociology of 
news, gatekeeping, or an evolved version of the theory such as gatewatching or 
‘networked gatekeeping’ (Ernste 2014, Barzilai-Nahon 2008), in relation to 
information control research and other studies within a rapidly changing industry. 
While this chapter does not seek to provide all the answers to what is an 
ongoing debate throughout both journalism studies and wider communications 
research about the validity of gatekeeping theory in modern times, it hopes to give a 
broad overview of the benefits and limits of it and other related newer theories.  
 
Section 1: Introducing Gatekeeping 
Theories are sets of statements, views or hypotheses which at a certain level 
are interrelated and logically consistent (Shoemaker, Tankard and Lasorsa 2003). At 
the most basic level, gatekeeping, when applied to communication studies, can be 
defined as “the process of culling and crafting countless pieces of information into 
the number of messages that reach people each day” (Shoemaker and Vos 2009:1). It 
determines what information is selected and therefore also what the nature of the 
news and its content will be. Therefore, gatekeeping theory within the news ‘domain’ 
describes the processes and patterns decision makers or ‘gatekeepers’ go through.  In 
the case of Shoemaker and Vos’ 2009 work on gatekeeping, the theory considers 
concepts on five levels of analysis, illustrating that theory is rarely straightforward as 
it can be very hard to predict decisions or acts involving people.  
Gatekeeping as a theory and gatekeepers themselves within the domain of 
communication are important because some theorists are of the view that decisions 
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made over time may dictate what will become a person’s social reality. In such cases, 
cumulative decisions by gatekeepers about inclusion or exclusion of content can 
result in a particular view of the world being given to readers/viewers/listeners in one 
place that is wildly different to the view broadcast to people elsewhere. The process 
of gatekeeping is also important because the messages that manage to get through the 
gates are considered to be the most important, at least by the journalist or journalists 
selecting them.  
The development of gatekeeping theory 
Every newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of a whole series 
of selections as to what items shall be printed, in what position they shall 
be printed, how much space each shall occupy, what emphasis each shall 
have. 
(Lippmann 1922:63) 
The above quote refers to the decision-making processes undertaken by 
journalists, in this case at a newspaper, which have come to be referred to as 
‘gatekeeping’. One of the earliest gatekeeping models was set out in 1947 by Kurt 
Lewin (Figure 2.1). Rather than referring to journalism, it related to decisions about 
what food was brought into the home. In Lewin’s theoretical model, there were two 
different channels that a product could potentially go through: a Buying or ‘Grocery’ 
channel and a Garden channel. The respective channels were divided into individual 
sections and each section had a ‘gate’ at the end.  Lewin was quick to outline that 
just because a product made it through one ‘gate’, for example cost effectiveness, 
this did not mean it would eventually get onto the dinner table. This was because 
numerous other factors, such as ease of transportation and choice of storage, would 
impact on the final decision as to whether the food got eaten. The people deciding if 
a food product made it through the buying or gardening channel were the gatekeepers 
(see Lewin 1947). While Lewin initially focused on food habits and social change, 
his later work stated that the theory could be related to the world of communication, 
and apply to “the traveling of a news item through certain communication channels 
in a group, for movement of goods, and the social locomotion of individuals in many 
organizations” (Lewin 1951:187). 
64 
 
 
 
(Figure 2.1: Lewin’s gatekeeping model 1947:149) 
 
McQuail defined gatekeeping as “the process by which selections are made in 
media work, especially decisions whether or not to admit a particular news story to 
pass through the ‘gates’ of a news medium into the news channels” (1994:213). 
Traditionally, in a newsroom environment, the journalist has taken on the role of 
gatekeeper, deciding what the news is and what the audience should encounter (Gans 
1980). The gatekeeping model outlined by Lewin for food was adopted by scholars 
Warren Breed and David Manning White among others to showcase the influences 
on content in a research-based model for journalism. The theory is applied to a 
newspaper office in White’s 1950 seminal work, which depicted the decision making 
processes undertaken by subeditor ‘Mr Gates’ at a mid-west US newspaper. This key 
piece of gatekeeping literature involved the research subject -  in this case Mr Gates - 
detailing the selection criteria he put agency wire copy through before determining 
whether it would pass through his ‘gate’ and into the paper. Though this was just one 
individual at one newspaper, and reasons for rejection varied depending on the time 
of day, other stories and space, the study and its associated findings are very 
important in terms of understanding the sociology of news. Hence, it is one of the 
most cited 20th century works illustrating the gatekeeping model.  
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White’s research highlighted the importance of the role of the individual 
journalist, their subjectivity and the process of thinking about the ‘news value’ each 
item possesses; that is, the elements which make events and stories newsworthy and 
whether that information should be refined to make it available for the audience (see 
also Gans 1980 for the importance of sources for journalists). White’s study was 
carried out more than 60 years ago, yet despite the passage of time and the fact 
newsrooms have altered significantly since then in terms of technology, platforms 
and personnel, the decision-making process of what to include in or exclude from a 
news bulletin or product is still undertaken by news professionals every day. White’s 
research and the work by Gans give us clearer insight into the ‘black box’ of 
journalistic decision making (Shoemaker 1997). By contrast Breed’s (1955) work 
highlights that organisational structures and social control could have an impact on 
editorial decision making. For example news staff might be expected to follow a 
certain policy put in place by their publishers (Reese and Ballinger 2001). The fact 
that these works are still drawn on by those carrying out more recent research 
suggests that their gatekeeping models are still relevant to journalism scholarship 
today, albeit with some evolution along the way. 
‘Levels’ of gatekeeping and newroom structures 
Shoemaker and Vos (2009) and Shoemaker and Reese (2014) stated that 
gatekeeping decisions as to whether a story is used could be influenced at a number 
of levels: individual, organisational or societal.  Journalistic routines also have an 
effect on this selection. In all, Shoemaker and Vos set down five levels of theoretical 
analysis which could impact on whether a story is allowed through the ‘gates’, and 
moreover the way it might be told. These ranged from the micro level of the 
individual to the macro level of states and even continents. Shoemaker and Vos 
divided these levels into individual, routine/practical level, organisational, social 
institutional level and a social systems level. This breakdown helps simplify what 
can be a complex theory, but in terms of gatekeeping scholarship, “there are no hard 
and fast rules about breaking the continuum into levels; scholars use as many levels 
as they think will help build theory, and they define those levels for their own 
research” (Shoemaker and Vos 2009:32).  
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In terms of this thesis, given that the data collection methods included 
newsroom observations and in-depth interviews, an individual level of analysis was 
to be of particular interest, as it involved looking at people’s experiences and 
attitudes. However, as previously mentioned, gatekeepers do not always work in 
isolation. Moreover, this research also considers developments on a macro level; for 
example, changes in the way news and UGC is disseminated globally and the impact 
this may have on certain journalistic routines. Therefore, other ‘levels’ in the 
hierarchy set out above became more relevant to this research as analysis of the data 
collected was carried out. This is another reason that the sociology of news theory is 
also being applied within this research framework, by using examples of how people 
made editorial decisions at both an organisational and individual levels in terms of 
journalistic practices.  
  Shoemaker and Vos (2009), related the theory of gatekeeping to an actual 
newsgathering process which journalists still undertake on a daily basis. Using a 
metaphor such as White’s Mr Gates to depict gatekeeping means researchers can 
identify and study “processes other than selection, such as how content is shaped, 
structured, positioned and timed” (Shoemaker and Vos 2009:11). Shoemaker and 
Vos’ contribution was in part based on the earlier of work of Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996) which was later updated and which focused on ‘hierarchies of influence’. 
They developed a model which suggested how influence at one level may interact 
with that at another. This model links to the sociology of news theory and is 
important for this thesis which examines how editorial decisions can be influenced 
by multiple factors simultaneously.  
As well as depicting products going through a channel from source to 
audience, gatekeeping models outlined here can also involve products being changed 
throughout the process. In Lewin’s 1947 food channel model, for example, potatoes 
could be baked or fried before being presented at the dinner table. Likewise, news 
stories may be trimmed or amended from the first raw content encountered, to make 
them more digestible and understandable to an audience. The next section expands 
on the basic gatekeeping process outlined by Lewin and expanded on by others, to 
consider other elements which could potentially influence the decision-making 
process.  
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Gatekeeping may have been introduced in the form of a metaphor by White, 
but as mentioned above with regard to different levels of analysis, gatekeeping is not 
always a process involving just one individual making choices based on personal 
values. When researching the gatekeeping process, some studies have proposed 
different models that look more at the mechanics than subjectivity. For example, 
Gieber (1956) and Breed (1955) approached gatekeeping as a process which could 
take place at an organisational level; unlike in White’s model, each person is but a 
cog in the machine and their individual views are not considered (see also Westley 
and MacLean 1957). 
McNelly believed that an international news item would have to go through 
an obstacle course filled with “reportorial error or bias, editorial selection and 
processing, translation, transmission difficulties and possible suppression or 
censorship” (1959:23), before being seen by an audience. This example of 
gatekeeping would also involve multiple stakeholders. In this model, at each stage of 
the news process there is a gatekeeper - whether it be the reporter on the ground, a 
wire editor in the newsroom or a copyeditor in the edit suite - making choices about 
content. The multiple stakeholders model may still see individuals acting as 
gatekeepers, but the end product seen by the audience may also be shaped by the 
content being passed from one gatekeeper to another, with someone else further 
down the production line most likely having the final say.  Bass (1969) elaborated on 
this gatekeeping at an individual level, and separated people into roles either of 
‘newsgatherer’ or ‘news processor’, with the view that the individual values did not 
have an impact on the process; decisions were based more on the role that individual 
played within the organisation. So newsgatherers collect the details and report the 
story using raw content, then a news processor finesses this content to make it 
suitable for the organisation’s audience. Here it is the job that dictates how people 
will perform rather than personal values. The forces that drive this process and the 
distribution of power among these gatekeepers can of course play a part in this 
process, and will be discussed as part of the next section. 
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Analysing the process of gatekeeping 
There are many steps to the gatekeeping process. By the time a reporter picks 
up the phone or goes to an interview, they may already have an idea of the story they 
plan to write. If they are at their desk when they get an email from a public relations 
company, or at a photocall or interview in relation to the story, some decisions may 
have already been made about inclusion or exclusion. The initial source of 
information and the way it is distributed may vary depending on whether it is an off-
diary or on-diary story. In most situations the newsgatherer, usually a reporter, 
chooses what pieces of that information they will include to build the bricks of a 
story or news item. The information may come to that newsgatherer in a number of 
different ways, such as via Tweets, a Facebook update, just by browsing online or a 
news alert to their phone.  
Sigal (1973) categorised these sources into different types of channels - 
routine, informal or enterprise, with press releases via public relations firms being an 
example of a routine channel. Having accessed the information from any of the 
channels, the decision as to whether these details make it into a final news product, in 
all likelihood, will not be dictated by the newsgatherer’s actions alone. As some of 
the gatekeeping models illustrated earlier suggest, while decisions may be made by 
individuals, the process does not always involve just one stakeholder. It is also 
important to consider that some gatekeepers may be more powerful than others (a 
newsroom editor versus a wire producer who collates agency copy, for example).  
The power dynamics in a newsroom, organisational structures (Breed 1955) 
and hierarchies of influence (Reese 2007) can also impact on what content is finally 
viewed by an audience. Many journalists will be able to recall a great story they had 
which ended up on the cutting room floor or in the wastepaper basket. Reasons for 
this could be as varied as the stories themselves, but a bigger, usually unforeseen, 
event superseding the story – such as breaking news of a death, or developments in a 
conflict - would be a good example. Alternatively, the rejection of a story could be 
down to the fact that a more powerful decision maker or gatekeeper, such as an 
editor, decides they don’t like the story as it stands, or they don’t fully recognise its 
value based on previous content. As with the channels through which information 
can come to a newsgatherer, the criteria for selecting an item for actual publication 
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can also change and evolve. These latter points are closely related to the sociology of 
news and news routines which take in issues about news production, verification and 
transparency, This approach complements gatekeeping and gatewatching and this 
chapter will help identify how the theories are connected and can be used to more 
accurately depict newsgathering and news work in the 21st century.  
Evolution of gatekeeping theory 
The original gatekeeping models were established when media messages 
largely travelled ‘one way’, from organisations to individuals. Yet, despite changes 
outlined here which allow audiences to become involved in the newsgathering 
process, the theory and act of gatekeeping are still considered relevant by many 
media scholars. For example, Domingo et al’s cross-national study into journalistic 
work practices at European and U.S. newspapers found the gatekeeping role was “ 
maintained and enforced by professional routines and conventions that are said to 
guarantee the quality and neutrality of institutional journalism”  (2008:326). Indeed, 
the study found participatory involvement was minimal across the eight European 
newspapers sampled. The core gatekeeping role remained intact and remained a 
monopoly, even for online papers. Likewise, research by Jane Singer (2010) 
indicated that UK print journalists still exercised great control over the incorporation 
of ‘civic content’, thereby retaining their traditional gatekeeping role even in entirely 
new formats. Singer also backed the idea of ethical gatekeepers having some 
responsibility for ensuring the longevity of democracy (2008). 
 However, there is a clear acknowledgement within academia and within the 
industry itself that the process of newsgathering is evolving. Due to the accessibility 
of online platforms we now have a media ecology and a public who share a virtual 
space, frequently resulting in a ‘multi-layered journalism’ (Robinson 2006), where 
the top-down hierarchy has changed to a horizontal approach (Shirky 2010). It is 
unsurprising then that some academics are calling for a ‘reconceptualisation’ of 
journalism (Hermida 2012, 2013), and a rethink on gatekeeping in particular. The 
initial model developed by Lewin dates back over 60 years, long before there were 
TVs in every home, way before the ‘CNN moment’ of the first Iraq War in 1991, 
when 24-hour news came into its own, and decades before people used smartphones 
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to access news and create and share their own media, whether it be videos, text or 
photos. So, while the food model initially set out by Lewin still rings true in some 
respects - we still make decisions about the food we buy, only now we can order 
shopping online for home delivery and don’t have to worry about transport - the 
choice of channels and ways to disseminate information have altered dramatically. 
Moreover, while the likes of White’s Mr Gates may still make decisions on what to 
include or exclude, that responsibility in some respects has been further extended to 
the general public, not just those within the sphere of journalism. Notwithstanding 
the digital divide, which is an issue for both developed and developing countries (see 
Nielsen 2013), most individuals now have the potential to create content and decide 
where they would like to place it for others to read, watch or listen to. Indeed, despite 
stating that the gatekeeping model remained relevant in newspaper offices, Singer 
later admitted that “Journalists who have long defined themselves largely as society’s 
gatekeepers now find that the role is broadly shared with members of an increasingly 
active audience” (Singer 2011:2). This brings the idea of gatekeeping into dispute to 
a certain extent, as different approaches are taken when dealing with news stories 
that involve participatory journalism.   
Certainly, with the internet and social media sites readily available globally, 
the audience does have the choice to bypass traditional outlets. Lasorsa et al (2012) 
and also Sambrook (2010) argued that this resulted in a decreased gatekeeping role 
for the individual journalist as “those who were once reported upon can now report 
themselves” (Sambrook 2010:33).   
One hypothesis of this research is that the core values assigned by journalists, 
including accuracy and fairness, remain important within the news cycle. The 
gatekeeping role is arguably altering (Bardoel and Deuze 2001, Burns 2010). 
Hierarchies of influence still remain, but the readers and viewers may now form part 
of that model in a way they did not before. The road to content creation and 
dissemination is no longer linear. As Kovach and Rosenstiel outline: 
The role of the press in this new age becomes working to answer the question, 
‘where is the good stuff?’ Verification and synthesis become the backbone of the 
new gatekeeper role of the journalism, that of the sensemaker. (2001:48)  
The gatekeeping models set out by White and others have now evolved, and 
journalists can find themselves frequently working in a virtual world where 
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journalistic content shares space with content created by the public. Here the ‘gates’ 
of traditional outlets compete against other ‘gates’ of information (Allan 2013).  
Often instead of making news and selecting it from traditional ‘official’ sources such 
as wire, the role of journalists is now also to keep abreast of the information which 
passes through virtual news gates, as the audience or users themselves do. In this 
respect journalists do not only engage in gatekeeping but also in monitoring, by 
gatewatching – a new form of newsgathering.  
This section has sought to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
development of gatekeeping theory and the concepts associated with it. Gatekeeping 
is a useful metaphor to depict the processes through which journalists make editorial 
decisions about what content they will use in their reporting and relay to audiences. 
However, this theory alone does not fully illustrate the complexity of the situation; 
news items are not simply selected but constructed.  For this we will look at the 
sociology of news literature and how it relates to journalistic practices. This is a 
theory which complements gatekeeping and the links between the two will be 
examined to help explain why the theory forms part of the theoretical framework of 
this research.  
 
Section 2: Sociology of news  
This study looks at how journalists have used UGC to cover crisis events, 
with Syria as the main case study. Part of the work looks at how journalists make 
editorial decisions about content found in digital spaces and, moreover, how they 
find that content. However, the research is also concerned with the evolution in 
journalistic practices, newsroom structures and relationships between journalists and 
their audiences. These can also influence content creation in a variety of ways. 
Therefore, gatekeeping theory is complemented by theory relating to the sociology of 
news production and news routines. Drawing on this theory, there are also other 
concepts which are relevant for this study: verification, transparency and newsroom 
hierarchies. 
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This section aims to explain this theory and the core literature, linking it to 
other ‘subfields’ related to the sociology of journalism and news newswork. It 
explains the importance of the theory in terms of the social organisation of 
newsrooms and outlines the ways in which it complements the older and newer 
concepts of gatekeeping. 
When they report the news, journalists are not entirely reflecting reality, 
rather they shape and filter news items from the information they receive (see Rogers 
et al 1993). This ideology is echoed in the sociological approach to news production. 
Given that the ‘news agenda’ is frequently dictated and filtered by one or more 
stakeholders in an organisation, the social construction of news cannot happen 
without the decision-making process of gatekeeping taking place alongside it. Put 
simply, someone has to decide what the news is before it can in any way be deemed 
newsworthy for an audience. 
The ideology of journalists creating a certain version of social reality when 
selecting the news is very closely linked to the concept of media sociology; that is 
that reporters and journalists do not just ‘discover’ news, their role also involves a 
degree of construction of news. There can be different approaches to this from a 
theoretical perspective, depending on what the focus of production is. One of the 
main theorists to apply this approach to newsroom studies is Schudson (1989, 2000), 
who organises the field in terms of three traditions: political-economy, sociological, 
and cultural approaches. The importance of media sociology and its links to 
gatekeeping theory are key to understanding the approach of this research, which 
examines, among other things, how journalistic routines are evolving. 
 
Media sociology and gatekeeping 
In ‘The Sociology of News Production’ (1989), Schudson stated that 
gatekeeping was ‘handy’ as a metaphor to depict the role of the journalist, but added 
that he believed it overly simplified the process of selecting news. He argued that 
rather than arriving in a prefabricated form, news was constructed from information 
which journalists had access to, and this information could potentially come from 
numerous sources. The journalists then took this information and, based on certain 
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criteria, shaped the message sent out to the public. Schudson believed that the 
gatekeeping model didn’t fully describe this complex process,  “nor the feedback 
loops in which generators of information for the press anticipate the criteria of the 
gatekeepers in their efforts to get through the gate, like teenagers trying to figure out 
how best to talk and look to get admitted to X-rated movies” (1989:265-266).  
Schudson proposed that it was not merely a process of selection, but also a 
process of constructing news items. He put forward his three alternative approaches 
to studying news production, which he believed were more useful in researching and 
depicting the realities of media production within a news organisation. The three 
approaches are: political economy, mainstream sociology and the anthropological 
approach which “emphasizes the constraining force of broad cultural symbols 
regardless of the details of organizational and occupational routines” (1989:266).  
These approaches will now be discussed briefly to highlight understanding and also 
to consider how they work in relation to this research context alongside gatekeeping 
theory. 
The first approach to news production considered by Schudson was that of 
political economy, whereby the news that is produced is linked to the economic 
structure of that particular news organisation. This perspective proposes that issues 
such as the funding model, whether it be commercial or state, have an impact on 
content, as do factors such as advertising and associated revenue. The suggestions by 
Peter Oborne in February 2015, that the Telegraph newspaper had limited its 
coverage of HSBC due to the bank being a major advertiser, would be a good 
example of where this perspective would be considered useful (Oborne 2015). It is 
useful because it also focuses on the connections between institutions, a topic which 
Schudson discussed in much more depth in ‘The News Media as Political 
Institutions’ (2002), though he stopped short of supporting a new institutionalist 
theory of news (see Ryfe 2006).    
However, in terms of overall production studies related to journalistic roles 
and routines, and moreover day to day practices, this perspective “does not attend to 
fine-grained questions but looks at the big picture” (Schudson 1989:268).  If a 
researcher wants to focus on micro-level news routines, starting from the economic 
perspective, the macro-level position is not ideal, something Schudson as a 
sociologist himself acknowledged and critiqued in his 2003 work The Sociology of 
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News. While it is important to understand the structure of the overall news 
organisation, to a large extent it would not be effective to use this approach in this 
research, given that the roles and routines of BBC reporters and journalists are 
subjects which have been studied and analysed. 
The second approach related to production studies is that of mainstream 
sociology. Schudson defined this perspective as the study of social organisation and 
in the case of the newsroom, “it takes as the central problem the journalists’ 
professed autonomy and decision making power and tries to understand how 
journalists’ efforts on the job are constrained by organizational and occupational 
routines” (1989:266). 
This perspective looks at the social organisation of newswork, and this 
includes issues such as how journalists become aware of stories and how they engage 
with sources within the organisation as well as outside it.  Studying the decision 
making processes carried out by gatekeepers within a newsroom fits with this 
approach. Schudson himself advised that “the story of journalism, on a day-to-day 
basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and officials” (1989:271). Given that 
Schudson was focusing on American newsrooms in the 1980s when he first outlined 
these approaches, interactions might include those between reporters and officials, 
governments and elite sources, but today this perspective could equally be extended 
to include reporters’ interactions with audience members and activists, be that 
through digital engagement or using them as sources in the more traditional sense, in 
terms of inclusion in stories. Therefore, it could be argued that one of the best ways 
to explain the workings of a news organisation on a micro-level is by looking at 
decisions made within newsrooms, focusing on individual roles as well as routines 
which are established across the whole organisation and even, in some cases, across 
the whole industry. In terms of a study of journalistic practices within a newsroom, 
Schudson’s sociological perspective works well. Schudson proposed these 
perspectives as an alternative to the gatekeeping model, but in fact this particular 
sociological approach complements gatekeeping theory and, if applied in a research 
setting, could potentially lead to interesting results.  
Schudson’s model is also closely linked to Shoemaker and Reese’s 
“hierarchy of influences” which was mentioned earlier in relation to gatekeeping. 
The model highlights the “multiple forces that impinge on media simultaneously and 
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suggests how influence at one level may interact with that at another” (Shoemaker 
and Reese 20141). Personal bias, political affiliation and organisational culture could 
all be factors that affect decision making and the organisation of newswork. This 
media sociology model ties into Schudson’s ideology that editorial decisions could 
be affected by economic, organisational or social elements.  
Relationships between journalists and sources and subsequent possible 
hierarchy models may become more complex (Reese 2007) as audiences become 
more involved in news work in terms of producing UGC, sharing content online and 
engaging with journalists though ‘participatory journalism’ (Singer et al 2011, 
Domingo and Paterson 2011). However, as was depicted in the gatekeeping section, 
such developments do not yield the theory and models redundant. Like gatekeeping 
the sociology of news “does not operate along a set of fixed conditions” (McElroy 
2013:12). It can evolve and develop. 
 The final perspective to consider when approaching newsroom research is 
Schudson’s ‘culturological’ or anthropological approach, which “emphasizes the 
constraining force of broad cultural symbol systems regardless of the details of 
organizational and occupational routines” (1989:266). 
The BBC is the UK’s public service broadcaster, which is expected to be a 
symbol of British life and reflect great British journalism as well as truth and 
accuracy.  The BBC and its associated values could be considered to represent a 
cultural given: “a given symbolic system, within which and in relation to which 
reporters and officials go about their duties” (Schudson 1989:275). In this respect the 
culturological perspective could be considered relevant to this study, as journalists 
interviewed as part of this research were very much aware that they were working for 
the world’s biggest broadcaster, which had certain editorial values it had to adhere to. 
These include as truth, accuracy and impartiality, which are key values laid down in 
the BBC’s editorial guidelines (BBC 2015). However, unlike the political economic 
perspective, this approach considers news production in relation to ideas and 
symbols. This involves thinking about cultural rather than social lines of explanation. 
Given that this research is predominantly concerned with journalistic routines 
and the way that news organisations operate and evolve and verify content, an 
anthropological account, based on Schudson’s conceptualisation, is therefore not 
ideal. Likewise, Schudson himself admitted this approach, while interesting from a 
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cultural perspective, has certain limitations in that it doesn’t allow for researchers to 
get up close and personal with the subject. In terms of this research project, it is 
important to be aware of the inferred importance of and symbolism of the BBC as the 
UK’s public service broadcaster. Indeed, the symbolism of the organisation may well 
impact on the way it is perceived compared with other news companies, and also the 
way people expect news information to be delivered to them, as well as how 
journalists working for the organisation do their jobs. 
Engaging with sources 
As the research carried out in this thesis demonstrates, developments in the 
news landscape mean newsmakers are now expected to engage and participate with 
their audiences in new and continually evolving ways. There is also an argument that 
the audiences themselves have become more active, using technology to produce 
their own content and engage with journalists on a level they did not previously 
(Lotan et al 2011, Strömbäck et al 2013). However, access to more information, 
more sources and new voices is both a two-way process and, potentially, a double-
edged sword. An increase in available content can potentially improve news output, 
in particular when covering hard to access places. But in turn, this new input of 
content and the use of new platforms may mean that there needs to be a new strategy 
or set of rules in place for journalists engaging in dialogue with their audiences and 
contributors. This is particularly important if the ‘conversation’ is in a public setting, 
such as via a Tweet or in the comments section underneath an online article (see 
Shirky 2010). What was once private may now become public and retain a digital 
footprint, which might not be desirable should exchanges become heated. The 
increase in participation with non-journalists and their associated content also 
increases the need to verify content. As was apparent when analysing the literature in 
Chapter 1, this can mean more work for journalists and an increasing number of tasks 
associated with newsgathering which did not exist previously (see Bennett 2013). 
The need for verification, transparency, and challenges related to journalistic routines 
and processes are also explored in this research. It is for these reasons that the 
sociology of news is a helpful theoretical framework to apply to this study.  
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Looking at the role of journalists 
  The role of journalists is not just to inform or shape public opinion. Also, 
depending on the content available and of course the type of society, the messages 
from different outlets may be strikingly different or very similar. A view held by 
many media theorists is that when there is a general consensus across all media this 
is the point at which public opinion is influenced most greatly, as is outlined in 
Noelle-Neumann’s ideas on a consonance version of reality (1981). However, in 
terms of broadcast and/or published content, Shoemaker and Vos have argued that 
only some of the similarities can be put down to the same content being available to 
journalists from different outlets. Part of gatekeeping theory is to “synthesize 
explanations for both discrepancies and commonalities into a systematic whole” 
(2009:3). In trying to understand the influence of journalists on media messages 
encountered by individuals and society in general, the literature has shown that there 
are the elements closely related media sociology or sociology of news (Schudson 
1989, Reese 2007) which can be ascribed to gatekeeping theory. 
This section has given an outline of media sociology, and the way that it 
complements gatekeeping theory. Part of this explanation of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research has also drawn on the literature to explain gatekeeping 
and the associated decision making processes in greater detail, and, moreover, how 
certain factors can influence how newsworthy particular stories are. This in turn may 
explain why certain events and messages are depicted in particular ways by the 
media and become news items (Shoemaker and Vos 2009, Shoemaker 1997, also 
Schudson 2003).  
Having explained gatekeeping and the sociology of news and associated 
frameworks we are now introduced in much more detail to the newer theory of 
gatewatching. 
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Section 3: Introducing Gatewatching 
This section provides an overview of the main characteristics which can be 
applied to the theory and the overall act of gatewatching, as laid out by media 
theorist Axel Bruns. Bruns depicts gatewatching as follows: 
News users engaged in organising and curating the flood of available 
news stories and newsworthy information which is now available from a 
multitude of channels have no ability to keep – to control – the gates of 
any of these channels, of course; however, what they are able to do is 
participate in a distributed and loosely organised effort to watch – to keep 
track of – what information passes through these channels:  
(Bruns 2011:121) 
Bruns coined the term when talking about collaborative news efforts, 
particularly in relation to online journalism (see Bruns 2003, 2005, 2008 & 2011). 
The theory draws on the sociology of journalism, and to a certain extent production 
studies. Bruns argued that for many 21st century journalists, having a shared space 
with their audience means journalists are no longer just selecting ‘what news should 
be told’, but spend more time amplifying what is already out there. They are also 
giving context to content audiences are finding and sharing amongst themselves, and 
helping users make sense of it in an accurate manner. For journalists, access to so 
many sources beyond traditional ‘official’ ones means their job has become “less 
similar to that of the traditional journalist than it is to that of the specialist librarian, 
who constantly surveys what information becomes available” (2003:7). Bruns 
suggested that the use of near real-time social media platforms had accelerated the 
news cycle beyond what was previously known in the era of 24-hour news channels, 
with mainstream media having less ownership of the news. In turn, this evolution 
continues to change journalists’ roles within the newsroom environment, so that at 
times they are curating existing news which the audience may well know about 
already, rather than selecting what stories to introduce to the wider public. 
As a result of changes in the way journalists and the wider public access 
information and then disseminate news, journalists must harness online, social and 
mobile technology. In some cases this means telling stories using different sources 
and platforms that are new to them. We don’t need to go back to the time of Mr 
Gates to see just how quickly communications technology has evolved, and with it, 
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arguably, so have journalists. As a result of this evolution in technology and changes 
in newsgathering, traditional news outlets now frequently monitor social media 
outlets, and Bruns proposed that ‘gatewatchers’ from these organisations are now 
embarking on ad-hoc collaborative sense-making processes (see Bruns and Highfield 
2012). This is demonstrated by news channels referring to Twitter feeds and social 
media platforms as sources of information, a topic that has been popular in scholarly 
research (Harkin et al 2012, Hermida, Lewis and Zamith 2014) and is in turn 
reflected in the Literature Review (Chapter 1).  
There have even been some breaking news scenarios where information has 
been disseminated and located more quickly on social networking sites than via 
traditional news wires, though these are limited (see Petrovic et al 2012). For 
example, news of the police officer shooting Michael Brown in Ferguson Missouri in 
July 2014, and the re-election campaign of President Barack Obama were announced 
via Twitter rather than through the traditional news cycle of press releases and 
mainstream news outlets (Pew 2012). In this sense it could be argued that the public 
communication taking place on social media sites is a good example of Hermida’s 
‘ambient journalism’ – a system which is “enabling citizens to maintain a mental 
model of news and events around them” (Hermida 2010:1). In seeking to continue to 
do their jobs effectively, journalists must tap into this communication, or else there 
will undoubtedly be key news announcements they will miss. Official confirmation 
of events in 140 characters potentially demonstrates a direct and, arguably, more 
informal communication between organisations and the public, as well as more 
channels for journalists to examine. It is also important to note that Twitter is just 
one platform used by the public and journalists alike. Facebook, YouTube Snapchat, 
WhatsApp and many more are used in day to day news curation and dissemination. 
Guarding the gates: information and channels 
Instead of choosing what information goes through the gates and informs the 
public, Bruns argued that journalists must monitor information coming in and out of 
the gates, including that created and shared by individuals who are not necessarily 
journalists. The online sphere is the key place where gatewatching takes place. This 
means that when people come to them with potential stories (rather than ‘letters to 
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the editor’) the correspondence is more likely to be electronic, whether it be an 
email, a Tweet or a Facebook message to the official account of an organisation. 
Depending on the news organisation or the journalist themselves, the potential to 
access information and have such exchanges with the audience may be greater than 
in the pre online era. This was seen, for example, with audience content submitted to 
the BBC following the 7/7 London bombings, when access to email and mobile 
phone cameras led to a flood of content being submitted to the BBC in a way and on 
a scale not previously seen (Sambrook 2010).  
The sharing nature of social networking sites also means that, while 
journalists may create news, there are many more channels and ways for this 
information to be disseminated. The New York Times website, Guardian feeds and 
BBC Twitter handles are good examples of long-running journalistic outlets which 
have evolved. Twitter itself is a platform that has generated much scholarly attention 
(Vis 2013, Lasorsa et al 2012), in recognition that media consumption is changing as 
are the areas in which journalists find and disseminate news. The 21st century news 
producer will in all likelihood find themselves in a journalistic space with a huge 
range of communication channels, and access to many sources of information that 
were not previously as readily available.  
As the number of different communication channels increases, there are also 
changes in the ways people consume their news, whether it be via smartphone apps, 
live streaming or ‘second screen’ viewing. For example, the 2015 Digital News 
Report indicated that a move to online video, new visual formats and social media 
coincided, in many countries, with a fall in audiences for traditional TV bulletins. 
The trend is most pronounced amongst the under 35s, and only 46% of UK under 45s 
now watch a scheduled TV bulletin, compared with 56% in 2013 (Newman, Levy 
and Nielson 2015:9, see also Pennington 2013).  A change in the way people 
consume their news can therefore result in news organisations having to create new 
products to continue to connect with their audiences. This is something that the BBC 
has done and these developments feature in this research. For any news organisation 
with a digital presence, there is a need to develop a media strategy to ensure that the 
organisation is visible across a variety of different social media platforms and that 
the content continues to be up to date, accurate, available and accessible to the 
largest possible number of people. Overall, to undertake gatewatching, today’s 
81 
 
 
journalist must be a news producer, a forensic librarian (Murray 2011), a detective 
(Browne 2014) and a digital savvy ‘techie’ (Belair-Gagnon 2015). 
This is not just a case of journalists monitoring the gates of information while 
providing their own content, in some respects they need to be able to navigate 
different gates that are only just opening, or in some cases visualise those that have 
not yet even been built. The next section will look as how gatewatching has evolved 
in tandem with changing newsroom routines and responsibilities 
Gatewatching as a developing theory 
Bruns (2008) proposed that, as a theory, gatewatching was ideal to 
understand the news flow across the World Wide Web, particularly across social 
media platforms. Indeed, Bruns claimed gatewatching developed as the number of 
news sources increased and traditional media became less relied upon. Allan and 
other media theorists have put forward the hypothesis that mainstream media is no 
longer the sole place in which people look for the news or get updates on a breaking 
story. Evidence of this is that, “practically every major breaking news story of 2010 
and 2011 has been propelled in significant ways by its coverage in social media 
spaces -  from storms, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and similar natural disasters to 
protests, riots, uprisings and other forms of popular unrest” (Allan 2013:127). That is 
not to say that stories always break on these platforms, though the assertion of 
Reported.ly’s Malachy Browne was that Twitter broke the story of the Boston 
Bombing, as well as that of the landing of the jet in the Hudson River (Browne 2014, 
also Silverman 2014). Neither does the development of gatewatching mean that 
legacy media are not important when giving context in relation to breaking news.  
While this thesis does not seek to use theory related to the public sphere as 
part of its theoretical underpinning, the concept of a networked and shared space for 
journalists and audiences, and connections between the two, are certainly a part of 
this research. Therefore, it is important to highlight the view put forward by Bruns in 
terms of gatewatching in relation to the public sphere. Bruns said that, “far from the 
society-wide public sphere envisaged at the height of the mass media age, the current 
media environment is characterised by a succession of overlapping ad-hoc publics” 
(2011:132). Bruns believed journalism had become a mass participation activity. 
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 What is certain, and has been examined as part of this research, is that social 
media platforms are key in journalists’ working lives, whether they are being used as 
a newsgathering tool to collate content or as a method of engaging with audiences 
through news outlets’ social media accounts. Some of the literature suggests that 
gatekeeping as a process has transformed within the industry and, as such, it is 
important to acknowledge calls from the likes of Hermida (2012, 2013) that the 
journalists’ traditional gatekeeping model needs to be reconceptualised, particularly 
taking into account these new platforms. Coddington and Holton suggested that this 
could involve “recasting it as an interpretative role that uses verification, analysis and 
content to regulate information, as gatekeeping’s main concern shifts from the 
quantity of information to its quality” (2013:5). 
A critique of Bruns 
Bruns called for an evolution from ‘gatekeeping’ to ‘gatewatching’ as 
journalists started incorporating news media platforms which are open to the public. 
Bruns himself was clear that it was crucial to understand gatekeeping and 
gatewatching as separate processes (see Bruns 2008). Within academia some are 
critical of Bruns’ theory, suggesting it cannot be an umbrella theory for all media. 
Milberry (2006) stated that gatewatching was too weak a theory to be applied to the 
contemporary news sphere, and in a review of Bruns’ work wrote that it relied upon 
too many ideas from other researchers: 
[Bruns] relies solely upon a book written by Herbert Gans in 1980, which 
proffers a multiperspectival model of the news, a two-tier system 
comprising mainstream and alternative news producers. The application 
of this model to a virtual environment is interesting, but it is a somewhat 
soft premise for an entire book. Bruns brings everything back to this 
(rather limited) model…In fact, Bruns’ over-reliance on other people’s 
ideas is the key drawback of the book.   
Milberry (2006:772) 
Another criticism is that Bruns does not cover the influence of individual 
background on decision making when depicting the gatewatching model, something 
that was a key consideration within gatekeeping (see Shoemaker and Reese 2014, 
Kim 2012). Many theorists and academics continue to back the gatekeeper model 
and see it as remaining relevant for journalists carrying out their work (see Hermida 
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and Thurman 2008, Domingo et al 2008, Graham 2013). In fact, as a theoretical 
framework, gatekeeping has been considered in a number of high-profile studies in 
recent years (see McElroy 2013, Lotan et al 2011, Strömbäck et al 2013).  
Some literature proposes that, while gatewatching may work for western 
societies, it is too weak a theory in the Middle East context, where gatekeepers can 
extend to families, public relations companies, authoritarian regimes, governments, 
etc. (see Zayani 2008). This is particularly the case in conflict zones (Ali and Fahmy 
2013). However, Almaghlooth (2013) argued that gatewatching could potentially 
work in relation to digital news forms in the region, as new media spheres allow for 
more open debate (see Lynch 2006).  Indeed, that hypothesis is supported by the 
research on the Arab uprisings as illustrated in Chapter 1. However, Almaghlooth 
concluded overall that gatewatching could not be effectively applied to the 
contemporary news sphere within the Arab World, particular in Saudi Arabia, the 
focus of his doctoral research, as “Saudis live in a different society and environment, 
which heavily affects the production of news” (2013:91) 
A final point to highlight in relation to Bruns is that he proposed that 
gatewatching could ‘supplant’ gatekeeping in digital forms and, as illustrated above, 
that could potentially work in terms of journalists working in the new media ecology, 
taking an ‘open source’ approach to disseminating and curating news information 
online. However, theorists such as Shoemaker and Vos (2009) did not believe this 
would lead to the death of gatekeeping, which they argued could also be applied to 
the online world, as “internet has empowered rather than weakened the gatekeeping 
model by introducing new vehicles” (Almaghlooth 2013:91). In this scenario 
audiences are the new gatekeepers, as opposed to journalists, and gatekeeping for 
these researchers remains a key tenet of their journalism studies. 
 
Section 4: Applying theory to the 21st century newsroom 
This research proposes that BBC journalists are now involved in a significant 
‘sentry’ or ‘curator’ role, which might involve being gatekeepers on an 
organisational level in relation to what is included in their own news products and 
within their own organisation’s news agenda. However, gatekeeping theory remains 
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relevant, particularly considering that this study is concerned with editorial decision-
making as well as journalistic routines and roles which are linked to the sociology 
and social construction of news. That said, gatewatching is also useful as a theory to 
illustrate the current state of the news media. It is a continually evolving ecology 
involving digital, online and social spaces. More ‘gates’ such as social media, digital 
platforms and ICTs such as mobile apps, need to be ‘watched’ by journalists who are 
deciding what news to deliver to their audiences. Gatewatching is also helpful in 
terms of thinking about audiences, which again ties to sourcing and the sociology of 
news, newsroom structures and hierarchies. Audiences are having conversations with 
journalists and have much more choice about the content they consume. But it is an 
evolving concept which is shaped by the behaviours of both journalists and 
audiences and in some ways mirrors the work of journalists themselves who are 
creating and disseminating news alongside new, additional duties. 
 Gatewatching is a helpful theory for researchers keen to explore changes in 
the way journalists filter information and engage with their audience in multimedia 
spaces. It is seen as an evolution or departure from what some journalists and Bruns 
himself considered to be the rather linear process of traditional gatekeeping. A very 
similar concept has been introduced by some researchers and refers to ‘networked 
gatekeeping’, which is understood here to be gatekeeping within the framework of 
the digital sphere, in particular in relation to social media networks (McElroy 2013, 
Robinson 2006, Ernste 2014). Ernste in particular called for a reconceptualisation of 
gatekeeping; his thesis on ‘networked gatekeeping theory’ in a new media 
environment drew greatly on social network analysis of Twitter and how the 
microblogging site plays a role in the process of gatekeeping of news. Here, like 
Shoemaker and Vos (2009), he differentiated between the theory and the actual 
process linked to gatekeeping. For the purposes of this research, networked 
gatekeeping will not be expanded upon as a theory, given that it is so closely linked 
to ideas supported by gatewatching, but it is interesting to observe that even within 
academia there are differences in looking at how theories around new media are 
developing. 
One thing to note when considering gatekeeping and the idea of 
gatewatching, is that the former theory can exist alone. However, to comprehend 
gatewatching and ‘networked gatekeeping’ there is a need to understand the basic 
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concept of gatekeeping theory; gatewatchers must know how to be gatekeepers to do 
their jobs. That is not to say that gatewatching cannot become well established as a 
theory as the media landscape evolves, but there is undoubtedly overlap on both 
theoretical and practical levels in terms of gatekeeping, gatewatching and networked 
gatekeeping. All involve some level of participation and engagement by media 
practitioners. In the case of the latter two terms, both have been used when speaking 
about newsgathering and news consumption in relation to new media environments. 
They are also particularly relevant when talking about scenarios incorporating social 
media or social networking sites and online spaces, which are no longer the preserve 
of journalists but are in fact open to all.  
Outlining theoretical frameworks 
This chapter gives an overview of the processes linked to the complementary 
theories of gatekeeping and the sociology of news. Drawing on key literature related 
to editorial decision making, newsroom structures and routines, this chapter has 
sought to give the reader an indication of how the gatekeeping theory has evolved 
over time, and it can be applied on an individual, organisational and societal level 
which fits with a focus on newsroom hierarchies and news routines depicted by 
Schudson (1989). The chapter has also sought to outline how the actual decision-
making processes journalists undertake are frequently based on a variety of different 
criteria as a need to verify, to be transparent and access to sources in digital spaces. 
These are aspects which journalists may or may not be conscious of when 
undertaking newswork. 
In considering the relevance of this theory in a multimedia age, we were 
introduced to the newer theory of gatewatching, primarily set out by media theorist 
Axel Bruns (2003, 2005, 2008 & 2011). Bruns’ view remains that journalists share 
digital spaces with non-journalists and therefore they are no longer the only people 
delivering information or news at either an individual, organisational or societal 
level. Some theorists have elaborated on gatewatching, particularly in relation to 
social networking sites which are frequently used for the dissemination of news. 
Arguably, both gatekeeping and gatewatching in relation to today’s journalism are 
closely linked to audiences, sourcing and sharing information. This fits with the 
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sociology of news approach, the main aspects of which have been outline in this 
chapter.  
Having considered the relevance of the main theories and newsroom 
processes as they apply to this research, this chapter concludes overall that, while 
gatewatching is of importance, gatekeeping and sociology of news remains hugely 
relevant when depicting the behaviour of 21st century journalists. In their everyday 
newsroom routines and practices journalists still engage in acts of newsgathering and 
gatekeeping, certainly in relation to their own news products. These decisions are 
also affected by different newsroom structures and hierarchies, which can influence 
decisions. News organisations may no longer be the sole supplier of news to the 
public, but it is important to remember that they remain a hugely trusted source of 
facts and analysis (Bakhurst 2011). This is the case in particular for public service 
organisations such as the BBC, which has key responsibilities to its audience that 
have been outlined both in the Introduction and in Literature Review (Chapter 1). 
While journalists may not be gatekeepers for all news, they do retain control 
over how they disseminate their news to the public, at least in the first instance, at the 
point of broadcast or publication.  Having now explored the ways in which academic 
theory will be applied in this research, it is useful to revisit the research questions. 
The two overarching research questions being asked in this research are: 
 
Q1. How have BBC News journalists used UGC to cover the Syria 
conflict? 
Q2: In what ways has the role of the BBC journalist changed to utilise 
UGC in news output?                    
  
The next chapter will outline how this research has been approached in terms 
of methodology. It also outlines and discusses the different data collection techniques 
used throughout; namely interviews, ethnography and qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This research used both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods, 
including interviews, participant observation and content and document analysis. 
This chapter begins by giving a full outline of the overall research project and its 
aims. Section one draws on literature to explain and justify the reasons for 
undertaking the interviews and how possible problems associated with this method 
were overcome. Section two relates the qualitative data collection methods to the 
overarching research methodology, which in this case is a phenomenological 
approach. This perspective is discussed critically in relation to this specific study. 
This section also looks at the ethical considerations which must be taken on board 
when carrying out research of this nature, particularly given the position of the 
researcher as a member of BBC staff, where the BBC is the organisation being 
examined as part of this thesis. Section three examines the way qualitative newsroom 
observations were approached for this study. Sections four and five of this chapter 
focus on the quantitative content analysis and the associated document analysis 
which were carried out as part of the data collection. 
The research assessed how the use of UGC and social media platforms 
affected BBC World News TV coverage of the conflict in Syria. It also looked at 
how the use of UGC affected journalistic practices when covering the uprisings in 
that country, which started with protests over the arrest and torture of children in 
Der’aa in March 2011. The study included quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis of news reports broadcast on BBC World News Television, the international 
television channel run by the BBC. It is funded commercially via on-air advertising 
and mainly broadcasts outside of the UK, with the exception of set hours such as the 
overnight (midnight to 0500 hours) service which also airs in the UK. Some of the 
packages analysed had also transmitted on domestic channels in the UK, but the 
main focus for the research was those which were aired internationally. The period of 
content analysis ran from March 2011 to March 2014. Initially, the first six months 
of the conflict was selected for analysis as, up until September 2011, international 
journalists - particularly westerners - could not legally enter Syria, and newsrooms 
had to rely on information coming out of the country, often in the form of videos and 
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photos posted on social media platforms or sent into the BBC.  However, as the 
conflict continued, a longer period of analysis of how the events in Syria were 
depicted by the BBC was thought to be more helpful, in terms of aiding 
understanding of changing practices. 
Research overview 
By using interviews, newsroom observations and content analysis, this 
research aimed to triangulate the data to get as full a picture as possible of how 
newsrooms operate and how journalistic practices are potentially altering. This 
examination related not just to the roles and responsibilities of producers, but also the 
news products they were involved in creating. For example, in an interview a person 
may make a claim about how they treat content or how their role is changing, but if 
evidence of their claims is not apparent following newsroom observations or doesn’t 
translate into on-air content, then this could potentially be an interesting finding, 
which may warrant further investigation. 
In order to examine the ways in which journalism roles and practices have 
evolved since the start of the conflict in Syria, data collection included in-depth, 
semi-structured, qualitative interviews with people from within the BBC. 
Interviewees included correspondents who had to rely on this content to report on 
Syria, as well as office-based staff, such as members of the UGC Hub, who checked 
and verified the content to ensure it could be used on air. In addition, the research 
also incorporated findings from newsroom observations carried out at the UGC Hub 
and also within different departments across BBC Arabic, including their 
Interactivity, live programming and social news online teams. This method was 
introduced as an information gathering tool following a series of interviews, after 
which the opportunity rose to go and observe BBC Arabic staff at work. This made it 
possible to compare the testimony of interviewees to what was observed when these 
journalists were engaged in day-to-day routines in a newsroom environment. 
The hypothesis of this research was that, over the lifetime of the conflict, the 
way journalists accessed UGC and engaged with activists altered, as did the way the 
BBC newsroom was structured. This was backed up by pilot interview findings and 
was another reason to extend the data collection period up to March 2014 (the three-
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year anniversary), rather than just the first six months of the conflict. Focusing solely 
on practices and events during 2011 might not have elicited accurate information 
from interviewees asked to think back several years.  
Data collection methods 
In terms of data collection, this study used both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, in this case interviews, newsroom ethnography and quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis. While there are undoubtedly benefits to using mixed 
methods (see Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Johnson and Turner 2003), such an 
approach will not guarantee resolution of all methodological difficulties and, 
moreover, “it is important to have the ability to weigh up the practical nature and 
methodological limitations of methods” (May 1997:108). The next section details 
each of the different collection methods in turn, beginning with qualitative 
interviews.  It considers the benefits of, and gives a justification for, each method, 
drawing on key literature and previous research which has used these techniques. It 
also focuses on the recruitment of interviewees, how data was processed, coded and 
stored, and discusses ethical issues which were taken on board – both while carrying 
out the research and afterwards - when analysing the data and results.  
 
Section 1: Qualitative data collection: interviews 
Although labour intensive, undertaking a number of qualitative in-depth 
interviews elicited more detailed information than a quantitative study alone. In 
considering whom to target, this research used a non-probability sample – i.e. given 
the finite number of BBC staff that deal with UGC, these participants were targeted 
specifically. While there were a number of set questions posed to all respondents, 
there were different lines of questioning for individuals from different BBC 
departments. Therefore the interviews were semi-structured, enabling the focus to go 
beyond the initial questions and get further details or clarification where and when 
required (Hoinville and Jowell 1978). This style of interview is thought to be 
particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant’s experiences (see 
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McNamara 2009).  As the research was looking for factual detail as well as getting 
respondents’ perspectives on the challenges of dealing with UGC, qualitative 
interviews were a good way to get these factual elements but also to probe into the 
meaning around a subject (Kvale 1996). 
Potential respondents were contacted through various gatekeepers within the 
BBC. These included heads of departments such as Andrew Roy, then editor of 
World News, and Chris Hamilton, formerly the social media editor in charge of the 
UGC Hub. Other interviewees were contacted personally via email. Some were 
selected as I knew they had experience relevant to the study, others were 
recommended by fellow members of staff.  Interviewees included TV producers, 
staff working at the UGC Hub and journalists from interactive programmes covering 
television and radio. 
Pilot interviews 
Prior to carrying out the full interviews, a number of pilot sessions were 
carried out with BBC staff from different departments. These pilot interviews were 
semi-structured in nature and, to put the respondents at ease, they were first asked to 
give a brief history of their employment at the BBC and talk about what their job 
involved. This information, in some cases, determined the line of questioning, 
relating it to their particular roles and expertise. All interviews (pilot or otherwise) 
were recorded on a digital voice recorder and later transcribed in MS Word and 
uploaded into NVivo. In addition, notes were taken down in shorthand during the 
course of the interviews. This format worked in most cases. However, one interview 
did not record properly and on another the sound quality was poor. Despite this, it 
was still possible to draw information from these sources by using the accompanying 
notes. 
As well as questions on working with the BBC and the use of UGC in the 
newsroom, at the end of the pilot interviews respondents were asked whether they 
felt that any of the questions asked should be omitted, or whether any additional 
questions should be introduced. This mode of piloting made it possible to revise the 
questions in order to gain optimum feedback from respondents. “…to take account of 
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any criticisms and problems [and]…provides a means of catching and solving 
unforeseen problems” (May 1997:93).  
After conducting the interviews, it was apparent that the respondents had very 
different perceptions of the benefits of involving UGC in journalism. Interviewing 
people with very different views was to a certain extent beneficial, as it provided the 
opportunity to look at the range of viewpoints that journalists within one organisation 
have. Piloting the interviews also allowed for reflection on the line of research and 
avoided presuppositions about how easy the method was to comprehend. Following 
comments from the completed pilots some questions were revised, taking into 
account the different roles and responsibilities the journalists have within the BBC 
and their level of involvement in covering events in Syria. For example, one 
interviewee was very experienced at getting guests on air from Syria and developing 
a rapport with activists but had very little to do with accessing footage. Another 
respondent was hugely experienced in terms of working at the UGC Hub but had not 
been tasked with getting content from Syria to a great extent. The data generated 
during the pilot interviews was extremely valuable, and therefore, information 
derived from these pilots has been included in the overall research analysis and 
findings.  
As previously outlined, initially the research was going to focus on 
journalists’ experiences in covering the first six months of the conflict in Syria. 
However, in the interviews, many respondents gave detailed accounts of their 
experiences in dealing with content, activists and coverage of Syria outside this 
period of time. This, and the fact that the crisis was ongoing, with major 
developments still taking place in the country, were deciding factors in extending the 
time period to be researched. Certain questions included in the pilots were therefore 
omitted from the final interviews as they were no longer relevant. For example, 
respondents were no longer asked to focus on a set period during the Syria conflict, 
as many interviewees had interesting information and experiences from different 
time periods. Also, questions were broadened to explore their experiences with 
technologies which were not widely used by the BBC back in 2011, such as 
WhatsApp, live streaming and online verification applications. 
In order to encourage a positive response, as well as targeting a specific 
group, respondents were assured anonymity and strict confidentiality with regard to 
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the data collected, unless the interviewee was particularly keen to be identified. This 
was done by coding interview responses during transcription and when doing 
analysis using a database such as NVivo. Ensuring anonymity was important as, to a 
certain extent, some might consider the work to be sensitive given it relates to 
experiences in covering war and dramatic events, and potentially viewing traumatic 
footage. This and further ethical considerations will now be examined. 
Visible researcher and the insider: outsider perspective 
Before undertaking a further discussion of the research methods, it is 
important to make clear that, as a researcher, my own experience and the nature of 
my employment as a senior producer at the BBC, could potentially have had an 
impact on the interview process and, more importantly, the analysis of the data. 
Firstly, there was always a strong chance of me being familiar with some of the 
interviewees, albeit only through work. This could arguably impact on interviewees’ 
responses and reactions to certain questions. There are many ethical debates and 
guidelines regarding interviewing people with whom you have a pre-existing 
relationship (see McConnell et al 2009, Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010), including 
concerns about whether a researcher should engage in data collection and whether 
connections will have an effect on the analysis of data at a later stage.  I am of the 
view that any potential pitfalls were outweighed by the amount of rich data it was 
possible to gather as a result of my unprecedented access to BBC journalists across 
the organisation. This was also one reason why the research included a quantitative 
as well as a qualitative element, though again the interpretation of the data is down to 
the individual researcher, despite co-coding with a researcher who had no links to the 
BBC.  
Another important element in relation to carrying out this part of the research 
is the issue a researcher must face in identifying the position from which they are 
carrying out the ethnography – whether it be an insider or outsider perspective. This 
is particularly the case when the researcher has a connection to the research field, the 
respondents or the topic. Therefore it was important to examine the possible 
implications of these links and what efforts were to be made to overcome any 
associated challenges for this particular research project. This meant I had to make 
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clear the identity that I, as a researcher, would be taking on while carrying out the 
ethnography. As Burgess (1984) outlined, there are four possible options. These are 
as follows: the complete participant, who works covertly; the participant-as-observer, 
who is open about their observations and takes part in activities; the observer-as-
participant, who will only probe where necessary; and finally the ‘complete 
observer’, who doesn’t interfere (see also Waddington 2004). 
In determining my position, as I am a BBC member of staff, it was 
impossible to categorise myself as a covert participant, and definitely not as an 
outsider. While I hadn’t worked with the UGC Hub or BBC Arabic teams directly, 
some of the staff were known to me and I had a background understanding of at least 
some elements of their roles and responsibilities. Therefore, from an ethnographic 
point of view, I was an insider. With this in mind, when carrying out the research, it 
was important to ensure I maintained a certain amount of distance to allow for a 
satisfactory level of observation and analysis. This was a fine balance to achieve; 
being close enough to develop a rapport, but avoiding ‘going native’ and losing the 
ability to think critically about the data (see Waddington 2004, Brewer 2000, Walsh 
2012). When considering Burgess’ perspective and options I categorised myself as 
an observer-as-participant, as I largely shadowed staff while gathering data, rather 
than undertaking an active job, and I mainly asked questions for clarification. 
There are undoubtedly issues which must be considered when a researcher is 
part of the organisation or community being studied (Naaeke et al 2011). Attempts to 
maintain distance alone may not be enough, as an insider researcher is still taking 
what Geertz (1973) referred to as an ‘emic perspective’ – that is a point of view of an 
insider within the community under scrutiny. This could potentially result in findings 
being biased or skewed (Naaeke et al 2011). In order to minimise the risk of this, it 
was important to examine the ways in which a researcher’s position and own identity 
could impact on the data findings, as I have discussed already. Engaging in self-
reflection at each stage of the research is considered to be a key element in 
participant observation (see Waddington 2004, Brewer, 2000).   
Another way I reflected was by listening back to the pilot interviews, to 
analyse how questions were phrased and how I interacted with the interviewees 
before carrying out any more interviews. Given that I had background knowledge, I 
sometimes felt the pilot interviewees were subjected to certain leading questions and, 
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at times, I interrupted or finished interviewees’ sentences. By realising this early on I 
was able to modify my questions and responses before carrying out the main 
interviews. 
In conclusion then, while there are criticisms of doing ‘ethnography at home’, 
there are benefits to having an insider knowledge of the locality or the people you 
will be researching. These perceived benefits can range from being able to gain 
access more easily, to developing a rapport more quickly and being able to ask more 
probing questions thanks to a shared understanding of the culture or practices 
(O’Reilly 2009).  What is certain is that, regardless of whether a researcher is taking 
the emic or etic perspective, this form of data collection can be “complicated, messy, 
personal and subjective” (O’Reilly 2009:4). 
 
Section 2: Research approaches 
While a background understanding could be considered useful in terms of 
getting the most out of interviews, this had to be considered when selecting a 
methodology. As this data collection involved collecting information based on the 
interviewees’ experiences, this was arguably a phenomenological approach, the aim 
of which was “to illuminate the specific, to identify phenomena through how they are 
perceived by the actors in a situation” (Lester 1999:1). Husserl’s view was that 
‘pure’ phenomenological research should start from a perspective which has no 
hypotheses or preconceptions (Husserl 1970).  In this respect my researcher position 
could be considered problematic by some, but I remain of the view that in this 
situation, while it was not fully possible to ‘bracket’ my own experience, it was 
possible to minimise influence on collection and analysis - while benefiting from 
background understand - by using the coping mechanisms previously discussed.  
Despite Husserl’s views on coming to research without a personal view or 
hypotheses, more recent academics - particularly those with a feminist and/or 
humanist perspective - have said that it is impossible to be without some biases 
(Lester 1999). Therefore, it is thought that the best option for a researcher with links 
to the subject and respondents is to explain to them clearly from the outset what the 
aims of the data collection methods are, and also what the researcher’s intentions are, 
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as has been done in this chapter. Once data has been collected, it is paramount to 
outline very clearly how research findings are being interpreted at each point during 
the analysis stage. In this respect the researcher will be a ‘visible researcher’ (Hycner 
1985). That is, they will adopt the stance of an interested and subjective actor rather 
than an impartial interviewer as, given their own industry experience, it will not be 
entirely possible to detach themselves from the process (see also Plummer 1983, 
Stanley and Wise 1993). 
Therefore, in terms of carrying out the research, I went over the interview 
structure with respondents in advance and made all decisions regarding interpretation 
and analysis of findings clear when writing up, in order to avoid further issues or 
potential conflicts of interest.    
Ethical considerations 
As the qualitative research involved dealing with human subjects, an ethical 
approval form was submitted to City University’s ethics committee detailing how 
subjects would be treated, as well as the scope of the research and how information 
would be kept and stored. The form was completed and the research formally 
approved prior to the interviews taking place. In the case of this research, all 
electronic information relating to the study were be saved on password protected 
USB sticks and cloud systems such as Dropbox, with paper content kept in a locked 
drawer on City University premises. In order to carry out research within the BBC, 
written permission and approval was sought from various ‘gatekeepers’ across the 
organisation.  Appropriate information sheets and consent forms were also read and 
completed by respondents in advance of any research being carried out (App. 2). 
Both the interviewer and the interviewee kept a copy of these documents and 
respondents were assured that, should they change their mind about being included in 
the interview process at any time, they could opt out. There was also a ‘cooling off 
period’ after the interviews had taken place. Above all, as previously mentioned, 
interviewees were assured that they would have a certain level of anonymity should 
any direct quotes be used in the final thesis. Interviewee responses were then coded 
and, given that it might be possible to identify a respondent based on their job title 
alone due to the small size of some teams, names and job titles were removed if 
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appropriate. If relevant, however, the department within which they worked would 
be included in the research findings. 
Justifying the data collection methods 
Carrying out interviews meant it was possible to get individual perspectives 
from staff on how their jobs may have changed and the type of content they have 
been dealing with since the start of the Syria conflict in March 2011. As previously 
mentioned this links into the methodology of phenomenology, which was also laid 
down as a philosophical movement by Edmund Husserl during the 20th century 
(Husserl 1970). Phenomenology is concerned with the study of experience and in 
particular the importance of how things are viewed or personally interpreted (see also 
Moustakas, 1994, Creswell 1994). This approach works well in relation to in-depth 
interviews where the aim is to get significant insight into people’s views and 
motivations through intense engagement with them.  
It is also important to highlight that phenomenology, given that it charts 
people’s experiences, can also work with other with qualitative approaches such as 
ethnography (Lester 1999, also Finders 1992). This research also involves carrying 
out newsroom observations, which will be discussed later in the chapter.  
Given that the aim of phenomenological research is to reflect the experience 
of the actors involved, such in-depth interviews can generate a lot of data and involve 
lots of notes – either during the interview process or afterwards, during transcription. 
With this in mind, the aim was to focus each interview and draw on the respondent’s 
specific experience as much as possible. It was hoped that, by narrowing down the 
focus of the research, it would be possible to generate more rich data and go deeper 
with each interview, while mitigating the issue of a large amount of data to wade 
through, piece together and analyse. The issue of ‘messy data’ (Lester 1999) is 
commonly associated with phenomenology. 
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Section 3: Qualitative data collection: newsroom observations 
Newsroom observations are a form of ethnography, a field of study 
concerned with finding or uncovering meaning, usually in the practices undertaken 
by a particular group. This method usually involves, “studying people within their 
own cultural environment through intensive fieldwork; they emphasize the subject’s 
frames of reference and understandings of the world” (Singer 2009:191). 
The opportunity arose to carry out a newsroom ethnography, in addition to 
the interviews, on receipt of an invitation from BBC editors to observe their staff at 
work. It was thought the additional information that could potentially be gathered 
during this period would further inform the research into the journalistic practices 
interviewees had spoken about and, as such, would complement the interview 
findings (see Agar 1996).  Such observations have always been a useful way of 
studying organisations, with Gans (1979) and Tuchman (1978) being seminal works 
consulted both by those preparing to undertake such a study and by those keen to 
learn more about journalistic practices. In recent years, ethnographies have also been 
increasingly popular when studying the sociology of news and evolution of 
newswork (see Wardle and Williams 2010, Anderson 2011, Robinson 2011, Harrison 
2010). Indeed Cottle (2007) wrote of the early 2000s being a ‘golden age’ in news 
ethnography, and lists a host of media scholars who have selected this method in 
recent years to find out more about the way news operations work.  For him, 
ethnography is seen as advantageous and relevant because of the rich data that can be 
gathered from ‘behind the scenes’ and thus inform our knowledge about journalistic 
roles and routines.  
Singer (2009) suggested that for journalism scholars, particularly former 
journalists, ethnography was a particularly attractive data collection method if they 
were undertaking newsroom studies. However, undertaking production studies in a 
similar environment to that in which a scholar was once employed may have pitfalls 
as their “own experiences are likely to color perceptions of what their research 
subjects are experiencing” (2009:193). In such a scenario it is important for 
researchers to be mindful of their own biases, and remember that “ethnographic 
research is not journalism” (ibid:193).  
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 With this in mind it is also important to be transparent when carrying out 
ethnography (Singer 2009). Openly explaining the process around collating 
information during the observations - and later when analysing the findings - is 
considered a good way to mitigate any potential problems related to background 
knowledge of the ethnographic field of study or research participants. Indeed, prior 
knowledge may help researchers to probe the data and find meaning and significance 
in it, rather than just relaying events as they happen (see Lareau and Schultz 1996). 
This level of interpretation, which goes beyond the “what” into the “why” in terms of 
analysis, is referred to by scholars as giving “thick description” (Geertz 1973). In a 
successful newsroom ethnography then, analysis of research data will be descriptive 
and it will also involve a significant amount of critical analysis and contextualisation 
of the data (see Lindlof and Taylor 2002, Singer 2009). 
One reason that the observations were included alongside interviews and a 
content analysis was to ensure the data could be subject to some form of 
triangulation (Denzin 1978). Therefore, one source would not wholly be relied upon 
for data collection. This did not negate the need to maintain balance when carrying 
out the observations, but it was intended that incorporating other information found 
in fieldwork and using multiple methods would minimise the risk of the researcher’s 
position impacting on the overall research findings (see also Jorgensen 1989).  
Access and carrying out research 
When I spent time observing staff across BBC News, it often involved me 
being assigned a journalist to work beside. This in turn involved ‘shadowing’ or 
‘trailing’, a common practice within newsrooms when learning roles. Journalists will 
spend several days ‘learning the ropes’ by working alongside someone already well-
established in the position. As well as observing they will ‘learn by doing’, so that 
they become familiar with what the job entails. This was particularly the case when 
working within the UGC Hub, where the editor had permitted access, for research 
purposes, to ENPS. ENPS is the database where BBC journalists’ ‘running orders’ 
(the files and codes for transmitting TV and radio programmes ‘to air’) are organised 
and stored, along with other broadcast information (Figure 3.1). I was given access to 
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the Hub’s folder related to ‘Key UGC’ within ENPS, which was updated daily. I was 
also added into the UGC Hub email feed.  
 
(Figure 3.1: Screen grab of the ENPS database system used by BBC to create running orders) 
 
To minimise intrusion during these periods of ethnography, I decided not to 
audio record the sessions, but to take handwritten notes and then ask questions where 
appropriate. This ties into Burgess’ approach of participant as observer which was 
discussed in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2). This format again would be similar to 
the ‘shadowing’ practice BBC staff undertake. It was hoped that by carrying out the 
ethnography in a similar vein, journalists I encountered would be willing to engage 
further, feeling more comfortable with the process and feeling less like they were 
being observed (see Bernard 1995). 
In all cases, I typed up notes shortly afterwards, while the experience was still 
fresh. This allowed me to revisit the topic again during interviews and later 
observations, and to clarify points as well as seek additional information on issues of 
particular interest. The benefit of carrying out a long-term observation, particularly at 
the UGC Hub, was that a rapport developed with certain journalists and, as a result, 
they were more likely to volunteer information about their roles, changes in the way 
that teams worked, changes in structure and new developments as they applied to the 
departments. For example, BBC Arabic had recently started a project with BBC 
Newsgathering and the UGC Hub, in a bid to streamline content being verified from 
Syria before it was used by BBC outlets. It was only through sitting in on meetings 
with various staff that I became aware of this pilot project, and was later able to 
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follow up on it during observations and interviews with key staff. This was one 
benefit of carrying out interviews simultaneously to other aspects of newsroom 
ethnography - the ability to triangulate information and therefore get the most out of 
each data collection method, and in some cases reinforce and confirm research 
evidence (see Merriam 1998, Agar 1996). 
Explaining processes 
At the UGC Hub the period of observation involved sitting with a senior 
broadcast journalist from the team at their desk, learning about the full curation and 
verification processes clips go through, from initially being sent in or identified by 
staff on social media sites, through to making it to air. It was hoped that receiving a 
clear explanation of the fact-checking processes each clip is put through could help 
explain why many pieces of UGC from Syria cannot be used. As a data collection 
method, it could also be potentially useful as a way to identify how much social 
media is used as a tool in newsgathering. The observations were also a useful way to 
help further comprehend the processes used by the UGC Hub, as well as the 
importance of each step to ensure balance, accuracy and impartiality - key aspirations 
for BBC News as a whole.  
Not only did the participant observation aid understanding of the journalistic 
processes and practices associated with citizen-submitted content and social media 
platforms, but it also helped to shape questions for qualitative interviews with 
journalists across different departments of the BBC carried out later in the research 
process, particularly interviews with those dealing with such content on a daily basis. 
Limitations 
I believe that no method other than newsroom observation could give a 
researcher access to such rich data from BBC employees, allowing the time to 
develop a rapport with the respondents. Long-term newsroom observation also 
allowed me to gain a greater understanding of the varied roles individual journalists 
have in relation to the newsgathering process, and the techniques involved in actually 
‘doing the job’. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that this form of research is 
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without its problems.  In particular, as has been outlined to a certain extent already in 
the previous chapter, my own position and indeed the research environment bring up 
a number of practical and ethical issues that required close examination throughout 
the data collection process. What is clear is that in order to carry out ethnography 
effectively it is important to be mindful of this relationship between “the researcher, 
the researched and the context of the research” (Mabweazara 2013:97).  
One common criticism of participant observation is that people being 
monitored are likely to react to the researcher being present by engaging in untypical 
or extreme forms of behaviour. However, Waddington (2004) suggested that unusual 
behaviour usually petered out the longer a researcher remained in the research 
setting. To combat this problem, on the first day of each observation, the main editor 
would advise that I would be working with the team and organise introductions to the 
staff. As the days went on it was possible to develop a rapport with staff, many of 
whom were not known previously. In fact, some interested individuals asked more 
about the research and what it involved. This allowed the opportunity to provide 
them with more detail about the project, and also to determine how the notes from 
the observations would fit in with the other data collection methods. In some cases, a 
number of those who were being observed had been interviewed; in other cases, the 
interviews would be done later, which afforded the opportunity to put respondents’ 
minds at ease. As some of the observations were carried out on a slightly ad-hoc 
basis, given the other data collection methods, it was important to keep in touch with 
the journalists who had been involved in the observations. This was often as simple 
as chatting informally when our paths crossed in the building, but also involved me 
sending them emails requesting they keep me up to date with any developments 
within their teams. This informal gathering of information meant it was important to 
write up details soon afterwards and also consult emails when it came to analysing 
the research in order to avoid omitting data which could potentially be useful to the 
research findings. 
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Section 4: Data collection: content analysis 
The research involved quantitative content analysis of BBC news reports 
related to Syria and an additional analysis of documents associated with these reports 
and the processing of UGC which may have been used in these reports. The results 
of this data collection, while valid in their own right, were useful background 
information which could also be used for probing interviewees.  This section 
differentiates between qualitative and quantitative content analysis and discusses the 
limitations of both methods. It also outlines how this particular piece of research was 
carried out and discusses the categories used in the content analysis codebook with 
further expansion on the document analysis, which was done separately. When 
explaining what these data collection methods involved it is helpful to draw on 
theory, in particular the work of Weber: 
A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are 
classified into much fewer content categories. Each category may consist 
of one, several, or many words. Words, phrases, or other units of text 
classified in the same category are presumed to have similar meanings” 
(Weber 1990:12) 
Quantitative content analysis is grounded in basic rules of social science. 
Indeed, while content analysis frequently refers to written text, in actual fact this data 
collection method can be used in relation to anything that can be ‘read’ (David and 
Sutton 2011), such as pictures and video. This data collection method was selected to 
complement the qualitative data collection methods of interviews and newsroom 
observations which also formed part of this research. It was hoped that a mixed 
method approach would help give a fuller picture of how journalists cope with 
citizen-submitted content and how they work on a day-to-day basis. As such, content 
analysis will be considered here as a method used to ‘read’ and code a large amount 
of TV news content. The items coded were TV news reports broadcast by BBC 
World News in relation to the Syria conflict. 
Content analysis preparation 
Prior to undertaking any content analysis, it is important to be clear what will 
units actually be analysed. Within these news reports it was decided that each clip (or 
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piece) of UGC used would be categorised as one unit. For example, in a two-minute 
‘package’, there may be a 30-second sequence that has three different pieces of 
mobile phone footage or footage from YouTube. Each of these different pieces or 
clips was considered as one unit to be analysed. In determining the unit which should 
be selected for analysis, however, it was also thought necessary to get a sense of the 
scope of the BBC’s reporting of the Syria conflict. To do this a basic search was 
carried out using Jupiter, the BBC video database which stores archived news 
packages as well as those not yet broadcast. (Figure 3.2) 
(Figure 3.2: screengrab of Jupiter the BBC’s TV transmission and archive system)   
  
This exercise involved using the search facility to bring up only full news 
reports, hereafter described as ‘packages’, which aired on BBC World News TV and 
were created by either BBC World News or the production team for the domestic 
BBC News at Six and BBC News at Ten programme. The key term ‘Syria’ was used, 
and the search range included titles and descriptions for packages created from 15 
March 2011 to 15 March 2014 - a period of three years. It later emerged that this 
search did not cover all reports on the topic, as a different term might have been used 
in the name or report description, such as ‘Damascus’ or ‘Assad’.  
However, given the ad-hoc way in which some of the other packages were 
named - either by towns or under certain groups, such as ‘FSA, Damascus’ - it was 
not possible to fully gauge the scope of how many different terms had been used. 
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The search did, however, take in any packages that had ‘Syria’ written in the 
description portion of ENPS.  In total 1436 news packages came up in the ‘Syria’ 
search and these were arranged by date. Given that this included descriptions, it was 
thought to be a fairly representative sample, and so other search terms were not used 
beyond this one. 
Each package had a separate description, and basic information such as date 
of publication, time codes and overall length. It was also possible to get rights 
information about the individual packages by clicking on an icon in Jupiter. This 
gave a breakdown of the source of the content which was used in the news package 
in the form of a timeline, though all this information was not always available, as 
will be reported in more detail later. 
In addition to the metadata available in Jupiter, further information was 
available on each package by looking at ENPS. Using the dates of news packages it 
was possible to correlate these with each day’s running orders for BBC World News 
and to look at the relevant cues (the script that was used by a TV presenter to 
introduce a news package, if that report was used on BBC World News television). It 
was also possible to access details of what the ‘astons’ were. ‘Astons’ originally 
referred to particular captions created by a branded broadcasting company, Aston 
Broadcast Systems. However, the term is now used within the BBC to describe any 
name straps or clip description captions that appear on the screen during 
transmission.  
This additional information, in some cases, helped paint a picture of how 
news producers described or referred to certain non BBC or non-agency content, 
unverified footage or ‘amateur footage’. That said, it was later discovered that many 
packages containing this content have no warnings or descriptions referring to the 
source of the type of footage. 
The packages which were coded were found via the search carried out in 
Jupiter. Given the nature of news, and the fact that the six and ten o’clock news 
programmes might have their own versions of a news report on any given day, it was 
decided that every fifth package would be coded. On any one day it would be rare for 
more than five Syria packages to be produced, and it was thought that a 20% sample 
would be representative of the reports produced over the three-year period of the 
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conflict focused on in this research. It also avoided the risk of coding two very 
similar versions of the same package. 
Devising the codebook   
Basic information available in Jupiter was imported into the codebook for 
each package that had been selected for coding. This information included the BBC 
package name, date of publication and length of the report in seconds (for ease of 
comparison). Jupiter also listed whether a report was published by World News or 
the six or ten o’clock news bulletins as, detailed in Figure 3.3. 
 
(Figure 3.3: Copy of the codebook created in Excel) 
 
In addition, a number of other fields were devised and added into the 
codebook in order to further code the information for analysis later. Table 3.1 lists all 
the fields which were selected and into which data was coded. 
  
Codebook Field Description of field coded 
Field 1 Package name 
Field 2 Date item published 
Field 3 Outlet 
Field 4 Duration of package 
Field 5 Does package open with UGC? 
Field 6 Is the clip UGC? Y/N 
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Field 7 UGC overall length (seconds) 
Field 8 Shot list 
Field 9 Individual UGC clip duration 
Field 10 Is originator of clip evident? Y/N 
Field 11 Audience made aware of originator? Y/N 
Field 12 Where content obtained from? 
Field 13 Are audience made aware of this? 
Field 14 How is this depicted? Cue (1), aston (2), script (3), logo (4) 
Field 15 Clip description (e.g. amateur footage) 
Field 16 How is this depicted? Cue (1), aston (2), script (3), logo (4) 
Field 17 Verification warning? Y/N 
Field 18 Verification wording 
Field 19 Verification format cue (1), aston (2), script (3), logo (4) 
Field 20 Running orders 
Field 21 Is there a Jupiter description? 
Field 22 Number of ‘Key UGC’ files that day 
Field 23 Additional notes 
(Table 3.1: Full list of fields in content analysis codebook) 
 
The codebook included a field related to the use of UGC clips in each news 
report. If a piece of footage which was used in a report was thought to be from a 
member of the public or a non-professional source, then it would be categorised as 
UGC. The term UGC was used as the description for ease of comparison, as was 
discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 1). The codebook also included a field 
indicating whether the report started with a UGC clip. Then, for the remainder of the 
package, individual shots were categorised as to whether they appeared to be UGC. 
While the timesheet provided in Jupiter was used as a starting point, it transpired in 
some cases that the timings were in fact not entirely accurate. For example, the first 
30 seconds of a package might be UGC - and may be labelled as such - but in fact 
this could be a sequence of three different shots (say 0-7 seconds, 7-12 seconds and 
then 12-30 seconds). These ‘clips’ may not be from the same source, or even 
showing the same place. Therefore, it was necessary to recode the timings so that 
each individual clip that made up a bigger sequence within the package was 
recorded. This was a time-consuming exercise but it was felt that, to give an accurate 
idea of the proportion of UGC used, each clip needed to be counted and categorised 
individually. 
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Having established whether a clip looked like UGC or not, each individual 
clip was coded to identify whether it was clear who had recorded the content, 
whether this information was relayed to the audience and where the video had been 
obtained from, e.g. Shaam News Network or YouTube.  
If the codebook recorded that who had captured the content was relayed to 
the audience, the codebook also recorded the way in which this was done, e.g. 
through a cue, a script, an aston or a logo. These are explained as follows: 
1: Cue: This referred to the introduction to a news package, and the 
information was gathered by including scripts from the World News running order in 
which the package first ran. 
2: Aston: These are name or credit tabs which appear onscreen, usually at the 
bottom of the screen, to describe a person speaking or to credit content. Astons do 
not automatically appear in the archive of the report on Jupiter, so this information 
again was gathered by consulting the running orders for BBC World News on the 
day the package first aired.  
3: Script: This refers to the voiceover or ‘track’ used in a package. This 
information was gathered by watching and coding the news reports. 
4: Logo: This refers to a logo which was burnt or watermarked onto footage, 
something separate to credit astons. Wardle et al (2014) found that such logos were 
usually put on by someone other than a news organisation and as such the content 
was ‘credited’ as being UGC. In the case of this data collection, logo information 
was gathered by watching and coding the news reports and identifying watermarked 
logos on a piece of footage. 
The same criteria were also used to determine whether there was a 
description of the clip, e.g. amateur footage, whether this was relayed to the audience 
and, if so, in what format. Finally, each clip was coded to determine whether there 
were any verification warnings in relation to it, whether the warnings were made 
obvious to viewers and what format the warnings took, whether it be in the script, or 
via an aston. 
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Sourcing 
Two different fields were included in order to determine the possible source 
and/or the author of the content.  The first was Field 10 in the codebook - ‘Is 
originator of clip evident? Y/N’; the second was Field 12 in the codebook – ‘Where 
content obtained from?’ However, if the data gathered showed a clip was obtained 
from YouTube this did not tell the researcher anything about the author, their 
background, or who to attribute content to. This in itself was very problematic, as a 
credit of ‘YouTube’ was used frequently, as is reported in the results. However, in 
terms of understanding sourcing practices this category was useful, as it aided 
understanding of where journalists found content which was later used. A more 
detailed discussion of the categories used in the codebook follows in the Results 
Chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), but the basic breakdown comprised:  
 
 Media Group: This included local media groups such as Arbeen 
Media Bureau, Murters Zamalaka and Douma Media Group. These groups had an 
anti-regime viewpoint. 
  Rebel or Opposition Group: This included Aleppo Media Centre 
and Shahba Press. Militant groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and 
Ahrār ash-Shām - an Islamic Rebel Group - also came under this category. 
 Arabic media agencies:  Douma City, Shaam News Network and 
Ugarit News outlets.  
 YouTube: This was used as a sourcing category only when another 
category could not be identified and rights information stated YouTube in its source 
description. 
 Western media agencies: These included EVN, Reuters and APTN.  
Similar to YouTube, this category was used as a last resort. 
 Other: This referred to content which didn’t fit into one of the other 
categories and included agency footage where the Jupiter shotlist advised what the 
content, was but not it source, e.g. UGC, AmVid etc.  
 Unknown: This category was used when source information was not 
relayed in the news package or in the rights information, nor could it be gleaned from 
viewing or analysing footage.  
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It was usually Field 10 (Originator) that would provide information about the 
content’s author, although certain groups would put a logo onto the footage, giving a 
sense of where the material came from. However, depending on how that group was 
categorised (e.g. Rebel Group, Unknown, Western Media Agency), that attribution 
might later say something about the type of content and potentially the content 
authors. For example, some content was categorised as being from one of the rebel 
groups but was labelled as being ‘extremist fighters’ in the clip description and by an 
aston. It later transpired to be a clip from Islamic State. The challenges around this 
are discussed more in the following Results and Discussion Chapters (Chapter 4 and 
6). 
Additional information on the overall package which was entered into the 
codebook included which World News TV bulletin the package first ran on, whether 
there were any Key UGC files from that date available in ENPS and, if so, how 
many. There was also a field to add miscellaneous data, such as indicating that parts 
of the same video were used throughout, or that time codes on the timeline for each 
individual shot were not available or were logged incorrectly. For example, putting 
all footage from Reuters in as one clip when it might in fact be several different shots 
from different feeds. 
Intercoder reliability 
Intercoder reliability was carried out as “it is important to check that the 
classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent” (Weber 
1990:12). The process is also a good way of ensuring that the classification process 
generates valid variables and, as is required for doctoral-level research, that the 
conditions for research can be replicated. Only by eliminating any sense of ambiguity 
in terms of coding is this possible.  
With this in mind, a fellow researcher coded 10% of the ‘text’ selected for 
this study. As a result of this, two further categories were added to the codebook. The 
first category related to the type of ‘voice’ used in news packages and the other made 
it clear whether each news clip was being categorised from the outset as UGC. 
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Cohen’s kappa was used to calculate intercoder reliability, as it was for two 
coders, rather than Fleiss’ kappa which is for multiple coders. The calculation was 
also given for Scott’s pi (Table 3.2). In the coding of the TV news reports, the kappa 
coefficient was 0.913. According to Neuendorf, “Coefficients of .90 or greater are 
nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in most situations, and .70 may 
be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices” (Neuendorf 2002:145). 
Therefore, the kappa values obtained in this research suggest excellent reliability. 
 
Percent 
Agreement 
Scott's Pi 
Cohen's 
Kappa 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N Cases 
N 
Decisions 
96.2% 0.913 0.913       25             1 26      52 
      (Table 3.2: Results of intercoder reliability for content analysis of BBC TV news packages) 
 
Section 5: Document analysis  
Content analysis is essentially a way of describing (or explaining) and 
quantifying phenomena (Krippendorff 2012). In addition to accessing the cues and 
package aston information in ENPS, it was also possible to look at the ‘Key UGC’ 
files relating to Syria that were kept on each date. These files or operational notes 
related to pieces of video which had been examined by staff from the UGC Hub. 
Having embarked on the quantitative content analysis, it quickly became apparent 
these files contained a huge amount of information pertaining to news packages, and 
not all of it could entered into the codebook. There was a risk that, by excluding or 
condensing certain data - such as background information relating to how the ‘best 
UGC’ files had been verified and who had looked at them - key themes, trends or 
patterns in terms of newswork would be missed, and as such the analysis would be 
incomplete. Weber in particular suggested that when carrying out content analysis, 
“where possible the entire text should be analysed. This preserved the semantic 
coherence of texts as units” (1994:43). 
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As a result, it was decided that the content analysis would also include 
another   element, a deeper analysis of the ‘Key UGC’ files and documents 
associated with the UGC. This document analysis allowed the researcher to make  
“an account of accounts of events” as depicted in television news (Fields 1988:191). 
Qualitative content analysis defines itself within this framework as an 
approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within 
their context of communication, following content analytical rules and 
step by step models, without rash quantification. 
(Mayring 2000:online) 
In many instances the clips referred to in the ‘Key UGC’ files had been 
through some kind of verification process. Sometimes a description of that process 
and a link to where it had come from - for example a YouTube URL - was included 
in the file. While it would be impossible to fully correlate whether the ‘Key UGC’ 
clips being described in the ENPS files were the same ones that appeared in that 
day’s packages, this information gives a sense of the work done by journalists using 
this content, as well as insight into the verification process which would not be 
possible otherwise. Given that a number of the available packages were edited 
overnight and first broadcast at 5am, it was decided that for these early packages (i.e. 
those published before 12pm), it would be better to refer back to the previous day’s 
Key UGC files. Therefore, in some cases the UGC files researched in tandem with 
the Jupiter package might not be from the same day. 
Qualitative content analysis, like quantitative analysis, required that units “be 
standardized and countable regardless of the questions one is trying to answer” 
(Fields 1988:184). So, in terms of data collection, while the document analysis still 
involved looking at a large amount of data and counting units, it also included 
seeking out further thematic information on that data over and above counting and 
looking at the presence or absence of certain fields. Quantitative content analysis 
usually produces results which can be displayed numerically, whereas this process 
involved looking at themes and more of the detail that came with those numbers. 
 Fields, who carried out qualitative content analysis into television news, 
pointed out that that thematic approaches used in his research relied “on an 
understanding of the specific structure of whatever content is being examined and on 
one's theoretical goals” (1988:184). The same can be said for this research. In order 
to carry out the research, it was important to understand where the content being 
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analysed was coming from, and how further information would add value in addition 
to the existing quantitative content analysis. 
The document analysis involved looking at data associated with the 
individual news reports which were broadcast on BBC World News TV throughout 
the same research period and that were coded quantitatively. The data collection 
process itself involved examining information collated by the UGC Hub at the BBC 
about key pieces of footage which were made available to BBC outlets, over and 
above counting the UGC clips used on air. 
This information included an analysis of Key UGC files relating to Syria that 
were kept for each day. These files are stored in the ENPS system in a dedicated 
folder and are essentially ‘operational notes’ which include details about pieces of 
video that had been examined by staff from the UGC Hub. The data was stored 
separately from Jupiter in most cases, but was collected at the same time as the larger 
quantitative content analysis of broadcast news reports was carried out. When coding 
each news package, the number of Key UGC files from that day were also noted and 
copies were made of them in an Excel document. As discussed earlier, given that a 
number of the packages analysed were from overnight and first broadcast at 5am, it 
was decided that for these early packages (i.e. those published before 12pm), it 
would be better to refer back to the previous day’s Key UGC files. Therefore, in 
some cases the UGC files gathered in tandem with the Jupiter package data might not 
be from the same day. There were also some days when there would be no Key UGC 
files in ENPS.  
Despite being collected at the same time as the data in the broadcasted 
reports, the content of the Key UGC files was examined separately.  By carrying out 
this research in addition to the quantitative content analysis and by looking for 
emerging themes in the data, it was possible to explain certain phenomena related to 
the news reports which aired, as well as the journalistic practices which surrounded 
such content. Therefore, overall it was hoped the research would show that “the 
structure of the coverage is grounded in the social processes of doing newswork” 
(Fields 1988:191, see also Epstein 1974, Tuchman 1978).  
Of course, the key to carrying out content analysis is to reduce the amount of 
information that needs to be analysed, while retaining useful and interesting data. So 
it was important to focus on the research questions and think what certain 
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information added, and only look at relevant units for analysis. It was therefore 
prudent to remember the advice of Elo and Kyngä: “Successful content analysis 
requires that the researcher can analyse and simplify the data and form categories 
that reflect the subject of study in a reliable manner” (2008:112). 
The other important thing to highlight is that the document analysis was 
carried out after the quantitative content analysis had been completed and the 
relevant news reports viewed. This meant that the researcher already had a base 
understanding of the most common clip descriptions, themes and sources. This made 
it easier to understand the labelling and processes detailed in the ‘Key UGC’ files. It 
also meant, at times, it was possible to identify specific clips used and triangulate the 
details seen on screen with what was found in particular running orders and what had 
been written down by BBC staff about certain footage.  
Other Limitations 
One weakness of this method of data collection was that the document 
analysis depended on interpretation by an analyst and was therefore “the product of 
that person’s bias, filters or prejudices” (Stonbely 2013;online). This is an issue 
which has already been touched on in relation to phenomenology and the qualitative 
interviews. That said, Weber outlined that “there is no simple right way to do content 
analysis. Instead investigators must judge what methods are most appropriate for 
their substantive problems” (1990:10). Therefore, for the content analysis, document 
analysis and related interviewing, any personal judgements or background 
knowledge had to be considered when analysing results, and it was important as a 
researcher to be clear about my position throughout the research process.  
 The quantitative aspect is the “single characteristic on which all the 
definitions [of the method] agree” and is the only thing that allows the analyst to 
make claims about the relative occurrence of various indicators in a text (Berelson 
1952:203 cited in Stonbely 2013). 
In terms of the limitations of content analysis and document analysis, in some 
respects it depends on the interpretation by the analyst. Concerns related to this can 
be mitigated to a certain extent by undertaking intercoder reliability, as has been 
discussed, though this can have problems itself. For example, in this particular 
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situation, the primary researcher and the researcher carrying out the intercoder 
reliability were trained in content analysis at the same institution. Therefore, there 
was a likelihood they would code in a similar way. However, as long as any issues 
were noted down, there is nothing to suggest that coding was an unreliable method 
(see Stonbely 2013, Hall 1980).  
In some respects, carrying out the content analysis was the most challenging 
part of this research, partly due to the restrictions on me as a researcher.  The data 
collection and subsequent coding had to be done in the main news areas on BBC 
premises, on computers which had Jupiter installed on them. When the content 
analysis actually began, it was clear that while there was a lot of copyright 
information about video clips available in Jupiter, sometimes the timings of these 
clips did not correlate with what was seen on screen. In cases such as this, the time 
codes given for individual news reports were adjusted with more accurate time 
codes, though the original data for each package was kept as a separate Excel sheet. 
This ‘recoding’ was a time consuming process. 
Also, there were some cases where content was catalogued as one type of 
footage according to the codebook but, after watching it, it was clear it should 
actually come under another category. For example, information in Jupiter stated that 
part of a package from 12 February 2014 included a clip which had come from 
Reuters, but it in fact had a Shaam News Network logo on it. Therefore, while it may 
have come via Reuters, it was not their original content, which could potentially have 
skewed the results. In other cases content was just labelled as ‘unknown’ in the 
copyright section, so it was unclear whether it was UGC or agency footage. In others 
still, the content said UGC when it was from Syrian TV, a state-owned station, and 
this discrepancy was identified by looking at the logo watermarked onto the footage, 
if there was one. In such conflicting cases, the content was coded depending on what 
could be derived from looking at the content. Therefore a clip that said ‘Reuters’ on 
the copyright log, but showed a Douma City logo, would be coded as ‘Douma City’, 
with the caveat it came ‘via Reuters’ in terms of where it was obtained from. These 
discrepancies are another reason why the document analysis of the ‘Key UGC’ files 
was carried out after the quantitative content analysis. A fuller discussion around the 
challenges of coding different categories, in particular the rebel groups, follows in 
the results chapters.  
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This chapter has sought to outline the key aspects of the proposed study by 
highlighting some of the existing literature and giving a brief overview of the 
methodology. It detailed the plan to use three data collection methods, and 
highlighted potential ethical issues surrounding both the research content and the 
respondents. The next chapter looks at findings which emerged as a result of the data 
collection and analysis processes. 
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Chapter 4: Content Analysis 
Part 1: Quantitative results 
This section outlines the results from the quantitative content analysis that 
formed part of this research project. As previously outlined in the Methodology 
chapter (Chapter 3), this research involved coding individual news reports - known 
as packages - which were broadcast on BBC World News Television. The timeframe 
for these reports spanned a period of three years, from Sunday 20 March 2011, to 
Monday 17 March 2014. Every fifth package was analysed and the data was 
recorded using a previously devised codebook. As well as counting the quantity of 
UGC used in news reports, each separate UGC clip was coded for a number of other 
criteria. These variables included: where the content was obtained from; whether the 
audience was aware of the content source and if so how they were informed; how 
content was described on air; how the descriptions were relayed to the audience; 
whether verification warnings were used. 
This chapter details the main findings derived from the content analysis 
exercise. The detailed and complex research yielded a large amount of data and this 
section gives a general outline of that data. The chapter concludes with an overall 
results summary which introduces particular themes, or trends, which are expanded 
on in the discussion.  
Method 
In order to ensure that all coded detail was accurate, a visual basic automation 
programme was run through the codebook. The programme - which was developed 
specifically for this piece of research by a software developer - went through each 
row of data within the Excel spreadsheet, collating the various attributes which were 
measured. These values were then outputted into several separate spreadsheets in 
order to make it easier to create the tables. As well as collating the information, the 
programme performed some basic checks on the consistency of the data to ensure 
there were no errors. For example, if a clip had been identified as being UGC, then 
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subsequent columns would be expected to have a certain range of values in them - 
they should not be empty. If they were empty this would be an error, which the 
programme would flag up.  
In addition, the programme was also used to help check the validity of the 
data. This meant that where a column in the codebook required a specific range of 
answers, if there was something different written in these cells it would be 
highlighted. For example, some cells were expected to have a ‘Yes’ (Y) or ‘No’ (N) 
answer and others had numerical values, while other cells might have a range of text 
categories such as ‘Unknown’, ‘Rebel Group’ or ‘Shaam News’. If something 
outside of these values was found in a cell, or indeed the cell was empty, this would 
be flagged up. 
Having run the programme, there were a number of instances where certain 
values had been overlooked during the manual coding process. In particular, cells 
relating to three news packages which were analysed at the start of the research 
process had empty cells where there should have been a value, or in some cases they 
didn’t have the correct data in them – e.g. data had been entered as ‘Yes’ instead of 
‘Y’.  In one case a package had missed coding points, in that a clip had been coded 
as UGC but didn’t have any other variables coded. As a result of running this 
programme it was possible to go back and recode the relevant packages. Overall, a 
total of 273 news packages were analysed using this data collection method. As 
outlined in Table 4.1, more than half (166) of the packages were created by World 
News, 62 packages were published onto the Jupiter system by BBC News at Ten, 
and 45 were published onto Jupiter by BBC News at Six.  
Outlet/Channel Number of packages 
BBC News at Ten Packages 62 
BBC News at Six Packages 45 
World Packages 166 
Total  273 
(Table 4.1: Breakdown of news packages analysed as part of content analysis) 
 
Drawing on the content analysis carried out, the research shows that 122 
(41.3%) of the 273 news packages opened with user generated content (UGC).  The 
average overall percentage of UGC used when considering whole packages was 
21.7%.   
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These average percentages were calculated based on a sample of news reports 
broadcast over a three-year period. In order to give a more detailed depiction of the 
presence and use of UGC in news reports during this time frame, the sample was 
broken down further. This meant that research could move beyond the initial findings 
and, as a result, that the average percentage of UGC used in news packages could be 
viewed month by month (Figure 4.1).  
 
(Figure 4.1: Average % of UGC used in BBC News TV packages covering the Syria conflict which 
were broadcast on BBC World News Television between March 2011 and March 2014) 
 
While there were some spikes in usage month to month, the overall timeline 
shows a downward trend in the use of UGC by the BBC in the coded news packages 
covering Syria, over the three-year period March 2011 to March 2014. 
From the start of the conflict in March 2011, the graph saw an initial increase 
in the average amount (%) of UGC being used in news packages, rising in the first 
three months from 36.6% in March 2011, to 42.9% in April 2011 and to 46.6% in 
May 2011. Journalists were ejected from the country in the first months of the 
violence (Starr 2012), following which other western journalists could not legally 
enter Syria, and this led to a reliance on UGC. This, coupled with an increase in 
protests in the first months of the Syria conflict (which people recorded), might 
explain the initial increase. At this time, President Assad also announced certain laws 
would be passed to curb further protests, though by May 2011 the situation had 
escalated and tanks were deployed to Deraa, Baniyas, Homs and suburbs of 
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Damascus. This again was content onlookers and activists were seemingly keen to 
capture. This and other elements are critically analysed and reflected upon in the 
Discussion chapter (Chapter 6). However, overall the data suggests that journalists 
used less UGC as the conflict went on. 
The results illustrated in Figure 4.1 indicate that the biggest spike in UGC 
used throughout the whole three-year period came in July 2011, with the average 
percentage of UGC used in news packages broadcast in that month being 53.05%. 
This was the only month that saw a figure greater than 50%. This period was during 
the first few months of the conflict when Arab uprisings in other countries had died 
down. Also, western journalists at this stage were still unable to legally enter Syria 
and so, with the exception of a BBC Arabic journalist who was very restricted in her 
movements, journalists were largely relying on content coming out of the country 
(BBC Trust 2012a).  
Overall there was a gradual decline in the use of footage, with the exception 
of a few months in the first year: October 2011 (37.5%), December 2011 (39.2%) 
and April 2012 (42.3%). Interestingly, high levels of UGC didn’t necessarily equate 
to a large amount of overall output. While December 2011 had a high percentage of 
UGC as a monthly average, only five news packages were coded from that period. 
Of these, only one package - Paul Wood’s reports from 7th December 2011 - was 
dispatched in the field with original BBC content from Syria in it, and even that 
included five UGC clips.  
The remaining news packages coded in December, which referred to events 
in Syria specifically, mainly contained agency footage and UGC clips, as well as 
some footage reused from Wood’s report to illustrate certain points. These were 
compiled by journalists in Lebanon, Jerusalem and London respectively.  
After April 2012 the gradual drop in use of UGC continued, and by 
December 2012 the average percentage was 40%. Thereafter, in the last 15 months 
sampled up to March 2014, no month had a UGC average of more than 30%, again 
highlighting the overall reduction in the use of UGC as the conflict continued. A 
discussion of possible reasons for this and the overall implications of this 
development follows in the later Discussion chapter. 
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Varying percentages 
While 21.7% was the overall UGC average, drawing on all 273 reports, there 
was also considerable variation in the percentage of UGC when looking at the 
sample, as Figure 4.2 illustrates. 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.2: Breakdown of proportion of UGC coded in BBC TV News reports about Syria which   
broadcast on BBC World News Television between March 2011 and March 2014 by percentage. 
n=273) 
 
Of these packages, 113 had UGC footage which amounted to less than 10% 
of the overall news package content. Forty seven news packages contained UGC 
which made up 10-19% of the report, 77 packages featured UGC which amounted to 
between 20% and 49% of the overall report. In addition, of the 273 packages 
examined for UGC, 36 had content where the total percentage of UGC within the 
reports amounted to more than 50%. This suggests that while UGC was useful to 
depict events that could not be shown otherwise, it was frequently used in tandem 
with other non-UGC content, such as Syria State TV footage, agency footage and, 
where possible, original BBC footage. Indeed, when packages which contained 
original BBC content aired, the audience would be told explicitly. Ian Pannell’s 
report from 16 April 2012, which saw him filming with the Free Syrian Army in 
Idlib in Northern Syria, is a good example of this. In fact, the cue into the package 
made it clear that Pannell had dispatched from there, stating, "Access for journalists 
in Syria is restricted, but our correspondent Ian Pannell and cameraman Darren 
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Conway sent this report from inside Idlib Province.” (BBC internal document, 16 
April 2012). 
Given the value of this content, the footage would frequently be used in other 
reports over the following days, to depict events on the ground. Pannell’s report and 
also Jeremy Bowen’s coverage of the battle for the Christian city of Maaloula (which 
first aired on 11th September 2013) are both good examples of this, as clips from 
their packages were used in other BBC reports in the days and months that followed, 
to illustrate the violence happening inside Syria. 
Verification 
While audiences were very occasionally informed that content used in a news 
package was UGC, and may have learned where UGC clips were sourced or obtained 
from, this is not the same as actually stating that the content is believed to be true or 
accurate. One of the main challenges for journalists with little or no access to a 
region where news events are taking place is that they must rely on footage from 
other sources. In situations such as the conflict in Syria, those sources may not be 
traditional news agencies to whom organisations pay a subscription fee each year, 
and may not in fact be journalists at all. With this in mind, steps may need to be 
taken to ensure content is what it purports to be. Therefore, UGC clips appearing in 
news packages were also coded to see whether they contained a verification warning, 
and Figure 4.3 details the findings. The difficulty was, only if it was an official 
source (or a BBC crew themselves) that captured the footage, could BBC journalists 
be certain the content was real or an accurate portrayal of events. Although, as is 
discussed in Discussion chapter (Chapter 6), certain sources were more trusted than 
others.  
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(Figure 4.3: percentage of UGC clips used in BBC News TV reports about Syria which aired on BBC 
World News TV between March 2011 and March 2014 which carried a verification warning. n=1007) 
   
Despite UGC being used in news packages throughout the three years 
analysed, verification warnings were only in place for 85 (8%) of the clips which 
were coded. This meant that the remaining 922 clips (92%) which were coded for 
this research did not have a verification warning, despite coming from a non-BBC 
source.  
In some cases, there were details in Jupiter stating whether the content was 
UGC, and in the package the timeline content would be coded in red on Jupiter.  
However, there would not necessarily be detail about whether a piece had been 
verified within that information. There are of course exceptions to this and, in the 
rights information in Jupiter for certain clips, there might be details - as in the case of 
the Jupiter files relating to a package which aired on 21 December 2013, shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
 
8%
92%
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Verification Warnings: Yes
Verification Warnings: No
123 
 
 
(Figure 4.4: Screengrab from Jupiter of news package on Syria conflict which aired on 21 December 
2013. The timeline shows a red line and an ‘R’ in the copyright box. The copyright information and 
restrictions state this footage has not been independently verified, but this did not result in an on air 
warning for this particular clip.) 
 
As well as the red ‘R’ restriction which suggests the content should have a 
warning, within the copyright information one particular video clip which runs from 
00:00:40:06 to  00:00:58:22 is labelled ‘AMVID VIA The Associated Press’ and 
further states: 
‘APTN HAVE NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED THE CONTENT 
OF THIS 
VIDEO OBTAINED FROM A SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE. IF YOU 
WISH TO  
USE IT CONTACT THE UGC HUB ON XXXX’ 
(BBC internal document, 21 December 2013) 
While this is not directly ordering whoever was using the footage to use a 
warning, the advisory instruction would strongly suggest that some kind of caveat 
should have been used.  Further investigation reveals that the clip to which the 
written warning information referred was UGC from the Local Co-ordinating 
Committee in Ankhel, which is a pro-regime change media organisation, and fits 
under the ‘Media’ category. This is identifiable by the watermarked logo, but the 
verification procedure (as will be discussed in the next chapter) involved much more 
than just identifying a source, hence the advisory would have been put in place.   
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Interestingly, it was not the piece of UGC which had an in-house advisory 
that got an ‘on air’ warning. In this particular report, the script referred to ‘these 
unverified pictures’ when another UGC clip, one from Shahba Press, was on screen 
at 0:26s (Figure 4.5). This underlines that even when verification advisories are 
suggested, they might get ignored or a warning put in place elsewhere.  
(Figure 4.5: Screengrab of Jupiter showing news report using footage with Shahba Press logo. Rights 
information says this content is ‘Not Unknown’ but the logo meant it was coded as ‘Media’. The 
footage didn’t contain any advisories, but a verbal on air warning was given when it aired in a news 
report) 
 
This is perhaps typical of the few packages where warnings were used – they 
didn’t always correlate with what those verifying the content suggested, and their use 
was nowhere near as rigorous as the actual process of checking the footage. This 
finding is expanded upon in the second half of this results chapter, which focuses on 
a more qualitative analysis of the BBC World News TV coverage of the Syria 
conflict. 
 
Audience awareness 
While it was possible to use metadata and copyright information in order to 
code where a piece of UGC had been sourced from, this information was not always 
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passed on to the audience. The next section examined whether, once a piece was 
categorised as UGC, the audience were made aware of its source. 
 
                          
(Figure 4.6: Proportion of UGC clips included BBC News TV reports on Syria conflict which 
aired on BBC World News TV between March 2011 and March 2014, where the audience was 
made aware of source of UGC. n=1007)  
 
Figure 4.6 highlights that in two thirds of cases (66%) the audience was not 
informed of where content had been obtained or sourced from. This is not the same 
being told whether content was UGC, which was a further category that was coded 
and will be explored later on in this chapter. The BBC and other media outlets 
frequently used newswire services and agency footage from the likes of Reuters, 
without either a credit or citing it as a source. This finding raises interesting 
questions about whether content sources should be given if that information is 
available, and if the content comes from a non-traditional outlet. This is tackled in 
the Discussion chapter. 
Crediting content 
The research also posed the question, “If the audience is made aware of the 
source of the content, how was this depicted?” The way in which audiences were told 
where UGC had been obtained from, or to whom it was ‘credited’, were broken 
down into four formats: via cue, aston, script or logo. A breakdown and explanation 
of these formats was outlined in the Methodology chapter, but in brief: 
Audience 
aware: Yes
34%
Audience 
aware: No
66%
Audience aware: Yes
Audience aware: No
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1: Cue: This referred to the introduction to a news package. 
2: Aston: These are name or credit tabs which appear onscreen.  
3: Script: This refers to the voiceover or ‘track’ used in a package. 
4: Logo: This refers to a logo which was burnt or watermarked onto footage, 
something separate to credit astons. As was the case with the previous ‘content 
source’ question, each time a different logo appeared in a package a screengrab was 
taken of it in a bid to identify the source if it was not immediately obvious. For 
example, ‘Douma City’ and ‘Shaam News Network’ have English lettering and 
easily identifiable logos, but other unknown logos would still be put under this same 
‘logo’ category. The results of this coding are detailed in Figure 4.7: 
 
(Figure 4.7: Format in which audience were given source detail of UGC clips within BBC TV news 
packages on Syria which aired on BBC World News TV between March 2011 and March 2014. 
n=1007)  
 
The content analysis found that the vast majority of clips which were coded 
as UGC (701) did not credit a source on air. Where there was some form of source 
depiction, logos were present in most cases (306) although, given that the BBC did 
not put them in place, there is an argument that while they may have informed the 
audience of where UGC clips were obtained from if the audience recognised the 
symbol, it was not a direct example of crediting content. This issue is highlighted by 
Wardle et al in their 2014 work, which found broadcasters often used logos as a 
default way of crediting, though for the audience this may not go far enough. 
Voiceover scripts referred to content sources in 32 cases and only 19 clips had their 
127 
 
 
sources identified via astons. Overall, having consulted scripts found in respective 
running orders which included in the reports, none of the content was credited or 
referred to in cues used to introduce news packages. This might be because packages 
could be used elsewhere, such as online, and were generally expected to be self-
contained. 
Sources of content 
The ways in which UGC comes into the hands of producers at the BBC can 
vary greatly. Staff interviewed as part of this research stated that - in an ideal world - 
all UGC would go through the dedicated Hub, but that in reality footage could be 
processed elsewhere, and research findings suggest information is not always 
universally catalogued. However, by looking at shotlists and other metadata which 
accompanied the coded news packages, it was in some cases possible to discern 
where content had been obtained from. This section focuses on where content was 
obtained from and also whether audience members were made aware of this content 
source. In some cases this information was not apparent just by viewing the footage, 
but also by consulting shotlists which were included in the codebook. 
  If the source was apparent just by viewing the content then this was 
catalogued; if the source was indicated via the rights list which gives ‘restrictions’ 
and source information shot by shot in Jupiter, and thus not readily available to 
audiences, this was also marked. There was a large variation in sources (App.3) and 
these were broken down into sub-categories.  
Explaining sub-categories 
As an illustration of sub-categories, the package by Caroline Hawley - which 
was broadcast on Sunday 31 July 2011 - had one UGC clip at one minute and seven 
seconds (1.07.16) into the package, and the shotlist which contained rights details 
suggested this clip was from ‘Ugarit News via APTN’ (see Table 4.2). 
 
SYRIA/HAWLEY/1800/31/7  Sun Jul 31 18:00:00 BST 2011 
00:00:00:00   00:00:11:00   SHAMS Amvid Via APTN   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
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(Table 4.2: Shotlist from SYRIA/HAWLEY/1800/31/7 package exported from Jupiter into Excel) 
 
The shotlist was used as the primary source of information for finding out 
where content had been obtained from, although if there was additional information 
detailed in Jupiter this would be included in the notes exported to Excel. Therefore, 
when it came to narrowing down the content for analysis for the 1:07:16 clip, the 
content source was coded as ‘Ugarit News’. Another package, by Jim Muir from 3rd 
March 2012, had a clip which appeared at 00.36.12 seconds and was labelled in the 
rights shotlist as coming from ‘YouTube’. However, upon watching the report it was 
apparent that the clip had a Ugarit News logo (Table 4.3), and, therefore, the clip 
would be coded ‘Ugarit’.  This shows that sources could be more clearly determined 
by viewing content for confirmation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
00:00:11:00   00:00:22:19   SHAMS Amvid Via APTN   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
00:00:22:20   00:00:30:15   SHAMS Amvid Via Reuters   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known  
00:00:30:20   00:00:59:15   SHAMS Amvid Via Reuters   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
00:00:40:20   00:00:59:15   SHAMS Amvid Via Reuters   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
00:00:59:00   00:01:07:08   SHAMS Amvid Via Reuters   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
00:01:07:16   00:01:22:08   Ugarit News Via APTN   A   Care: Usage 
Restrictions Not Known 
00:01:22:09   00:01:32:08   SHAMS Amvid Via APTN   A   Care: 
Usage Restrictions Not Known 
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SYRIA/MUIR/12062/3    Fri Mar 02 12:06:00 GMT 2012 
In some cases, determining the source involved looking at watermarked logos 
on the footage. Each time a different logo appeared in a package a screengrab was 
taken, in a bid to identify the source if it was not immediately obvious. For example, 
footage broadcast by the ‘Douma City’ outlets had English lettering and easily 
identified logos (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4.). 
 
00:00:00:00   00:00:07:04   syrian tv   A   Limited news use under fair dealing. Check with senior 
news editor before use. No live use 
00:00:07:05   00:00:21:15      G   NO RESTRICTION 
00:00:21:16   00:00:36:11   Am Vid via YouTube   A   CARE: Usage restrictions not identified. 
syria/youtube syria/hospital/0822/6/2 
00:00:36:12   00:00:36:18   Youtube   A   Usage restrictions not known--check reuse 
00:00:36:19   00:00:37:02   Youtube   A   Usage restrictions not known--check reuse 
00:01:00:16   00:01:01:14      G   NO RESTRICTION 
00:01:01:15   00:01:10:23   Don't Know   A   This video just uploaded shows the French journalist, 
Edith Bouvier, who was hit yesterday in Homs alongside Marie Colvin and French cameraman Remi 
Ochlik.  
00:01:10:24   00:01:14:05   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:14:06   00:01:16:22      G   NO RESTRICTION 
00:01:16:23   00:01:23:14   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:10:24   00:01:14:05   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:14:06   00:01:16:22      G   NO RESTRICTION 
00:01:16:23   00:01:23:14   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:10:24   00:01:14:05   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:14:06   00:01:16:22      G   NO RESTRICTION 
00:01:16:23   00:01:23:14   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:23:15   00:01:26:20   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:26:21   00:01:37:19   Various   A   careful: restrictions not identified 
00:01:16:23   00:01:23:14   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:23:15   00:01:26:20   EVN   A   care: usage restrictions not identified 
00:01:26:21   00:01:37:19   Various   A   careful: restrictions not identified 
 
 (Table 4.3 Shotlist from SYRIA/MUIR.1206/2/3 package exported from Jupiter into in Excel) 
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(Figure 4.8 BBC news package footage with Douma City logo watermarked was categorised 
as ‘Arabic Media Agency’) 
 
Where it was not possible to name the source logo at the time, it was put into 
a ‘general’ category and researched afterwards. When it came to analysis, a large 
number of the logos were written in Arabic but were known to be organisations or 
groups such as social media channels or Local Co-ordinating Committees (LCCS). 
Others were thought to be rebel groups based on the style of the logo or translation of 
the Arabic writing used, for example the Free Syrian Army, Nusra Front and Islamic 
State (Figure 4.9).  
(Figure 4.9. Islamic State logo watermarked on BBC package was categorised as ‘Rebel’) 
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Where it was not immediately clear what the source was, it was recorded as 
‘Unknown’. A more detailed breakdown of the categories used in the codebook 
follows, expanding on what was outlined in the Methodology chapter. 
Category breakdown 
 Media Group: These included local media groups such as Arbeen 
Media Bureau, Murters Zamalaka and Douma Media Group (Figure 4.10). In some 
cases, these groups would have an agenda, perhaps giving an anti-Assad or anti-
regime viewpoint, but they were not known to be directly affiliated to any 
organisation. Some of the Local Co-ordinating Committees which operated 
nationwide would also be placed in this category. 
    (Figure 4.10: Douma Media Centre logo watermarked on BBC footage categorised as ‘Media’) 
    
  Rebel or Opposition Group: This included Aleppo Media Centre, 
an organisation that later transpired to be affiliated to the rebels in the Syria conflict 
and was considered to be ‘pro revolution’. Social media channels such as Shahba 
Press, which was initially considered an opposition group but was later linked to 
rebel fighters, was also included in this group (see Figure 4.11). 
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     (Figure 4.11: Shahba Press logo watermarked on BBC footage was categorised as ‘Rebel’) 
 
However, numerous other organisations which had a more militant 
perspective also came under this category. These included the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), Ahrār ash-Shām, an Islamic Rebel Group (Figure 4.12) and what was initially 
the Nusra Front, but during the course of the Syria conflict emerged as Islamic State 
(IS).  
 
(Figure 4.12: The watermarked logo on BBC TV footage was identified as being from Islamic rebel     
group Ahrār ash-Shām, and was categorised as ‘Rebel’ in the codebook field) 
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 Arabic media agencies: ‘Douma City’, ‘Shaam News Network’ and 
‘Ugarit News’ outlets had English lettering and easily identified logos, and were put 
into a category in their own right, namely ‘Arabic media agencies’.  
 YouTube: This was used as a sourcing category only when another 
category could not be identified and rights information stated YouTube in its source 
description. 
 Western media agencies: These included EVN, Reuters and APTN.  Similar 
to YouTube, this category was used as a last resort when the content could 
not be categorised as anything else. This stance was taken because, 
frequently, footage that stated it came via agencies in the rights details would 
have logos which suggested it was not original agency footage. 
 Other: This referred to content which didn’t fit into one of the other 
categories, and included agency footage where the Jupiter shotlist advised what the 
content was but not source e.g. UGC, AmVid etc.  
 Unknown: An ‘Unknown’ category was included and was used when 
source information was not relayed in the news package or in the rights information, 
nor could it be gleaned from viewing or analysing footage. In some cases the shotlist 
actually stated ‘Unknown’ in terms of copyright.   
Content source results 
The results of this stage of coding and analysis are captured in Figure 4.13. 
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(Figure 4.13: Breakdown of source of UGC, where BBC obtained footage from for use in reports 
relating to the Syria conflict broadcast March 2011-2014 n=1007)     
 
In this case most UGC clips (404) came from sources deemed to be 
‘Unknown’. YouTube itself was the next most popular ‘source’, with 123 items. 
While YouTube is a UGC and video sharing platform it has been included as a 
source, as the coding sheet makes it very clear this field pertains to where content 
may have been obtained from. As well as learning that content came from YouTube 
by watching the news reports, YouTube was frequently cited in rights information as 
a source. There were 123 Western Media agencies, though as previously mentioned 
this was used as a last resort. In many cases that this source was deduced based on 
the rights from Jupiter rather than it being highlighted to the audience or gauged 
from logos. 
Rebel groups were perceived as the source for 108 clips and included 15 
instances where Islamic State (IS) or Nusra Front clips were used, seven Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) clips and seven instances where clips were identified as Aleppo Media 
Centre footage, via the logo watermarked on it (Figure 4.14).  
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(Figure 4.14: Aleppo Media Centre (AMC) footage was identified by watermarked logo and was 
coded as ‘Rebel’, as AMC is affiliated to rebel fighters and has a ‘pro-revolution’ stance) 
 
There are undoubtedly other activist and/or rebel media channels, but these 
were the most easily identifiable.  
The next most popular category was ‘Other’, which referred to agency 
content or content that didn’t fit into any other category, such as media group, rebel 
group or one of the key Arabic agency outlets – Shaam News Network, Ugarit News 
and Douma City. This category had 103 items, and included footage with logos 
which could not be identified. In preparation for data collection, Google Images was 
used to become familiar with the key logos of the most common media outlets and 
rebel groups. For other logos, Syrians working for the BBC and staff from BBC 
Arabic provided advice and guidance prior to analysis. If outlets’ logos could not be 
identified following that discussion they were put into ‘Other’, as they clearly had a 
known source but it was not possible to identify the group or organisation. Figure 
4.15 is an example of such footage, where Syrians working in the UK could not 
identify the logo easily.  
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(Figure 4.15: Screengrab of footage from package from 21 August 2013. It was not possible to 
identify the logo, which did not feature in any other UGC coded in this study. Details in Jupiter 
record it as ‘Unverified UGC via the internet’) 
 
One of the most challenging issues around identifying the source of the 
content of UGC used in news reports was the need to have a working knowledge of 
the vast array of local media, social media and rebel media outlets. The other 
difficulty was that both social groups and militant organisations became not only 
more organised, but also more fragmented as the conflicted continued. Therefore, 
outlets creating or distributing content also changed over time, and content that might 
be considered to come from a ‘Media source’ at one point in the conflict might be 
classified in this study as a ‘Rebel source’ some months later. For example, certain 
groups which publicised contented on social media were later found to be affiliated 
to the FSA or other opposition fighters. A more detailed discussion about the 
classification of content and the issues around changing media groups is provided in 
the Discussion chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Document Analysis 
In addition to carrying out a quantitative content analysis as part of this 
thesis, the research included a more in-depth analysis of documents associated with 
relevant individual news reports which were broadcast on BBC World News 
Television throughout the same research period. As was outlined in the Methodology 
chapter (Chapter 3), this involved analysis of ‘Key UGC files’ relating to Syria that 
were kept for each day.  These files were stored in the ENPS system in a dedicated 
folder and were essentially ‘operational notes’ containing details about pieces of 
video which had been examined by staff from the UGC Hub.  The data was collected 
at the same time as the larger quantitative content analysis, but the Key UGC file 
data analysed in this section was analysed afterwards, which enabled the researcher 
to have an understanding of the themes and possible patterns which emerged when 
dealing with these reports and the associated video content.  
Analysing the data 
Analysing the data involved examining the Key UGC files, and focused in 
particular on dates when there were more than seven clips recorded in that day’s 
folder. The figure of seven was chosen because, when the full list of clips processed 
each day was analysed, seven was the most common number other than zero, which 
suggested no clips had been logged in Key UGC files that day. In total, the sample 
took in documents from 36 different dates in the three-year period March 2011 to 
March 2014, although given a change in the way that UGC data was regularly 
archived from mid-2013, the last Key UGC file to be analysed and presented in this 
section was in December 2013. This document analysis gives an insight into those 
practices and reveals more about how video from Syria was catalogued and 
processed, and the work done by various BBC outlets to enable this UGC to be used. 
Notes were made about the Key UGC files manually and these were coded 
thematically with the results analysed, using a mixture of Excel and NVivo.  Details 
about the verification processes, the involvement of other departments and whether 
language or pictures were mentioned were among the aspects noted in the research.  
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Importantly, as was outlined in the Methodology chapter, due to there not 
being a formal BBC database of footage used in TV output, it was not possible to 
fully correlate whether the Key UGC clips being described in the files were the same 
as ones that appeared in that day’s packages. In that respect this part of the chapter 
provides details of the main themes connected to the overall content analysis, rather 
than a comprehensive outline of the footage used, as was the case in the quantitative 
section.  
Categorical differences 
There was a large amount of information in the Key UGC files, which 
included detailed visual descriptions of video clips, sources and indicators as to 
whether the video had been through some sort of verification process, as well as what 
that might be. Some files also included a link to where the footage had been located, 
for example a Local Coordinating Committee’s Facebook page or YouTube URL. 
These details help us understand more about journalistic roles and routines in terms 
of accessing and verifying UGC, an area of significant interest to both scholars and 
practitioners. The way that the files were arranged and written was not always 
uniform. There were variations in how UGC clips were catalogued within the Key 
UGC files, which might indicate differences in how they were actually analysed and 
processed. Figure 4.16 is an excerpt from a file related to a UGC clip from 27 April 
2011, which was detailed within the Key UGC files folder in ENPS. 
BBC Newswire: NWR RAWPIX 
Source: YouTube/Facebook 
Location: Syria – Unconfirmed 
Date/Time: 27.4.2011 Restrictions/Credits: None 
Story info: Unconfirmed comments and video added to social networks 
this morning says that Syrian army tanks are being driven to Deraa. 
(Figure 4.16: Excerpt from Key UGC files, 27 April 2011) 
 
The key information relayed in this portion of the file included source details, 
information about the location and date of the footage, and whether the source is 
known or unknown, tying into the quantitative content analysis results. Interestingly, 
some files included details of restrictions on using content and relevant credits. In the 
case identified here there were none, but often there might be if an outlet such as 
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Shaam News is identified. Shaam News was coded in the quantitative section of this 
content analysis as one of the most popular of the named content sources in its 
category, alongside Ugarit and Douma City News outlets, though the category itself 
was the second least used.  
To provide context, some story information was often given in the file. There 
would usually also be detail relating to verification, which would largely be a blanket 
disclaimer such as: “Caution: This video is not verified and as such as we have not 
spoken to the person who filmed it. Please use cautionary wording in any cues 
describing it.” (Key UGC files, 10 June 2011). A more detailed analysis and 
discussion around the verification aspect of this work will follow later. 
These basic elements formed a part of most clip files analysed, highlighting 
the main focus for journalists in terms of gathering information. Beyond these basic 
details, however, there were significant differences in the level of information 
available about each UGC clip, depending on a variety of factors. For example, the 
files might also detail what the particular video clip was called if it had been stored 
in Jupiter, as well as where it had been found online and potentially a URL. In the 
case detailed above, footage was found on Facebook embedded with a link to 
YouTube, but this information would not always be included. This may be a 
reflection of the different workloads journalists had, or different roles journalists 
were undertaking while cataloguing this content. 
Other information was logged in the file for the guidance of producers rather 
than for broadcast, and gives us an insight into the working practices of journalists 
and how they share information with their colleagues. This was detailed explicitly 
with the line “Text below this line is for guidance only” (Key UGC files, 5 May 
2011). While certain content within the files was not included with the aim of it 
being relayed to the audience, the BBC Trust and other research now suggests that a 
greater level of transparency regarding verification and sourcing processes, and 
passing some information about them beyond the newsroom, could be beneficial (see 
Mortimer 2012, Wardle et al 2014).  For example, one file from 27 April 2011 stated 
that the UGC video included unconfirmed quotes from Facebook Group ‘Syrian 
Days of Rage’, with the guidance: “Here is an amateur video that shows troops of 
soldiers going to Deraa to intensify the siege over the city.  This is not verified as 
explicitly true.” In this respect this additional information could be beneficial, as it 
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informs journalists undertaking newsgathering using the UGC about the nature and 
context of the footage, especially if they did not have a direct connection to the staff 
processing this content. Another clip from the same day featured detail about the 
voiceovers used in the video and also a translation, which provided further context: 
The chanting in the first clip says: Both the people and the army seek 
unity. Then they chant: “God, Syria and nothing else but Freedom.” The 
first banner reads: “We will sacrifice our blood and soul for the city of 
Deraa.” The second banner reads: “The Baath Party is the cause of our 
problems.” 
(Key UGC files, 27 April 2011) 
The file relating to this clip also stated that the voiceover mentioned Babr 
Amr. It also included a hyperlink to the YouTube video which suggests the footage 
may have been taken the day before, 26 April 2011. Interestingly the video also 
opened with date signs (Figures 4.18 and 4.19). 
                
(Figure 4.17: Screengrab of YouTube video uploaded 26 April 2011) 
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(Figure 4.18: Screengrab of YouTube video uploaded 26 April 2011) 
 
As the examples shown here indicate, while some of the detail given in the 
Key UGC files was structured and set information was given on many occasions, 
files still varied widely in terms of the information that was provided about clips. 
Indeed, while there is now a set verification process in place in relation to checking 
UGC, including that which comes in on agency feeds, the files analysed here indicate 
that verification and cataloguing processes of some footage and other relevant details 
were not set in stone, and at times could be slightly ad-hoc. Arguably, this was 
particularly the case in relation to clips examined during the first weeks and months, 
when journalists were working in what was largely unchartered territory in terms of 
the skills needed and the amount of UGC which was available to process. This 
hypothesis echoes the findings of the qualitative interviews and newsroom 
observations which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Delving for more detail 
The information gleaned from videos and detailed in the Key UGC files 
folder in ENPS seemed to alter as the conflict went on, telling us more about 
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journalistic routines. For example, before more dynamic relationships with both BBC 
Monitoring and BBC Arabic were established - which resulted in a new attachment 
system and a Syria specialist working in BBC Monitoring - the content studied here 
suggests BBC staff informally drew on the expertise of Arabic speakers. For 
example, one YouTube Clip from 29 April 2011 was accompanied by the following 
two-part note: 
Notes on audio verification from Middle Eastern Monitoring -  
  
This clip was filmed in Dayr az-Zawr in eastern Syria, the man on the 
mic says “today whoever beats us we will break his head” and then he 
says “All security elements must leave within 30 seconds” they break into 
cheering, “God is great”, “One, one, the Syrian people are one”, “No 
traitor”, “we are going to paradise martyrs in our millions” and “Allah, 
Syria and Freedom alone.” 
 
UGC hub note – I have run the page through Google translate. The title 
says day of age or anger and today's date.   
(Key UGC files, 29 April 2011)    
While the clip above was sent to someone in BBC Monitoring, many other 
clips featured testimony from Arabic speakers from other parts of the newsroom who 
did not have direct links to UGC. In this and many other cases, the Arabic speakers’ 
role was to discern and then provide an audio description of what was being said in a 
video. This would be noted down and recorded in the relevant Key UGC File by the 
UGC Hub. However, based on the files analysed in this study, there were many 
instances where Arabic speakers did not provide any further detail in relation to what 
the video content actually showed. This might be because they didn’t have time to do 
any more research, given they were trying to do their own jobs as well as assist 
colleagues, or in other cases because they didn’t have enough background knowledge 
to provide further detail. 
Verification processes 
As has been proposed throughout this thesis, and, the process of checking and 
verifying UGC before it went to air was crucial. This was a task that BBC journalists 
learned the importance of throughout the process of covering the Syria conflict, as 
well as other key events throughout the Arab Spring (and even earlier, such as the 
Iran election protests in 2009). By examining the documents related to this process in 
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more detail, it was possible to gain a further understanding of what the work entails 
and the multiple stakeholders involved – highlighting the ‘hierarchies of influence’ 
involved in decision making about UGC and other footage (Reese 2007). However, 
as is indicated in the main content analysis, details of these processes were rarely 
translated to the audiences in the forms of on air warnings or caveats 
The topic of verification and the risks and issues associated with it are 
expanded upon in the results chapter in relation to the newsroom ethnography and 
qualitative interviews (Chapter 5). However, as has already been established in this 
chapter, new relationships and workflows were recognised between the UGC Hub, 
BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring. While these were initially informal exchanges, a 
more structured workflow was set up later on. These findings are complemented by 
the sociology of news approach adopted for this research, which highlights the issues 
of verification, transparency and evolving newsroom roles as key areas to be 
examined when researching the role of the journalist (Schudson 1989).  
Evidence of these informal workflows was seen in some of the Key UGC 
files analysed. Repeated references to staff from other departments indicate they 
were called upon to help look at content. In providing a translation of videos and an 
understanding of the locality, BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring were both key 
stakeholders in the verification process. In the first instance this was done on an ad-
hoc basis and there was no clear line of communication – some of the text was cut 
and pasted directly from emails. In other files, a BBC Arabic producer wrote directly 
about what he believed the content to show. While this contribution was highly 
valued, the speed and arguably the quality of the translation, description and insight 
into what a video showed would entirely depend on who was contactable within 
BBC Monitoring or BBC Arabic, and on their experience. This modification of 
newsroom routines ties into both the sociology of news and the gatewatching 
approaches, the implications of which are discussed in the next chapter. 
For example, one producer could translate what was being said in video 
dialogue but was unable to confirm the location of a video, while someone who was 
Syrian and had visited the country relatively recently would be in a position to 
provide more detail and content. For example, BBC Monitoring assessed one video 
in May 2011 and stated in the Key UGC files that they believed the shooting to be 
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genuine and the location to be Barzeh, Damascus. However, they also provided more 
detail and views on what it depicted. 
The riot police is believed to be Shabiha, dressed in riot police uniforms. 
Note that they're wearing civilian clothes under their gear. The date is 
believed to be around Good Friday, 22 April and it was uploaded to 
youtube on 3 May. 
(Key UGC files, 3 May 2011) 
As a result, the verification process in the initial months of the Syrian 
conflict, while important, was carried out in a largely unstructured manner with no 
proper framework outside of the UGC Hub to streamline what was already a difficult 
process. Verification also came through multiple channels, with staff from BBC 
Arabic also doing their own verification for content going onto their own outlets. 
This was highlighted in another example where a BBC Arabic journalist made notes 
on a video which was processed on 10 June 2011. The note relating to the clip in the 
Key UGC files folder states that: 
“It looks quite clear that it is the Jisr al-Shughour area. The person heard 
commenting in the video is saying that the video was taken on the 8th of 
June 2011, and that families and children are currently staying in the 
nearby jungle due to the ‘catastrophe’ happening in the town”. 
(Key UGC files, 10 June 2011) 
Content found ‘in the field’ 
While Arabic-speaking journalists within the BBC’s newsrooms were crucial 
in terms of checking dialogue and content, much of the video which was initially 
spotted or sent in for checking actually came from BBC journalists working in the 
field, particularly in neighbouring countries. Their expertise in working in the region 
was useful in looking at footage. As shown in this example below from May 2011, it 
was not always clear how such journalists had come to the conclusions that the 
content was credible. This is not to say that these journalists were incorrect in their 
interpretation, but unlike those detailing the content they had checked via the Key 
UGC files in ENPS, there was not as much detail as to why the content was thought 
to be accurate. This was another reason to carry out the analysis after the main 
content analysis and qualitative data collection, as these themes allowed the 
researcher to give context to the documents being analysed. 
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This video has been assessed by the BBC bureau XXXX, who believe it 
to be credible. It appears to be from Wednesday 4 May and showing 
tanks in Palmyra, Syria.  The video has not been verified as such, as we 
have not been able to contact the people who shot the original footage. 
Please use appropriate cautionary wording in any cues describing the 
footage. 
(Key UGC files, 6 May 2011) 
Other pieces of UGC were looked at by BBC journalists in the field, in 
addition to BBC teams in London, in order to ‘brainstorm’; and multiple people 
checked the content before making it available to outlets, such as the following notes 
relating to a clip from 10 June 2011. The notes contained analysis about local accents 
which could only be provided by a knowledgeable Arabic speaker from the region: 
The video purports to show the army heading to Jisr al-Shughour. The 
Arabic audio is in a northern rural Syrian accent. One of them is saying: 
“We have never seen this amount of army in our life, man”. The other 
said sarcastically: “What are they going to Golan, man.” The woman was 
murmuring about God forbid what will happen next. Then one man said: 
“There are police coming up at the roundabout, so hide your camera.” 
(Key UGC Files, 10 June 2011)       
    
Another video from the same week which the UGC team cleared for use also 
had evidence in the detailed notes which suggested a joined up approach was used in 
relation to video coming in from Syria: one individual was not solely responsible for 
checking content, it was a group effort from multiple teams across the BBC as these 
Key UGC file notes suggest.  
The XXX team on the ground have verified this -- showed to XXX 
reporter, verified accents, showed it to Syrians who've come across the 
border to verify the accents, got a translation. Verified they are Syrian 
uniforms. No idea of date.  
(Key UGC files, 9 June 2011)     
   
This cataloguing of where content was used within the BBC once verified 
was in no way uniform, but it would undoubtedly be useful for journalists working 
with this content in the future. Indeed, as the results of the qualitative interviews and 
newsroom observations show, it has taken nearly three years for a more streamlined 
workflow - with regards to keeping a database of previously verified content - to be 
created, and even then this is not a pan-BBC system. It has been run as a pilot, 
mainly in BBC Arabic in collaboration with the UGC Hub.  
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One element, which was used as a coping mechanism during the start of the 
Arab uprisings and further developed during the first year of the Syria conflict, was 
the creation of an unofficial checklist. The list highlighted some of the investigations 
UGC Hub staff would do to ensure content could be used (see Murray 2011). Some 
of these were ‘common sense’ approaches and the answers to these are included in 
some Key UGC files, such as what the weather shows, time of the video upload and 
whether it was possible to speak to the person who posted the video, if it was found 
online. Given that by 2013 the BBC had also taken a ‘more relaxed’ approach to 
seeking copyright approval for video posted on YouTube if it was from Syria, 
something which will be discussed more in-depth in the next chapter, this in some 
ways made the verification process even more challenging. 
Verification during chemical attacks 
The BBC introduced an attachment system in mid-2013, whereby a member 
of staff from BBC Arabic would spend three months on an attachment at the UGC 
Hub, learning verification and social media skills while imparting their language 
expertise and knowledge of Arabic affairs. This modification to newsroom routines 
indicates that the BBC is aware that there are many more ways in which shared 
knowledge (and shared experience) of verification, Arabic language and Middle 
Eastern affairs could benefit the whole organisation, and lead to ease of access to 
UGC which has already been through the checking process.  Indeed, the Key UGC 
file notes for 21 August 2013, which was the night of the chemical attacks in Ghouta 
in Damascus, were completed by the BBC Arabic journalist who was on shift, 
highlighting the importance of that attachment role.  
I have had a look at this video. I'm confident it is from Syria. The accents 
and outside location match previous videos I have had a look at from 
Damascus. The video and pictures support each other. Today's date and 
locations (Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta) are referenced in the 
video title and cross-referenced by the commentary. The reports of the 
chemical attack are corroborated by Syrian activists and by the local co-
ordination committees. 
(Key UGC Files, 21 August 2013) 
In total 11 clips were verified overnight, with the attachment producer named 
throughout in the documents dating from that night which were analysed in this 
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research. This, and findings from the newsroom ethnography, suggest this role was 
and continues to be hugely valuable.  
Following the chemical attacks, the UGC team worked scrupulously through 
all the footage. Picture editors and producers from the main newsroom, BBC Arabic 
and Monitoring worked carefully with them on the images to choose sequences for 
television and the website. Writing about events later, Mary Hockaday, then head of 
the BBC’s multimedia newsroom, said that “close collaboration meant that we could 
advise editorial teams across TV, radio and online and explain the verification 
process to the audience too.” (BBC Internal Document 2013). 
The new workflow also resulted in a number of collaborations between 
different departments, with the World Affairs Unit, BBC Arabic, BBC Monitoring, 
News Online and the UGC Hub working with diplomatic correspondent Bridget 
Kendall to produce reports for television, as well as an online feature tracking the 
story of the Wednesday attack through the individual videos. (Kendall 2013). 
The attachment role was created as part of the ‘Arabic Change’ project within 
BBC Arabic, which saw the department restructured and different teams responsible 
for social news and interactive TV programming being created. The initiative also 
resulted in the appointment of a dedicated social media editor who oversaw 
operations for the whole of BBC Arabic. This led to a more cohesive way of thinking 
when verifying content from events in Syria, as well as a more structured 
relationship with departments such as BBC Monitoring, where a specialist in Syria 
UGC/social media was appointed in 2013. This was prior to the chemical attacks. 
Warnings 
Another important finding, that became apparent while examining content as 
part of this research, was the inclusion of caveats about how credible content should 
be used. These were put on nearly all Key UGC file notes within ENPS. While there 
was some variation in the wording in the files analysed, a disclaimer such as, “This 
video has not been verified as such, as we have not been able to speak to the person 
who took it or uploaded it” (Key UGC files, 5 May 2011) was common. Moreover, 
the wording suggested an understanding that the people filming the footage may not 
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be the same as those making it available via social media outlets or on video sharing 
sites, which raises interesting questions about copyright. 
Some advisories went further than this, such as one from 27 July 2011, a time 
when UGC usage within BBC news reports was at its peak. This operational note 
stated: “Caution: This video is not verified as such as we have not spoken to the 
person who filmed it. Please use cautionary wording in any cues and scripts 
describing it." (Key UGC files, 27 July 2011). The change in wording to also include 
the explicit suggestion to journalists in charge of news output that they include 
caveats in introductions and in the package scripts themselves, rather than a blanket 
disclaimer which assumes an understanding of the need to provide warning, is 
perhaps an indication of the learning curve UGC Hub staff and other journalists went 
through, in terms of learning to work with this footage and the risks involved in it.  
Later on in the conflict, particularly after the chemical attacks in August 
2013, there appears to have been a further change in the advice regarding verification 
warnings provided by the UGC Hub and BBC Newswire, as this example from 28 
August 2013 shows: 
Caution: We are confident this footage is genuine, but because of its 
nature and source, we cannot be certain. Any use MUST include 
cautionary wording in cues/scripts/astons/captions, such as: “The BBC 
has not been able to fully authenticate this footage, but based on 
additional checks made on it, it is believed to be genuine.” 
(Key UGC files, 28 August 2013)  
The research also included an examination of scripts and cues used by the 
BBC. Findings suggest that there was a systematic failure in applying the warnings 
given by the UGC and Newswire service in the form of ‘on air’ caveats. Warnings 
might have been provided but they were rarely included in news packages: they were 
used for just 8% of the clips coded during data collection for this research. As the 
UK’s national broadcaster and a global news outlet, the BBC is considered a trusted 
source and arguably has a duty of care to its audiences, as laid down in its charter. 
Perhaps indicating the source of content, or being transparent about what the 
organisation itself knows about events in a country where access is challenging, is as 
important as being able to include the video itself on air. 
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Limitations 
 While this piece of research can identify certain themes by drawing on the 
notes within ENPS, it is not possible to directly correlate whether each of the videos, 
which were processed by the UGC Hub, translated into on air content. One reason 
for this was the issue of sourcing. In the Key UGC files set information would be 
given, but URLs for video from sites such as YouTube were not always included. 
Moreover, where these links were included, sometimes when an attempt was made to 
access the video, the links were found to be no longer active (Figure 4.19). 
 
(Figure 4.19: One of the video URLs logged in Key UGC files is no longer active) 
 
Another challenge in determining the themes around this these documents 
was that from mid-2013, fewer and fewer entries were made in ENPS in relation to 
Key UGC files. This was evident following the data collection but was also 
discussed in interviews with staff. The reason for this change in logging may have 
been because more details were being put into the copyright information relating to 
clips, which were used in news packages and archives in Jupiter (senior story 
producer, October 2013). The main issue with this type of archiving was it meant 
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that only clips which were used in news packages were recorded. There was not a 
definitive list of UGC clips which had been verified available on a daily basis within 
ENPS.  
The issues highlighted here suggest that while the UGC Hub might have 
verified or looked at a lot of UGC content related to Syria, this did not necessarily 
result in a high level of on-air content that day. Given that one in five packages was 
coded during the sample period, this meant some consecutive days were focused on 
during peak coverage of the conflict in July 2011, but even then there did not appear 
to be a pattern where a large number of UGC Clips being processed led to more clips 
being used in the next day’s coded reports. 
Indeed, when investigating the number of UGC clips detailed in ENPS on the 
same day as a video was coded, there appeared to be no relationship at all between 
the proportion of UGC in any one package and the number of clips in the Key UGC 
files folder. For example, a news report by Bridget Kendall, which aired on 10 June 
2011, was two minutes and 28 seconds long and featured 35 seconds of UGC; yet 
eight clips were listed in Key UGC files as having been looked at that day by the 
UGC Hub, as well as other teams and departments such as BBC Arabic. Likewise, 
Jonathan Head’s package on Syria which aired on 9 March 2012 only featured 19 
seconds of UGC, but there were 17 different clips listed in Key UGC files in ENPS 
that day which had been examined and verified to a certain extent.  
Discussion 
The document analysis has sought to give an overview of the coping 
strategies and techniques used by BBC journalists to verify and catalogue UGC 
content throughout the Syria conflict. The analysis focused on dates when a large 
number of videos were logged using operational notes within the ENPS server, under 
the Key UGC files folder. Having already looked at issues of verification and 
transparency, in terms of UGC shown on air via the content analysis and codebook, 
this deeper study of associated documents allowed the researcher to draw out 
information relating to workflows, adoption of new techniques and modifications to 
certain processes. For example, stakeholders at different levels throughout the 
organisation became involved in both verification and decision-making processes 
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associated with UGC clips, telling us more about newsroom relationships and 
routines.  
 Results show that Arabic speakers from across the BBC were called upon to 
help advise on what voiceovers on video from Syria were saying. This was 
somewhat ad-hoc, however, and did not form a set process; different people were 
named, though some people more than others. Later, key stakeholders such as staff 
from BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring became involved in the verification process, 
though it was much later again before content would be sent along more formal 
channels. By mid-2013, this dynamic, inter-departmental relationship resulted in an 
attachment system, created through the Arabic Change programme. Furthermore, as 
will be discussed in the following chapter and the Discussion chapter, it resulted in 
changes to journalistic practices and structures across the BBC which links to the 
‘hierarchies of influence’ approach proposed in the sociology of news/media 
sociology theory adopted for this research. The existing expertise of staff the 
experience and preferences of editors and the timescales available for programmes 
are all aspects which could impact on the decision-making of newsroom staff 
working with UGC and striving to cover events in hard to reach areas where there is 
no journalistic coverage. 
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Chapter 5: Qualitative interviews and 
newsroom ethnography results  
This chapter will focus on the results derived from data collected during 
qualitative interviews with BBC staff and the periods of observation across BBC 
newsrooms that formed part of this research project. Acquiring new skills, 
particularly in relation to verification is a key theme which emerged from the 
research and is detailed in this chapter. Other important findings relate to new 
workflows and evolving relationships with departments and contributors. The 
findings are significant as they give insight into the complex workings of a major 
news organisation to which scholars are rarely given unprecedented access. The 
verification findings in particular, when linked to those outlined in the content 
analysis chapter, are significant as journalists learn how to navigate UGC and 
multiple sources in the digital age. The data collection methods are fully outlined in 
the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3) but, to recap briefly, the interviewees included 
correspondents, TV producers, UGC Hub staff and journalists from interactive 
programmes covering television and radio. 
The periods of newsroom observation took place within the UGC Hub and 
BBC Arabic at different points throughout 2013 and 2014. As the interviews were 
carried out both before and after the newsroom observations, it was possible to 
question some respondents on topics which arose during the observation periods. The 
structure of the fieldwork also meant it was possible to get more information about 
working practices from individuals who had not taken part in the interviews, but 
were seen undertaking working roles during the periods of observation. In this 
respect the qualitative research methods used have influenced each other, but have 
also allowed for a triangulation of findings. 
The results detailed in this chapter are divided into several sections in order to 
highlight key themes and findings. The first three sections focus on newsroom work 
and challenges. Section one looks at how journalists learnt to deal with the influx of 
UGC and the skills needed to identify this content. This ‘learning curve’ had a direct 
impact on the way that journalists processed UGC and other footage, and research 
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findings suggest that as the role of the UGC Hub has evolved, the way its journalists 
go about verifying content has “become much more forensic in nature” (news 
producer, sourcing content and guests, October 2013). Therefore, section two aims to 
explore the challenges and changes in the verification process undertaken by staff 
during the time period being researched. 
Section three examines how BBC staff’s working practices and newsroom 
workflows developed during the research period. The remaining two sections 
predominantly look at news routines and relationships with outside forces and 
stakeholders which can influence editorial decision making. It could also be argued 
that to a certain extent they can affect journalists’ access to resources. Section four 
examines relationships between journalists and contributors and journalists in the 
field. It also explores the use of certain video content which depicted events in Syria 
during the time period which was researched. Section five considers challenges 
related to issues of balance and duty of care to staff and contributors for the BBC as a 
public service broadcaster. 
 
Section 1: Starting out with a steep learning curve 
The current conflict in Syria began in March 2011 and, for the first six 
months, foreign journalists were unable to enter the country. As a result, UGC 
showing events on the ground, eyewitness testimony and contributor voices 
associated with this period were vital tools in telling the story. 
It is acknowledged in the BBC Trust’s reports into coverage of the Arab 
uprisings that the BBC initially did not cover the story of Syria as well as it might 
have, had other high profile uprisings not been taking place in the same period (BBC 
Trust 2012, 2013). This meant the initial protests did not get much coverage on BBC 
News and, with the exception of BBC Arabic journalist Lina Sinjab who was based 
in Damascus, the BBC did not have a presence in the country and did not deploy 
anyone further.  Sinjab became the Damascus correspondent in 2008, initially 
reporting mainly for World Service outlets and BBC Arabic. She grew up in 
Damascus and reported across the county during the regime's crackdown, including 
from the flashpoint city of Homs. However, at times she was restricted in what she 
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could report on and was subjected to a travel ban by Syrian authorities in 2012, 
meaning she could not leave the country and frequently risked detention. This meant 
that when reporting for certain BBC outlets, Sinjab often only depicted events, as 
opposed to providing in-depth analysis. If she could appear on air it would usually be 
via phone, and very occasionally via webcam from home (Figure 5.1). This 
move may have been connected to safety concerns, though respondents didn’t all say 
this categorically. Lina Sinjab herself wrote in 2013 about her passport - which had 
been taken from her by Syrian authorities a year previously - being returned and her 
decision to leave Syria (BBC 2013f). She was based in London as the World Service 
Middle East Editor, and in mid-2015 moved to Beirut where she continues to work 
for the BBC. 
Violence in Syria escalated throughout 2011 and it became clear that the 
conflict was not going to be a short-lived event, similar to that of Egypt; borders 
were closed and BBC journalists, alongside other western journalists, were still 
unable to legally enter Syria. Respondents said they were then forced to rely on 
information and footage coming out of the country to tell the story. 
 
                     
(Figure 5.1: Lina Sinjab appeared on BBC World News TV and other outlets, but this was mostly via 
phone, and very occasionally via webcam. She could only describe events rather than provide 
analysis) 
 
It was in situations such as this that Lina Sinjab was able to supply off-air 
expertise and information, including lists of potential contacts. She also highlighted 
video she had spotted online or footage she had been sent directly, to teams in 
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London. Respondent said she often helped with the verification process given she 
had already checked the footage herself. In this way she played a hugely important 
role in helping piece together what was happening across Syria, although she could 
not always work freely as a correspondent. These actions were in fact praised in the 
BBC Trust’s aforementioned report into coverage of Syria (BBC Trust 2012). 
Most interviewees said that compared to previous crisis and conflict events 
such as the protests following the Iran elections in 2009, the Arab uprisings of 2011 
were unprecedented in terms of the volume of content they produced - mainly UGC 
of protests and violence. Syria was very much an extension of that. All of those 
interviewed believed that they had experienced a steep learning curve in developing 
new practices to ensure that non-BBC content could go to air. Even if they were not 
directly involved in the verification process, respondents said they still felt they 
needed to learn how to use the content appropriately in terms of attribution, crediting 
and labelling, as well as warnings and caveats. This issue will be explored in more 
detail later. With previous stories, staff had processed UGC to be used alongside 
BBC material. In this respect Syria was unique, as UGC was frequently the only 
footage available and the impetus - as with all UGC - was on journalists to check that 
the content was accurate and representative of what was happening. 
In my personal opinion the Arab Spring shaped UGC, it made UGC a 
force of to be reckoned with and it made the rest of the newsroom 
realise how incredible it can be and what a great tool it is, rather than an 
occasional added extra. And I think people realised how useful social 
media was because we couldn’t get anyone in there [into Syria]. When it 
is going off in three or four cities in three or four countries you cannot 
send people in and you have people there using social media and they 
knew the power of it, probably before their own governments did, and 
certainly before the BBC did. 
(Former UGC producer and researcher, December 2013) 
Journalists spoke about devising a type of ‘checklist’ related to protest 
videos, based on their experience during the Arab uprisings. This list then enabled 
journalists to go through certain processes, in a bid to try and determine whether a 
piece of UGC was indeed what it claimed to be.  This process could apply to stills, 
but the content which would most frequently need to be checked would be video. For 
example, searching for the original source of the upload was one crucial tactic. As 
the scope of the work done by the UGC Hub became wider, as is indicated in the 
interview findings, this research suggests that the way its journalists perform their 
156 
 
 
jobs also became much more forensic in nature. Journalists have had to become “part 
detective, part librarian” (senior story producer, working with UGC). In some cases 
this has involved learning new skills, particularly around UGC and accessing and 
utilising social media platforms. These findings are also backed up by the literature 
detailed in Chapter 1, which relates to changes in journalists’ roles and routines (see 
also Murray 2011). 
I was sort of following my own path if you know what I mean. It wasn’t a 
prelaid one. And I think that’s what a lot of people covering the Arab 
Spring did, a lot of journalists, because the whole social media aspect to 
it was new. The Skype/Twitter aspects, that’s something I guess couldn’t 
have been done in previous wars, five years before, because it wasn’t 
there. 
(Story producer, sourcing content and guests, June 2013) 
A more detailed examination of the technical skills adapted by journalists, 
particularly around verifying content, will be carried out later in the chapter. 
New social media skills 
As well as traditional newsgathering techniques, journalists reported that they 
found themselves actively searching across social media platforms for information 
on events in Syria, and this searching extended to finding contributors and 
eyewitnesses. In this respect, BBC producers were encouraged by management to 
further harness social media and became more proficient at using it to uncover 
information, especially as, at times, it was a quicker medium to use to contact people. 
Also, parts of the audience were already active on platforms such as Twitter. This 
meant some journalists felt they had to develop new skills, while others merely 
updated and honed their existing skills. Staff said that adopting social media as a 
newsgathering tool was encouraged by editors, and this happened at the same time as 
social media references were being used on air regularly for the first time, either as a 
way for the audience to get in contact with BBC journalists as part of a ‘call to 
action’, or in relation to how certain stories were being reported on these platforms. 
Journalists covering Syria in particular found themselves using these platforms as 
newsgathering tools to find actual content which could be used, rather than just as a 
way to find information. 
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I needed to find an opposition voice in Damascus. I had a Twitter contact 
in another city, Latakia, and I said ‘I would love to have you, but I need a 
Syrian female voice from Damascus, do you know of anyone?’ And my 
contact said yes, and passed me on to this lady. I vetted her as usual and 
then she came on air. So I keep those relationships going because they 
pass me on to people. 
(Senior producer for interactive programming, October 2013) 
As well as working with individuals, journalists tracked Local Co-ordinating 
Committees (LCCs) set up across Syria, who regularly posted regional updates about 
the conflict on Facebook. These updates often included Arabic and English 
descriptions of video with embedded links to the footage on YouTube. The 
interviews carried out during this research confirmed producers also began sourcing 
Skype addresses, as well as joining Skype conversations with activist groups and 
eyewitnesses to garner information. They catalogued valuable on-air contributors and 
off-air contacts, often going back to them later if their information had been of value 
or proved to be true. 
With the chemical attack, my colleague from Arabic was working with 
Newsnight and wanted someone from Douma talking about the attacks… 
I contacted the LCCS and two of them came back to me. And eventually 
we got someone who claimed he was there when the attacks happened 
and was injured. Then we managed via Skype to speak to a doctor who 
was allegedly there. You can never be 100% sure but from the description 
it was very authentic…you just need to dig down into Facebook and find 
these groups and pages. It’s an essential tool, and the way it is used at 
Monitoring and Arabic right now is crucial to newsgathering. At UGC 
it’s also crucial for communication in a way it is not used elsewhere. It’s 
a way to speak to audiences, rather than just gather information. 
(Former producer, BBC Monitoring and BBC Arabic, December 2013) 
Skype in itself is arguably not a social media platform, though much has been 
written about why it should or should not be classified as such (see Middleton 2012, 
Foremski 2013). Regardless, in this situation it was certainly being used by BBC 
journalists to keep in touch with people and also to share information in an organised 
way, similar to a social networking site or a provider such as WhatsApp (Evans 
2012). In this respect, journalists working in UGC and newsgathering believed Skype 
was a useful ‘social networking tool’ (former UGC producer, December 2013) to get 
information and contact potential contributors as they tried to cover a challenging 
story with limited in-country resources. 
158 
 
 
You got to know certain people who were very useful and well 
connected, who had other contacts, and then they would pass on good 
Skype addresses. So part of what I did, on a practical level, was set 
myself up a Skype account on my mobile phone, which I didn’t have 
before. I was a total newcomer to all of that. And we also I guess had to 
be careful as to whether what they were saying was true. What was their 
motivation for saying it? Who were they? Where were they coming from? 
(News producer, sourcing guests and content, June 2013) 
Examples of verifying information or content from Skype or other sources 
could include asking contributors about the weather, or what they could see from a 
location if they had filmed or captured something, then correlating their response and 
content with Google Maps, picture reversal software and weather reports. In this 
respect traditional newsgathering techniques and ‘common sense’ approaches were 
applied to a social media setting on a scale not previously seen at the BBC. 
In 2012, there was a particular video of a Syrian soldier burying a rebel 
alive. Initially it was sent to the UGC and they had a story online about 
this video, but they passed the video onto Monitoring to have a look at. 
So I took a look and wrote down a lot of details. The main thing was 
about their footwear, they were not wearing boots, they were wearing 
sneakers. And I also wrote something about the accents, and also the fact 
the video ended before we see the man fully being buried alive. And then 
another friend who watched it added that the voice of the man being 
buried seemed like a voiceover, it was not his natural voice. So we wrote 
all these details up, and said we cannot confirm or refute the veracity of 
this video, it cannot be verified. Then we sent that back to the UGC, and 
the BBC had the story up online and they pulled it. 
(Former producer, BBC Monitoring and BBC Arabic, December 2013) 
As journalists became more adept at using social media platforms, so too did 
the contributors and those uploading footage which the BBC frequently sought to 
use. Interviews and periods of observation revealed that, while some content 
continued to be sent into the BBC directly, from mid-2011 onwards BBC journalists 
were increasingly harvesting visual content directly from social media platforms, 
such as Facebook and YouTube. 
We used to rely heavily on information coming in to us and now we’re 
going out a lot more and hunting, using social media a lot more – 
Facebook and Facebook groups as well. There is a lot of technology now 
that makes our life a lot easier than it used to. 
(Senior producer, gathering and verifying UGC, October 2013) 
One journalist argued that activists - keen to get their footage seen globally - 
would be much more likely to turn to social media than to contact separate outlets. 
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This was something that had also been seen (in their opinion) in Iran in 2009, when 
the government switched off the internet across the country at the height of the 
protests (Hänska-Ahy and Shapour, 2013). Once that blackout had been lifted there 
was a change in the way people filming - activists or not - used their content. 
If someone [in Syria] is going to get their content seen, they will smuggle 
it to an FSA commander and they’ll decide where it goes, probably 
YouTube. They won’t come onto the BBC website, see a post and send 
us their clip. 
(Senior story producer, curating and verifying content, October 2013) 
For many journalists learning to process the information was something they 
did ‘on the job’. There was an acknowledgement from some respondents that they 
were unsure about what needed ‘to be done’ in relation to using and verifying UGC 
from Arab countries where there had been unrest, and Syria in particular. Therefore, 
some interviewees said that it was possible that some content went to air without 
being checked as thoroughly as it could have been, and definitely not as rigorously as 
it would be at the time of writing this report. Indeed, while certain ‘checklists’ were 
introduced (see Murray 2011), these were initially somewhat ad-hoc; a formal 
process was not in place and verification relied mainly on individuals’ expertise and 
ability to spot ‘real’ content from Syria, as well as their contacts within the rest of the 
BBC who could help them. 
We put ‘unverified’ on YouTube pictures because YouTube pictures 
were just all over the place and still are. And it was very confusing for a 
journalist to pick out what was what. It started off just as a small stream 
and now it’s hundreds and hundreds of sources posting stuff. And then 
obviously there were caveats, ‘We tried to verify this, but we weren’t 
able to get hold of anyone else in the area,’ or ‘we asked for the 
government’s comments on this, and they said ‘no’. 
(Former news producer, sourcing guests and content, June 2013) 
My interviews confirmed that staff felt there was a lack of a ‘joined up’ 
approach and that initial methods of using, cataloguing and checking UGC were, at 
times, chaotic. This was down to both the demand for content and the large volume 
that was available. Results suggest that it was partially in response to this that new 
coping mechanisms were introduced within the UGC Hub, which interviewees said 
were aimed at streamlining the workflow. This in turn, it was hoped, would help staff 
processing UGC from Syria do so more easily. 
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Learning to understand content  
The BBC introduced new social media guidelines in 2011 and these remain 
under review, with the guidance last updated in March 2015 (Hamilton 2015). The 
guidelines acknowledged that staff were regularly processing non-BBC content, such 
as the video sharing website YouTube and other social media platforms. These 
guidelines were aimed at helping all staff, not just those dealing with UGC on a daily 
basis, to understand the steps both content and potential contributors should be put 
through before being transmitted on air. This is further evidence that journalistic 
practices have altered, and this research argues that these changes in practice have 
been accompanied by an increased reliance on content from non-traditional sources; 
in the case of Syria, this particularly relates to UGC from non-professional groups 
used since the start of the conflict. 
 
Section 2: Verification and the evolution of processes 
Several interviewees confirmed that the BBC decided to amend its copyright 
policy (BBC 2013), which previously stated that a producer should always speak to 
the uploader of content. This was specifically in relation to Syria and would not be 
the case in most other circumstances. UGC Hub staff in particular said they found it 
near impossible to speak to the people who had either filmed or uploaded any Syria 
videos, and so managers and editors relaxed the requirement to get permission to use 
the content. 
Where our verification process has had to evolve with the Arab Spring 
and Syria, is that in the past we had rigid rules where we wouldn’t use 
video unless we had spoken to the original source and got their 
permission and done a credibility check based on having a conversation 
with them. Now, because by its very nature it was almost impossible to 
get hold of the original source of these videos, we basically relaxed that 
rule in terms of needing copyright clearance permission to use these 
videos. Because we took it as granted, the risk of the person who took the 
video challenging us for copyright, was miniscule, though not non-
existent. 
(Former news editor, managing UGC, Oct 2013) 
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 This in turn had an impact on the verification and checking process which 
was carried out by staff.   
The verification process is different if you can get in touch with the 
person, then you can verify by asking certain questions. Where you get 
footage from Syria and you have to verify it is a totally different 
procedure. Because when you verify from conflict zones you cannot 
actually contact the person who filmed it. This is where you have the 
need for expertise in terms of language and how to verify landscape, 
accents etc. 
(UGC producer, December 2013) 
 Part of the verification process involved using the previously mentioned 
UGC ‘checklist’, resulting in a journalist-led review of content and an analysis of 
what it purports to show. This meant that over and above the signposting of content, 
Arabic speakers and those with a knowledge of Syria within the BBC played a 
massive part in verifying UGC for BBC use. 
I’ve done lots of verification of Syria content. Some is easy because I am 
from Damascus, there are certain neighbourhoods I know in the city so I 
can immediately see where it’s happening. With other areas, I can 
see things about a similar landscape and know roughly geographically 
where it is. And I have knowledge of accents, whether an accent is 
spoken in this area or not which helps. 
(Former producer for Monitoring and BBC Arabic, December 2013) 
 In addition to analysing accents and language, journalists said they would 
also focus on other elements; the clothes people were wearing, significant buildings, 
the weather and even flowers on the landscape. These were all used to deduce 
whether content was showing what it claimed to. However, as the conflict went on 
and journalists continued to rely on UGC to tell the story, they also faced the 
challenges of having more content to look through. As such the checklist would not 
be used in isolation.  One journalist talked of analysing multiple videos taken of the 
same event before being sure the content was real. 
With Syria, it’s almost hard to think back to the times when it was just 
about protests on the streets and then maybe guards coming and shooting 
into the crowds, and we’d have video of that. If we didn’t have a whole 
sequence or a long shot, if we just had someone shooting we would never 
have gone with that. Maybe different people will record it from different 
angles and it’s meant to be a peaceful protest and then you have someone 
coming and shooting into the crowd. If you’re able to do the jigsaw 
puzzle, to put it together in a way that we could go with the story. That 
happened a lot at the start where we would have that. 
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(Senior story producer, curating and verifying content, October 2013) 
 Interviewees said that they would look at pieces of information other than 
videos in order to decide whether content could or should be verified. However, this 
information was only ever used as background and details would not be shared with 
the audience.  
Issues of verification - inside the office - technology available 
This section looks at the use of technology to verify content and how this has 
changed. Interviewees were clear that, as well as there being a greater need for social 
media skills to seek out information and content, there was also a need to be more 
savvy about how to verify content or at least check it as much as was possible, given 
the limitations in contacting authors of video footage, an issue which has already 
been explored in this chapter. 
Most verification was done by the UGC Hub, though BBC Arabic went 
through their own procedures and, as referred to earlier, correspondents in the field 
may have used their own contacts to harvest and check content. What the two 
newsroom-based departments - the UGC HUB and BBC Arabic - had in common 
was that they would use computer software as well as traditional ‘common sense 
techniques’ to check footage. This could have been as simple as a YouTube search 
by upload date to see if content had been posted before, or checking metadata on 
stills and corroborating that with what was known about events on the ground, to 
check that they matched up. The UGC Hub would also regularly trial different types 
of software and feedback as to how useful they were in helping journalists with the 
verification process. This technology would be used, alongside the expertise of the 
BBC staff across the newsroom, to check the veracity of content.  
Now there are more social media tools, things such as Geofeedia which is 
like an interactive map. It picks up if people are Tweeting, using 
Instagram or Facebook and have their location switched on, it picks up 
what they are saying, what they are producing.  So we can make a map of 
it – and we probably get better content, we get more instant and better 
quality content by going out and finding stuff and seeking out content 
(Former producer and researcher within UGC, December 2013) 
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However, despite the best efforts of journalists, working in a newsroom can 
be challenging and there are often time pressures, which mean that mistakes can and 
do happen. The picture found on Twitter which was used by BBC to highlight the 
Houla massacre, which later transpired to have been taken by a Getty photographer 
in Iraq ten years previously, is just one example (Hamilton 2012). Incidents like this 
in some ways highlight the demand for breaking news, challenges in contacting UGC 
providers and difficulties in determining whether content not from a BBC crew can 
ever truly be 100% verified. As mentioned in the Literature Review (Chapter 1), this 
was one incident which led to a tightening up of practices, a move which is further 
indicative of the research findings which suggest UGC staff are conscious of the 
risks associated with using this content, but this understanding may not always 
extend to the wider newsroom.  
In addition to more technological aids being used to help verify content, they 
could be used to provide outlets with more information and context about the footage 
itself. 
There is a lot less of ‘we’ve been sent it, cannot verify it but we’ll use it 
anyway’, which used to happen a lot, particularly on the [BBC] News 
Channel. It used to be that we would say ‘it’s unverified’, now we can 
say to outlets that it’s been verified as much as we can, we know it’s 
yesterday but we cannot tell you who sent it. There are a lot less things 
left unanswered now.  
(Former social news producer, working with UGC, October 2013) 
 While more detail might have been available in relation to some of the UGC 
clips processed, the content analysis and interviews suggest that this did not always 
translate into on-air depictions, something that will be expanded on in the next 
section.            
Issues around signposting content or giving warnings 
As verification is crucial in terms of ensuring the veracity of content, the 
UGC Hub advises that UGC footage which is used on air should be accompanied by 
a caveat or ‘warning’ about whether the content has been fully verified. In most cases 
the content cannot be 100% verified, but the content analysis carried out for this 
research suggests that these warnings rarely got used on air. If there was a warning, it 
was a blanket disclaimer. The findings indicate that for journalists checking the 
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footage on a daily basis, this blanket disclaimer could be frustrating as it didn’t 
acknowledge the work that had gone into analysing the footage or what the 
journalists were basing their judgment on when broadcasting this content. In 
particular there was frustration that this information was not translated to the 
audience. 
Often we’ll say ‘this can’t be verified’, but actually, we’ve spent hours 
and hours standing it up. We don’t have 100% thumbs up like we would 
if we had a reporter there, but we’re pretty sure otherwise. Increasingly in 
the Syria story, articulating how much we know about a video is a really 
intrinsic part of the journalism, so it’s part of the story.” 
(Social media producer, curating and verifying content, October 2013) 
Journalists also said they felt that, overall, more could be done to outline what 
the verification process involved and then relay this to the audience. For example, a 
Bridget Kendall report (Figure 5.2) detailed how footage of the Ghouta chemical 
attacks was checked and used on air by BBC outlets to depict events which happened 
in August 2013 (BBC 2013e). 
(Figure 5.2: UGC clips verified by the UGC producer from BBC Arabic were the main source of 
coverage of the August 2013 chemical attacks. They featured in Bridget Kendall’s report detailing 
what was found out about the attacks by analysing the videos) 
 
 The perceived reliance on UGC during the conflict also brought associated 
risks, not least the fact that content and intelligence could not be always fully 
verified, despite producers’ best efforts corroborating information from contacts with 
other information and sources. Indeed, as the conflict became increasingly 
fragmented, activists would continue to produce content, but interviewees said that 
those creating the footage on both sides could be doing so for political ends. This 
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meant exaggerations and hoaxes were commonplace, and as a broadcaster the BBC 
had to be vigilant and selective when using UGC. 
There were three videos which were posted on YouTube allegedly 
showing Syrian rebels firing chemical rockets. Basically, it was saying 
that the rebels were the ones behind the chemical attack that happened in 
August [2013]. The videos were shot in the night so you cannot see the 
landscape, the faces of the people or what they are wearing. You can just 
hear their voices and see they are firing rockets and they are saying that 
these are chemical rockets that are being fired. So on the verification 
front, there was a conflict between what the description said was the 
location and what they were saying in the video. Taking into 
consideration all these details we couldn’t verify the location or the time, 
and the fact it has been uploaded to YouTube three months after the 
chemical attack it is really suspicious. So we advised ‘don’t run this, 
don’t use it’. Because it could be anyone putting it on YouTube. 
(Former producer for Monitoring and BBC Arabic, December 2013)  
 
Section 3: Changing workflows 
While there have been some pan-BBC changes, the findings from this 
research document extensive structural and organisational changes within the UGC 
Hub itself. The interviews and observations in particular highlight various changes to 
UGC roles in response to the way content related to Syria was accessed, and also the 
moves which acknowledged the need to engage with eyewitnesses, particularly 
activists, in areas where English was not widely spoken. 
Changes in rotas 
One of the first staffing decisions made in response to events in Syria was the 
creation of a dedicated ‘Syria desk’. Similar temporary measures had been used in 
the past; during the first weeks of the Arab uprisings and also in response to protests 
following the Iran elections in 2009. The desk allowed members of the UGC team to 
sit alongside BBC Arabic staff and newsgathering specialists in the first few weeks 
of the Syria uprising. This allowed the free-flowing exchange of information and 
meant content could be processed quickly for on-air use. In addition, the UGC 
Hub developed new ways for its staff to work as a team. Interviewees recalled that in 
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the early days of the Syria conflict a small group of producers, perhaps three or four, 
would work consistently across the story.  As the Hub saw staff working different 
shifts and on different patterns it was hugely important to keep across the material 
which was being used in BBC broadcasts. 
It meant we knew if a video had appeared yesterday, or appeared to be of 
the same incident we had seen on another video, a day or two earlier. And 
so to do that we had to just basically break down our rota a little bit and 
figure out a new way of working that would allow us some producer 
consistency so that at least there were consistent handovers as well. 
(Former news editor, working with UGC, Oct 2013) 
This new arrangement meant certain staff within the UGC Hub would be 
assigned set tasks. At what editors considered the ‘peak’ of events in Syria, in early 
2012, nearly all UGC resources were focused on the story. On average, six members 
of staff would be dedicated to it on any one shift. This was a vast change compared 
to the previous set up where each person would usually be assigned one story to 
cover for the duration of the shift, save for any breaking news. The new set up could 
mean, for example, that one producer could spend their shift solely on one task, be it 
looking at YouTube video footage relating to Syria; identifying Facebook groups and 
posts relevant to the conflict; looking at what direct content the BBC were getting 
from inside Syria or from other parts of the world from ex-pat Syrians; or liaising 
with BBC Arabic and other departments. This development, however, had its own 
challenges, not least the fact that certain producers could end up working on Syria 
non-stop for a number of weeks. More findings around issues with staff processing 
this content will be explored later in the chapter. 
Syria was a very challenging story to cover, not least because of the 
nature of content staff encountered or because of the day-to-day routines associated 
with the conflict. Amid concerns that staff would continually be focused on the one 
story, rotas were again amended and, in early to mid-2012, bigger teams were 
dedicated to covering Syria as it became apparent that the conflict was not going to 
be short-lived. Rotas also became more fluid and there was a greater rotation of 
responsibilities. It was understood from observations and speaking to staff that this 
was done, in part, to vary the stories staff covered and limit the amount of sensitive 
or challenging content they were subjected to. Editors interviewed said they believed 
this fluidity also meant it was easier to react if there was breaking news in relation to 
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Syria, as well as other stories; it also meant the journalists working in the UGC Hub 
would be multi-skilled, in the sense that they could be assigned a different role at any 
point. 
We tended to have temporary workflows and structures that we put in 
place, and I think one of the things that we as a team have become much 
better at, is the fluidity of our work patterns and rotas. Two, three years 
ago we had quite sort of fixed roles in terms of what each producer would 
do on any given day. And now we have much more fluidity across the 
team in terms of who does what and when, and it depends much more on 
the news agenda of the day. 
(Former news editor, managing UGC, Oct 2013) 
Previously, UGC staff might have been given one task, such as finding a case 
study, updating and moderating comments on the BBC news website or verifying 
content related to breaking news or certain requests from news programmes. Given 
the demands on the UGC Hub in relation to processing Syria content, staff still 
needed the skills to do these roles, but all staff were trained in verification and had 
some understanding of sourcing voices and contributors. This meant in a breaking 
news situation or when demand for content was high, all staff would be able to 
‘muck in’ and there would not be a reliance on one person to process UGC for all 
BBC news outlets. This ethos remains today and, as changes in the newsroom 
organisation continue, some non-UGC staff are being trained in certain aspects of 
basic verification. 
Creation of ‘Live and Social’ role 
In addition to amending rotas within the UGC Hub, a new role was created 
which involved one UGC producer working each day, on shift, with the main 
newsgathering team in New Broadcasting House. Information collected through 
interviews and newsroom observations suggests that this role was not created as a 
direct result of events related to the Syria conflict. However, appointing someone to 
this post made accessing relevant new information, contributors and UGC easier for 
the newsgathering division, who were in a position to speak directly to a member of 
staff from UGC about the important stories of the day. The role, known as the ‘Live 
and Social’ shift, was formally introduced in 2014 after UGC moved into what aimed 
to be an integrated newsroom, with different departments working side by side. The 
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job involved the UGC staffer scouting social media for potential stories and working 
with newsgathering, if there was breaking news, by searching for UGC and social 
media content relevant to the story.  The role also involved acting as a liaison 
between main newsgathering and the UGC Hub, as well as taking specific requests 
for particular programmes across domestic and international outlets. Those who 
carried out the job said they believed the role ensured a constant point of contact 
between departments throughout the day, but it also meant that BBC journalists 
developed a greater understanding of the role of the UGC Hub and the risks and 
responsibilities associated with using UGC. 
They [Live and Social producers] are in the centre of the newsroom and 
they are interacting with all the teams, so in terms of UGC, it’s 
good because we are tucked away in a corner. They are good for bringing 
awareness because sometimes people don’t know what we do. Their job 
is to keep across social media and filter content. 
(UGC producer, October 2013) 
The UGC Hub and BBC Newswire send out alerts about key pieces of UGC 
each day, which the Live and Social producer will make the newsgathering team 
aware of. These alerts also include advice and caveats around how footage should be 
used and where details about verification or sourcing should be included. A further 
discussion about the issues staff encountered around verification process and 
associated warnings will be detailed later in this chapter. 
Developing rapport with other departments 
Journalists spoke about becoming more proficient in using social media to 
track down footage and contributors, but those interviewed were also very quick to 
highlight the importance of drawing on the expertise within the BBC when checking 
or verifying content. This finding was also apparent when consulting the internal 
documents available in ENPS as part of the qualitative content analysis component 
of this research; further information on how this part of the study was carried out is 
detailed in the methodology chapter.  Producers referred specifically to working in 
tandem with colleagues in BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring. They said that these 
journalists played a crucial role in helping ensure suitable content was aired, 
especially at the start of the Arab uprisings and events in Syria in particular. 
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I think that being in the new building has helped a lot with that because 
you can just walk up to someone at Arabic and ask for help. We send 
content to Monitoring and they do help, depending on what is happening 
and how busy they are. 
(UGC producer, October 2013) 
One hurdle for UGC producers was the language barrier, in that it meant 
Arabic speakers from across the BBC - but particularly within BBC Arabic and BBC 
Monitoring - would often be called upon to translate video. This included staff 
working overseas, such as Lina Sinjab in Damascus, but the main points of contact 
on a regular basis would be staff based in London. 
We were working closely with BBC Arabic and developed what turned 
out to be a vital new relationship with BBC Monitoring, who we had 
never really engaged with much before. But we quickly discovered that 
they had some really specialist producers who not only spoke Arabic but 
were from a lot of the countries affected, whether it was Tunisia or Egypt 
or Syria or Libya. And we realised that in-country experience and 
expertise and familiarity was vital in a lot of the verification aspects we 
were looking at. 
(Former UGC editor, managing UGC, Oct 2013) 
 
In addition to taking advice from those with in-country experience when 
checking footage, BBC journalists also looked to BBC Monitoring when sourcing 
eyewitnesses and potential contributors. BBC Monitoring staff had spent years 
documenting the working media of countries around the globe. Many staff had direct 
links with Syria, which meant they were able to pass on knowledge as well as 
contacts to news producers. In 2013, BBC Monitoring also appointed its first 
specialist in Syria UGC/social media, a direct response to the challenges the BBC 
faced when covering the conflict using this type of content. Observations suggest that 
the creation of this role was also in response to the changing remit of Monitoring as, 
for the first time, it was funded by the BBC, rather than via the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (BBC 2010). In addition, a BBC Monitoring staffer now sits 
within newsgathering at New Broadcasting House, in a similar capacity to the Live 
and Social producer - being a go-between for the two departments and also offering 
insight and advice. 
The increased engagement and dependency on staff from BBC Monitoring 
and BBC Arabic highlighted a gap in skills within the main newsroom and the UGC 
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Hub, in particular language skills. As well as translating audio descriptions or 
handwritten signs which accompanied footage, Arabic and BBC Monitoring staff 
also frequently advised on what video actually showed; giving their opinion on the 
accuracy of the content, drawing on their expertise in the region as well as their 
language skills. 
In response to what was arguably a pull on resources, respondents reported 
that an attachment role was created within the UGC Hub, allowing a BBC Arabic 
journalist to come and spend three months learning verification and UGC skills while 
lending their language skills and knowledge of the region to the UGC Hub team. The 
plan had originally been to have it as a swap scheme, but the need for trained staff 
within the UGC Hub meant that the resources weren’t available to move staff from 
the department. 
All change at BBC Arabic 
The attachment was launched in 2013 as part of the Arabic Change project, 
which involved a major restructuring of BBC Arabic’s social media teams as well as 
the implementation of a service-wide social media strategy. More detail on the size 
and scope of Arabic Change project is in the thesis Introduction, but among the main 
developments was the appointment of an overall social media editor for BBC Arabic. 
Other measures taken as part of the project included streamlining of content, with a 
reduction in the number of official Twitter accounts and programme Facebook 
Pages. Staff at BBC Arabic interviewed for this research said that, as they became 
more aware of the importance of social media as a newsgathering tool, there was an 
increased use on these platforms for calls to action for BBC Arabic programmes on 
television. Within online teams, there were also changes, as staff updated official 
BBC webpages to include options to upload video more quickly via smartphone apps 
and other devices. 
There was a need for some transformation within BBC Arabic. We did a 
full analysis of the market, of BBC Arabic’s performance, what are 
competitors are doing, what are the main findings of this strategic review 
which are relevant to BBC Arabic in relation to social media. And we 
started to devise a social media strategy for BBC Arabic because they 
didn’t have one. There was housekeeping around ownership of social 
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media details, restoring identities. There was also a lot of branding and 
naming conventions and storing data. 
(Social media editor, managing resources, July 2014) 
In relation to the attachment scheme, UGC Hub members involved in this 
research said that they welcomed a staff member with expertise in Arabic affairs 
coming to the team. The attachment ‘proved itself’ when the Ghouta chemical 
attacks took place in August 2013 and the BBC had to cover the events with no 
reporters near the area affected. The UGC Hub producer on overnight shift was the 
first BBC Arabic staffer to take part. He and other BBC producers turned to social 
media and their established contacts to determine what was going on. This meant that 
by the time correspondents came in for the morning shift, at least 11 UGC clips had 
been verified and were used with correspondent inserts across many different news 
reports online and on television. “That was a moment for UGC that proved the point 
of having someone from Arabic there.  It worked out very well on that day. A 
horrific story but great in terms of newsgathering.” (UGC story producer, October 
2013)  
In 2015, this ‘rolling’ attachment scheme continued, indicating the value in 
sharing expertise in the newsroom. Eight staff from BBC Arabic have been through 
the programme and, overall, interviewees reported it was a positive experience. 
We get a lot sent into us and then it’s not only verifying where it is, but 
also that it is what it says it is. We get content that says it’s a chemical 
attack in Syria and it’s from Iraq, or it’s activists with their own ends. 
With the Arabic attachment the people on that have been brilliant, they 
know how to do things and they can identify things much quicker than 
we can because they speak Arabic but they have been working on the 
story much longer than us at UGC. 
(Former UGC producer and researcher, December 2013) 
The end goal of the attachment scheme was that after a set period with the 
UGC Hub, producers returned to their home departments with new skills in relation 
to UGC verification and social media, which they could apply to a number of BBC 
Arabic programmes and products across different platforms. 
It’s an interesting networking opportunity and a chance to get to know the 
wider BBC, getting to know verification methods and the best practices 
around it. It widens the synergy of the journalists. So they come back 
with a different perspective. So when a producer came back [from 
attachment] we thought it was a good idea to spread the information, and 
even I know that the College of Journalism have started to devise a new 
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verification course and they have spoken to many people, including the 
people within BBC Arabic who worked at the UGC Hub. 
(Social media editor, July 2014) 
Impact of using UGC on other departmental relationships and structures 
Journalists reported that in trying to source content from Syria, they found 
themselves liaising with language services and also newsgathering, and this in turn 
resulted in more content being shared around departments. BBC staff said that when 
they did find good content, they might try to share that with other outlets and 
departments, such as passing on contact details for activists from BBC World News 
TV to the BBC News Channel, or from an interactive TV programme to the sister 
radio show. By sharing content it was hoped in some ways to avoid duplication of 
effort. 
Sometimes the UGC Hub will send the footage to more than one person, 
so to BBC Monitoring Middle East team, or BBC Arabic footage, and 
they asked ‘we have this footage, these are the checks we have done, do 
you have anything to add?’ and they would probably add in someone like 
Lina Sinjab so they are aware of the Syrian story. It’s mostly people who 
have something to add who would help in the verification. 
(Former Monitoring producer, December 2013) 
However, while the UGC Hub was said to be the main source for content, 
some programmes and producers said they went out and found their own voices and 
footage, citing that deadlines and time constraints meant that going to other outlets or 
departments would take too long, particularly when working on a rolling news outlet. 
One major issue that arises from the workflows for departments not being fully 
aligned is that there is not a BBC-wide database of verified content and contributors. 
Individual producers and even programme teams may have had a list, but these were 
not widely shared or made available, so producers were not aware of content used on 
a day-to-day basis. Findings suggest that, while some content was shared, there was a 
lack of communication between departments, and that caused problems. 
Let’s say the three of us are working on the same file but nobody knows 
that the other two are working on it, so that means duplication of effort. 
The other issue is what happens if BBC Arabic say we can use it and the 
UGC Hub say, “don’t use it, we’re not happy”. Then you have two 
different standards. 
(Social media editor, managing resources, July 2014) 
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Key UGC Files were kept by the UGC Hub in ENPS, as was detailed in the 
previous content analysis results chapter (Chapter 4), but findings indicate these files 
did not always include external links to YouTube and that the footage itself may not 
have been kept. The file might only contain a list of content which had been 
processed by the UGC Hub and the list was not accessible to everyone. Moreover, in 
terms of usage, it was up to individual outlets to come back and state whether they 
had used the footage or contributors, and UGC Hub staff said that this did not always 
happen. This meant that if a list was kept which detailed the channels and services 
where a certain clip was used, it would not be possible to say that list was exhaustive. 
 The issue of there being no full and centralised record of ‘verified’ content 
which aired on BBC services was seen a major problem, particularly by those in 
BBC Arabic and the UGC Hub who had devised many of the strategies for checking 
content. Some of this content included violence, which could be disturbing for 
producers to curate and viewers to see on air. Over and above the issue of duplication 
of effort, there are questions about the duty of care the BBC has to its staff, duty to 
the audience as a public service broadcaster in keeping them informed about events 
and duty to warn viewers about content which could potentially be distressing. 
These concerns have since led to the piloting of a database of Syria content – 
linking up newsgathering, UGC Hub and BBC Arabic.  This project has been led by 
BBC Arabic in the first instance. While this is merely a trial it is hoped that, if it is 
rolled out, footage can be catalogued in a searchable database which includes details 
about how footage has been verified, relevant links and records of its use. At this 
stage it is not clear whether this database would also store video files, so they would 
not be deleted. Also, previously used footage pre-2014 is not being catalogued, 
which again raises questions about what the BBC should be doing, given the nature 
of some of the content. 
I hope that in the future there will be one single database that will be 
around verified UGC content that you can search and you can find out, 
what is this video that was verified before? The tricky bit for that is that 
sometimes the same video has been uploaded by more than one person, 
maybe [stored] metadata and keywords can be part of that [database]. 
(Social media editor, managing resources, July 2014) 
 
 
174 
 
 
Section 4: Relationships outside the newsroom 
In addition to taking advice from those with in-country experience when 
checking footage and exchanging ideas with other departments, BBC journalists also 
looked to external organisations when sourcing eyewitnesses and potential 
contributors. This section explores these relationships and how they assisted 
journalists in reporting events in Syria, verifying content and learning about different 
groups operating inside the country   
Developing rapport with activists 
BBC journalists reported they were frequently in contact with the 
aforementioned Local Co-ordinating Committees (LCCs) across Syria, as well as 
other groups such as Shaam News Network and Ugarit News. Many conversations 
began with BBC journalists tracing the owners of YouTube accounts who had 
uploaded content, in some cases via interaction on Facebook. Events depicted by 
these groups would be triangulated with reports from agencies and other sources and 
interactions; journalists would usually not rely solely on such content. LCC footage 
went through the same checks and balances as any other any piece of UGC. That 
said, LCCs had become well established online and their content had frequently 
proven to be accurate. 
BBC staff said they didn’t just approach activist groups, they also approached 
individuals who gave good information over time. Their details would be put 
together in a comprehensive contact list which staff, particularly those working in 
television, would refer back to and update regularly. This meant that certain voices 
would be put on air again and again, and confidence in using these people would 
build up over time. As a result, certain groups’ footage, contributors and intelligence 
sources were used more regularly throughout the conflict. 
Some of them are activists but some of them are people who just want to 
share the situation they are in. They are a good source for verifying stuff 
as well – we can ask people what they have seen, can they see smoke 
from where they are, what have they heard? People are good for directing 
you to other people – they are a network on the ground which we cannot 
be- it’s an invisible network and the more tools we have the more we can 
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bring more social media platforms together. And that means we can be 
more sophisticated and that makes our jobs easier. 
(Former UGC producer and researcher, December 2013) 
For example, one key contact was Homs-based activist Abu Rami, who 
appeared on BBC World News TV several times including in June 2012 (see Figure 
5.3, YouTube 2012). He also featured in BBC online articles and was widely quoted 
by other news outlets. 
(Figure 5.3: Activist Abu Rami appeared on World News TV throughout June 2012) 
 
However, by building up links and a rapport with contributors, producers 
were able to work with individuals to create other content beyond on-air 
commentary. This included online pieces such as the Damascus diary (BBC 2013h). 
When I was at UGC we wanted to know how life was in Damascus and 
we translated it to English [from Arabic]. When I went back to Arabic, 
there was a similar editorial need to hear from people, preferably ladies, 
so we can diversify our voices, in the heart of Damascus who have 
different views on Bashar. It was challenging because you want two 
women, and our audiences and those that call in are male dominated... So 
you build a rapport with them and they did a diary for us every week. 
(UGC story producer, October 2013). 
The research findings from this project suggest that throughout the Arab 
uprisings the type of content submitted to and encountered by the BBC also altered. 
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Journalists covering Syria reported that, rather than a long video clip being posted 
online, it was common to see sequences edited together so that they were easier to 
identify. Video may also include signposting such as date stamps or in-video 
commentary. 
They used donuting [shooting around a subject] - so in Hama you would 
see a big protest round the clock tower and then you’d find a wider shot 
of it. Then you would be able to see that there was a big protest around 
the clock tower, but it wasn’t a big protest in the square...so you got the 
perspective. There was also one example, as well, of duplicating sounds 
on audio. I think one of the picture editors spotted that exactly the same 
gunshot happened repeatedly because it was the same sound wave...Or 
you’ll get a piece of footage where the original was done without 
commentary, but they had added in their own commentary about where it 
was and when it was at a later date. 
(Social media producer, curating and verifying content, June 2013) 
This finding echoes the work of Hänska-Ahy and Shapour (2013), who cited 
the filming of key landmarks as an approach taken by activists to show where they 
were. 
Staff also revealed that activist groups became more organised by cataloguing 
content posted on their Facebook pages. The LCCs provided both English and Arabic 
descriptions of the videos they uploaded. However, as the conflict in Syria went on, 
journalists said they became conscious that some of those sharing content were doing 
so along political lines and that activists might arrange content in a certain way to 
push a particular narrative. It was for the journalist, using the skills they have 
learned, to try and make sense of it and ensure, where possible, there was a level of 
balance.  
Findings from the period of participation suggest that the UGC Hub was all 
too aware of the risks associated with using UGC. However, the findings from the 
content analysis, detailed in Chapter 4, suggest that this awareness did not always 
extend to the teams responsible for producing news reports and outputting this 
content, especially as there were only warnings for 8% of reports which contained 
UGC. This discrepancy - between what was understood as important at the UGC 
Hub and what was important within the wider newsroom - shows the tension 
between different departments dealing with this content. While no one likes to be 
wrong it seems that for some departments, warnings and labelling on UGC are not 
always priorities. When something goes wrong, however, the whole of the newsroom 
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is likely to take notice. The high-profile hoax of the blog ‘Gay Girl in Damascus’ - 
where a US-Syrian lesbian blogger turned out to be an American man writing out of 
Edinburgh University - is “emblematic of the more fundamental challenges facing 
journalists reporting the Arab Spring” (Bennett 2011: 193). 
Some video content sent in by activists, once checked, would be made 
available to all BBC outlets. This footage might be broadcast on its own or 
incorporated into packages. In some cases it might be converted into stills to 
illustrate online stories – such as the screengrab below which activists claimed 
showed the inside of the Abu Bakr al-Saddiq mosque in Herak (Figure 5.4). 
(Figure 5.4:  A screengrab of video, which activists claimed was from a mosque in Herak in Syria, 
was used to illustrate a BBC online story in March 2012) 
 
Having to rely on intelligence and content from activists inevitably has some 
pitfalls, and journalists from the UGC Hub stated that any non-BBC content - 
including social media footage from Syria which was sourced from agencies such as 
Storyful and Reuters - went through a verification process. Meanwhile, intelligence 
about developments on the ground was vetted and corroborated with other sources. 
However, research involving journalists working in other parts of the BBC, as 
previously mentioned, suggested that, at times, they would ‘go their own way’ and 
not involve the UGC Hub. This again raises issues about tensions between 
departments, as well as concerns about both the cataloguing of content used, and 
maintaining standards in terms of content and verification procedures around footage 
which the BBC does not own. 
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Engagement ‘in the field’ 
The reliance on engagement with activists extended beyond the newsrooms 
into the field. Foreign correspondents tasked with covering Syria, either from the 
bordering countries or when they got access to Syria itself, said they had to rely on 
individuals, not just to gather content but also for their safety.  
Paul Wood (BBC 2014a, 2014b) and Ian Pannell are just some of the 
correspondents who have engaged activists, armies, rebel fighters and even jihadist 
groups, as they and their cameramen attempt to cover events in a country which is 
now hugely dangerous and becoming increasingly ‘unreportable’ in the eyes of some 
journalists (Frontline 2013). Sometimes this has involved meeting and travelling with 
them, at other times using their content to illustrate events. 
Correspondents, particularly those who were experienced in working in 
conflict zones, spoke about working with teams of activists that they built up close 
ties with over a number of years. These individuals worked day in and out with BBC 
teams, picking up content and intelligence and passing it on to the BBC crews. Much 
information about content and events on the ground was located via Skype and 
Facebook, and helped shape correspondents’ reports.  
For example, Ian Pannell’s May 2013 report on the violence in al-Bayda and 
Baniyas included chunks of unverified footage, shot by opposition activists, which 
allegedly showed the mass slaughter of families (Pannell 2013). Much of this was 
sourced in the field. Another report from Taftanaz in northern Syria, by Pannell and 
cameraman Darren Conway, featured an interview with media activist Ibrahim, 
whose video is also used (BBC 2013g). The content was corroborated by the BBC 
team who went to the locations where the footage was filmed from. Such reports 
highlight the importance of these relationships, but also raise questions about the 
importance of alerting the audience to the source of some of the content and the 
relationships BBC journalists have with these individuals, as well as issuing 
warnings and caveats, something that will be discussed later in the chapter. 
One thing that staff - both in London and deployed in the field - did seem to 
be united about in relation to using content, intelligence and eyewitness testimony, 
was their reliance on certain groups to pass on information. Producers across all 
departments involved in the research stated that some contributors became trusted 
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sources over time. As a result, a rapport built up between journalists and activists 
both in the country and within the Syrian diaspora. 
We were lucky to be able to form our own team out there. They were 
great because they were also very plugged in, in terms of accessing 
material.  In terms of trust these are people I have known a very long 
term, and we also entrust our lives to these guys – they organise the trips, 
they make contact with rebel groups, work out locations, routes, crossing 
points. Those trips took weeks to plan and so it builds up a level of 
friendship and trust which you couldn’t ever have remotely in London, so 
they were perfectly placed as native Arabic speakers familiar with the 
region as well as sometimes knowing the people filming the material.  
(Foreign correspondent, May 2015) 
Engaging with the Syrian Diaspora 
Often relationships between individuals and BBC departments developed 
after BBC Arabic staff contacted people they trusted inside Syria. Conversations 
would snowball, resulting in journalists from across the BBC speaking with other 
‘trusted’ individuals, including activists. In other situations, members of the Syrian 
diaspora in the UK helped locate individual activists via phone, email and social 
media.  The research identified that the expertise of the Syrian diaspora was 
harnessed by BBC journalists to assist with on-air and off-air issues. As well as 
groups such as the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, individual members of the 
Syrian community became go-to sources for information, with many becoming 
trusted on air contributors. Off screen, producers continued to engage with Syrians 
abroad, whether they were helping establish contacts within Syria or ‘standing up’ 
reports of events unfolding inside the country in a way not previously seen. One 
reporter spoke about a Syrian editor from an Arab TV channel who came into the 
BBC’s London office late at night at short notice. 
He wasn’t a rebel on the ground but he was ‘Mr Connected’ and he used 
to be someone I could call at whatever hour and say, ‘can you sort me out 
with contacts’ in Northern Syria, southern Turkey, where there had been 
this incident happening. And he would have people on the ground that he 
would give me, or he would come in himself and give an expert interview 
to kind of balance things out. He was opposition obviously but he was 
good. 
(Former news producer, sourcing guests and content, June 2013) 
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The interviewee recalled that, as well as going on air to speak to BBC TV 
News, the Syrian editor stayed on and helped BBC producers to verify their content 
when there was no one else available. There are obvious problems in relying on such 
individuals, such as the fact that they may exaggerate reports of deaths or violence in 
a bid to highlight their cause. Like the UGC posted by activists, my research 
observations and interviews indicated that any claims made by members of the 
Syrian diaspora were checked and attributed, or ‘stood up’, before they went on air. 
There were shots we used in other pieces that were from people we had 
actually met in Syria. There was a piece we did on Aleppo last February 
or March on the civil defence forces and we met the guys and followed 
them around and they had all this footage. So it is UGC but it becomes 
something more than that – it increases the veracity of it. 
(Foreign correspondent, June 2015) 
 
Section 5: Balance and duty of care 
As a public service broadcaster, the BBC is bound by a charter that its 
journalism will be accurate and impartial. However, the report by the BBC Trust in 
2012 questioned the impartiality of reporting, in particular in relation to Syria as a 
result of restricted access to the country. This access meant that at times content was 
skewed towards that produced or uploaded by activists, particularly those from 
opposition groups. This raises questions about balance in reporting of events.     
Staff interviewed for this research stated that they did try to engage with 
Syrians from a variety of different backgrounds and, at the beginning of the conflict, 
there was an active effort by journalists to get pro-Assad voices on air as well as 
contributors from other groups, in order to have more balanced coverage of events 
and give a variety of different viewpoints. In fact, one journalist proposed that when 
contacting people in Syria became a concern due to fears about security, it was 
initially pro-government and Assad supporters who were still contactable. However, 
research findings suggest that as the conflict continued and became more complex 
and dangerous, civilians and government officials were increasingly unwilling to 
speak or were uncontactable. 
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I cannot remember how many countless times I have tried to get the 
Syrian foreign ministry or a government spokesman on the programme. 
Many, many times. And maybe once or twice in the earlier days we got a 
government advisor on, but often when you approach people who are 
pro-government online they respond and say, ‘I’m not coming on 
because you’re biased’. 
(Interactive programmes editor, sourcing contributors, June 2013) 
As a result, opposition activists keen to engage with the media became the 
‘go to’ voices of the conflict and would appear on air more regularly than other 
contributors. This also meant that BBC producers developed relationships with those 
activists. This brings up major issues for the BBC in terms of impartiality, as 
opposing viewpoints to those given by those supporting regime change and/or 
protests were less frequently heard. The 2012 BBC Trust report, which involved 
some content analysis of reports, warned of the dangers of one-sided reporting by the 
BBC across its channels. Interviewees charged with finding eyewitnesses and voices 
out of Syria said that viewpoints given on air by contributors were ‘held to task’ by 
the news presenter interviewing them, in a bid to maintain some level of balance. 
Moreover, the first major speech by President Assad following protests and violence 
back in 2011 was carried in its entirety, some 90 minutes of coverage (see BBC 
2011e). 
Staff also identified that, at key points throughout the conflict, the BBC had 
aired contributions from Syrian officials such as the government spokeswoman 
Reem Haddad and had carried out sit-down interviews with President Assad (Bowen 
2015). But, in terms of day-to-day reporting of the conflict, producers said they 
would overwhelmingly illustrate the story of Syria with eyewitness testimony from 
whomever was available and willing to speak, certainly throughout 2011 and 2012. 
Invariably, these people portrayed a certain narrative and were more likely to be 
media activists supporting regime change or opposition voices.  
Coping with trauma and distress 
As BBC producers learned how to process UGC and cope with the large 
influx of content found on the internet, journalists - particularly at the UGC Hub - 
developed a level of expertise in checking and verifying content. However, this 
meant that certain producers could end up working on Syria non-stop for a number of 
182 
 
 
weeks. While some interviewees said they enjoyed the forensic process around 
checking content, others said there was a fatigue around consistently having to 
process footage from one story. This was over and above the fact that some of the 
content, certainly when protests turned violent, could potentially be very distressing 
to watch. This had risks associated with it. 
There’s been stuff that’s been burned into the inside of my eyelids for a 
few days. You feel like at times you have been desensitised, and then you 
see something beyond it. I found I got more involved in the story because 
of that. People were talking about ‘alleged attacks’ [in August 2013] and 
I was saying ‘they aren’t alleged; I’ve seen a child choking.’ We might 
not know who did it, but it happened. Because the UGC stuff is so grainy 
we are not seeing it roundly packaged, we’re seeing what is being filmed 
raw. 
(Former UGC producer and researcher, December 2013) 
Dealing with that content was, in some respects, a huge challenge; not just for 
the individual producers viewing and processing it but for the UGC team and the 
BBC as a whole. Picture producers, story producers and editors might also be 
subjected to viewing this content, even if they were not verifying it. For some, the 
main difficulty was in processing the emotions linked to viewing UGC later on, 
rather than the actual roles and responsibilities they had as journalists checking and 
viewing the footage. 
I think, personally, it has changed my approach to dealing with traumatic 
events as it were, as in I think we all learnt a lot about our personal 
limits…I think one thing that has been touched on in recent times, and I 
think we have all learned actually, is what used to be considered the 
foreign correspondent sort of experience doesn’t necessarily involve 
having to go into the field anymore. We don’t get the physical 
experience, which in a way is quite easy to cope with because you can 
say ‘Physically I felt this,’ and point to physical indicators of your 
experience. You can say, ‘I was shot at’. Whereas from our perspective 
we have had to learn how to deal with the sort of the experience I 
have of listening to people dying today. But it’s very difficult to deal with 
it in a personal/professional context. And we’ve all learnt how to process 
that and when to step away. 
(Senior producer, sourcing and verifying content, Oct 2013) 
The BBC, as a newsgathering organisation, has a duty of care to its 
contributors, including activists sending in content or appearing on any of the BBC’s 
platforms, according to editorial guidelines. Likewise, there is a duty of care to 
staff as they do their jobs. The BBC has acknowledged that dealing with UGC, or 
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indeed any violent footage, can be distressing. The corporation has adopted the 
Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) method of traumatic stress support as it 
recognises issues around trauma are not just applicable to correspondents and crews 
working in war zones (BBC Academy:online). Interviewees identified that many 
office-based staff are now TRiM trained, so as to be able to look out for signs of 
distress or colleagues having difficulties coping after dealing with potentially 
traumatising events, whether that be witnessing events first hand or from content 
online. Moreover, all UGC Hub staff and others who may come into contact with 
distressing content, or have had to deal with traumatic situations or content, are 
offered counselling. These offers of support were given more frequently following 
events in Libya and Egypt in 2011. Respondents also said that there were situations 
where they or colleagues had stated they did not want to cover a certain story or 
undertake a role that involved looking at such images and footage.  
Safety concerns 
Findings suggest that, as the dangers inside Syria grew, so did the reliance on 
certain groups and individuals. As a result, the BBC employed new coping strategies 
to maintain engagement amid concerns about the security of communication with 
contributors. Interviews and observations confirmed that, over and above the BBC’s 
policy, journalists themselves felt they had a ‘duty of care’ to contributors, regardless 
of the viewpoint they had. This concern for safety, by producers for the contributors 
themselves, could potentially explain why later BBC coverage predominantly 
featured voices of media activists. Strategies to protect sources and contributors were 
constantly evolving and guidelines on the best method of approach could change 
daily. Today BBC policies remain under review, but the following section outlines 
key changes which have been put in place since the start of the conflict in 2011. 
Some producers stated that, amid security concerns, staff were given 
guidelines as to phrases to use when contacting people in Syria by telephone, so as 
not to arouse suspicion. For example, opening a phone call with “This is Ben in 
London,” not “This is Ben from the BBC,” (news producer, June 2013). 
One thing we have done is to keep an up-to-date Twitter list and Skype 
list.  Say something happens in Aleppo. We go to our list and see when 
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they were last online and we can drop them a line and ask if they can tell 
us any more, can they send us any pictures? It’s also a case of being 
careful, them not telling us too much and getting in trouble. They’ve got 
more savvy and equally we’ve got more careful. You let them drive it – 
you don’t say ‘BBC’ because it will get people into trouble. There is an 
element of anonymity, it’s not using full names and it is an awareness of 
the dangers both from journalists and from the people on the ground. If 
they get scared they won’t talk, so there has to be an element of trust. 
(Former social news producer, working with UGC, October 2013) 
 Respondents said there were concerns that landlines and even satellite 
phones could be tracked from early on in the conflict. A ban on routinely calling 
satellite phones was imposed at the UGC Hub amid fears about the safety of those 
using them. This was not a blanket BBC ban though, as correspondents were still 
using such devices when ‘in the field’ and interview producers also contacted 
potential ‘guests’ via phone. However, it was recognised there could be risks 
involved; some attribute the death of the Times war correspondent Marie Colvin in 
Babr Amr to her phone being tracked (Rayner and Spencer 2012). As a result, there 
was increased reliance on the ‘Voice over Internet Protocol’ (VoIP) service provided 
by Skype, which is now the preferred medium for contacting people inside Syria. 
Producers said they also used anonymous Gmail and Skype accounts to contact 
people not associated with the government, in a bid to ensure anonymous 
contributors wouldn’t be linked to the organisation and that these addresses didn’t 
have any references to the BBC. Where individuals did appear on air via Skype, this 
would usually be in an ‘audio only’ capacity, again due to safety and security 
concerns. One producer who worked on interactive programming on radio and 
television said that he only knew a handful of instances where a Skype guest was 
seen ‘in vision’; even then their face was lit in silhouette or obscured by a scarf, as 
was illustrated earlier with the example of activist Abu Rami who was a key contact 
in Homs. 
This chapter has aimed to outline the key findings from interviews carried out 
with BBC staff, as well as extended periods of newsroom observation with UGC 
Hub staff and various teams across BBC Arabic. The findings suggest that journalists 
experienced a steep learning curve in terms of developing skills to process the high 
volume of UGC being uploaded to online sites in relation to the Syria conflict. They 
also faced challenges in terms of becoming more technically savvy and more 
proficient in the use of social media.  While some staff had experience with UGC 
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from uprisings in other Arab countries such as Egypt, this footage was frequently 
used to complement journalists’ work on the ground. Learning how to deal with 
UGC from Syria was largely done ‘on the job’, in order to meet demands for quick 
turnaround of footage that could be used by BBC outlets. There were risks for both 
the BBC and contributors in using this content, not least because, initially, set 
procedures were not fully in place to allow staff to verify UGC in a vigorous way. 
Respondents also suggested that this process was rarely explained to the audience, 
which may have led to confusion over the use and labelling of UGC in BBC 
broadcasts. These issues and other findings recorded throughout the research period 
will now be discussed in relation to the broader research questions, which seek to 
examine how UGC has been used by BBC News and how this use has impacted on 
BBC journalists’ roles and practices.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion  
This chapter critically discusses and analyses findings from this thesis and 
relates them to recent developments within the context of the research field. The 
chapter is divided into four main sections. The first is a synthesis of what has been 
learned throughout the research period, giving a critical perspective on the results. 
The second section looks at how the overall research is congruent with existing 
literature in this field. The third section focuses on how the study’s findings relate to 
the theoretical framework and practitioner issues which emerged during this 
research. The final section considers and reflects on how the thesis extends previous 
scholarship and conceptual understanding in this area. To aid overall understanding 
of this study an introductory section gives a brief overview of the research model and 
its aims. 
 
Introduction: Carrying out the research 
This research project looked at the work of the BBC and how UGC was used 
by the organisation when covering the Syria conflict. It also focused on the impact 
this usage had on the way journalists did their jobs and the process whereby this 
content was eventually put ‘on air’. The overall research questions, outlined at the 
start of the thesis, were: 
Q1: How have BBC News journalists used UGC to cover the Syria 
conflict? 
Q2: In what ways has the role of the BBC journalist changed to utilise 
UGC content in news output?                    
This study used both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. In 
order to examine how the BBC used UGC, a content analysis of news reports which 
aired on BBC World News Television was carried out, and 273 individual reports 
relating to Syria were selected for analysis. These packages dated from March 2011 
to March 2014 and were coded for their use of UGC, how content was labelled and 
sourced, and a number of other criteria. This helped to paint a picture of how such 
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content had been used by the BBC since the start of the conflict. A full breakdown of 
the data collection methods is detailed in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3).  
This content analysis of television reports was complemented by a further 
analysis of internal BBC documents relating to the use and processing of UGC clips 
by BBC journalists. The data provided greater insight into the ways that UGC was 
used and labelled, and also helped contribute to knowledge about BBC newsroom 
routines, particularly at the UGC Hub. This has helped in understanding changing 
journalistic roles and responsibilities of staff working with UGC.  
In addition, a total of 20 interviews were carried out with staff from 
departments across BBC News; including the UGC Hub, BBC World News 
Television and BBC Arabic. Following an invitation from senior editors, the data 
collection methods were extended to include a newsroom ethnography. This was 
carried out at the UGC Hub and across a number of departments within BBC Arabic. 
These periods of observation allowed for additional information to be gathered about 
journalistic roles and routines, and helped contribute to understanding how UGC was 
used by journalists, as well as BBC outlets. It also allowed for further examination 
and discussion with staff beyond the interviews about whether journalistic work had 
changed during the lifetime of the conflict in Syria. 
The research was carried out by a member of BBC staff. Having reflected on 
both the research and the findings, the benefits of being able to access BBC content, 
engage in informal conversations with staff and double check findings far 
outweighed the disadvantages of being close to the research topic. As new findings 
and developments were uncovered during the course of the research, the level of 
access made available to the researcher ensured that the research presented here is as 
up to date and relevant as possible. Unprecedented access also means that the scope 
of the discussion chapter extends beyond the use of UGC and journalism practices to 
look at the changes in news products in response to both the UGC and social media 
phenomena. Without insider knowledge of the structure and workings of the BBC, 
access to this type of information would be hard to come by. 
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Research aims and context 
The research aimed to contribute to knowledge of production studies within 
the field of journalism and paint a picture of how roles and responsibilities within the 
BBC have changed during the Syria conflict. Syria was a country that, at the start of 
the conflict in March 2011, could not be easily accessed by western journalists. Now, 
five years later, it remains one of the most dangerous places in the world from which 
to report. One major threat in the country, which has gained momentum since the 
start of the uprising, is the presence of Islamic State, the jihadist group which joined 
the civil war and rebellion against President Assad. Though it has existed since the 
early 2000s, the group first appeared in Syria as the Al-Nusra Front (BBC 2015). In 
2013, under leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIS) was established. Now commonly referred to as IS or Islamic State, the 
organisation has support from many other jihadist groups, including offshoots of the 
rival al-Qaeda network. It is known for its mass killings and high profile beheadings, 
particularly of westerners such as journalists James Foley and Stephen Sotloff, and 
aid workers Peter Haines and Alan Henning. 
This background is outlined in more detail in the Introduction chapter, but it 
is important to consider the context when discussing the findings from this research, 
as these developments have affected journalists’ access to information and their 
ability to report events inside Syria. For example, compared to other terrorist or 
activist groups, Islamic State is seen as having a very strong social media and 
communications strategy. The group has a large following and presence on Twitter, 
and its propaganda materials such as online magazine Dabiq have been translated 
into western languages such as French, German and English (see Veilleux-Lepage 
2014). Some of its content, particularly videos, have a cinematic quality which 
makes them visually appealing. In a cruel irony, in a similar way to the BBC, Islamic 
State also has its audience at the heart of its content creation plans. As Veilleux-
LePage outlined: 
In order to frame its message, IS has developed a range of exceptionally 
professional and sophisticated communication and social media 
initiatives that are exceptionally easy to access and highly attractive to 
their audiences. 
(Veilleux-Lepage 2014:7) 
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As well as violence involving fragmented groups within Syria, the diplomatic 
situation and military offensive from outside sources remains volatile. In September 
2015 both Russian and US airstrikes took place in the country, with allegations from 
the US that Russia’s forces were not striking Islamic State strongholds, but targeting 
other rebel groups and strengthening Islamic State’s position (BBC 2015d).  
As a result of the ongoing violence and unrest, including the rise of Islamic 
State, news organisations have been forced at times to rely solely on content created 
by those inside Syria, many of whom are not journalists but media activists, with a 
specific narrative or viewpoint regarding Syria which they wish to publicise. 
Therefore, the research also examined how UGC was used by the BBC - in particular 
BBC World News TV - to tell the story of events in Syria. This took in periods when 
journalists were unable to legally enter the country and also when they were 
restricted in their movement if they were deployed there.  
In a changing media ecology, where journalists are now engaging with ‘the 
people formerly known as the audience,’ (Rosen 2008), this research depicts BBC 
journalists undertaking continually evolving roles, which at times involved using 
content which had editorial risks associated with it. The study also highlighted an 
evolution in the use of UGC by BBC News, the findings of which will hopefully 
inform both scholars and journalists about best practice when dealing with such 
footage, and also promote debate about how to cover events in what, at times, could 
be considered a journalistic black hole.   
 
Section 1: What was learned? 
Use of UGC 
The content analysis results from this research indicate that, up to March 
2014, UGC was used regularly by the BBC to help tell the story of events in Syria 
when no access was possible by correspondents, or when those deployed in the 
region were unable to cover events due to safety concerns. The content analysis was 
carried out in order to answer the question, ‘How have BBC TV News journalists 
used UGC to cover the Syria conflict?’  
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The overall finding that there was an initial increase in the average 
percentage of UGC being used in news packages during the research period. Average 
usage rose in the first three months from 36.6% in March 2011, to 42.9% in April 
2011 and to 46.6% in May 2011.  The biggest spike in UGC used throughout the 
whole three-year period came in July 2011, with the average percentage of UGC 
used in news packages broadcast in that month being 53.05%. 
Despite this high usage of UGC, these clips were not always accompanied by 
a clip description or a verification warning. In fact, of the 273 news reports coded, 
only 8% of the UGC clips which featured in these reports came with some form of 
verification warning. Results from the qualitative content analysis, interviews and 
newsroom ethnography highlighted that UGC which was processed via the UGC 
Hub did come with information about providing verification caveats. These findings 
suggest there were major failings in translating this guidance into on-air warnings for 
the audience. 
Overall, the quantitative content analysis showed a gradual downward trend 
in the use of UGC from March 2011 to March 2014. This shows that while UGC was 
critical to telling the story of events in Syria, once BBC journalists were able to get 
some - albeit limited - access into the country, this UGC complemented journalists’ 
own reporting. However, UGC was still processed and used to illustrate events 
happening in difficult to reach places, as well as informing background knowledge of 
events. In this respect the content was useful to journalists as a source of intelligence, 
even if the footage was not seen on air.  
In other conflict stories which were covered during the lifetime of this 
research project, UGC has also featured heavily; from footage showing fighting in 
Ukraine throughout 2014 to the alleged torture of children by Islamic State militants 
(Sommerville 2015). UGC will be used by the BBC if there is no other way to tell 
the story, and ideally this content will have been checked and verified as far as 
possible. Eyewitness footage which came from the Tunisia beach attacks in June 
2015 and was used by the BBC in their reports in the following days was another 
example of this. The problem, however, is how and when this UGC can be checked, 
highlighting that, “the work of verification is perhaps most difficult in the very 
situations when providing accurate information is of utmost importance” (Silverman 
2014:8). 
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One of the BBC’s core values is that “Audiences are at the heart of 
everything we do” (BBC 2015). This research found that UGC became a key tool to 
tell the story of the conflict in Syria, and journalists had to respond to this 
phenomenon with new working strategies and skillsets. The change in audiences’ use 
of social media platforms during the uprisings in the Middle East and elsewhere led 
to journalists needing to become more social media savvy. They also developed a 
clearer understanding of the power, the reach and the limitations of these platforms, 
both as places to disseminate information as well as gather it. The research findings 
also illustrate that journalists no longer just report events to the audience, they also 
actively engage with them and the associated content they produce. 
A greater dialogue has developed between BBC News journalists, their 
audiences and other content providers such as activists. Moreover, journalists have 
become more conscious about audience behaviour online and their interest in using 
social media to find out information, as well as sharing content or ‘talking back’ to 
journalists about their reporting. 
Role of the journalist 
This research also investigated the ways in which the role of the BBC 
journalist changed to utilise UGC content in news output. The research findings 
suggest the changes to newsroom work for journalists using this content are many 
and varied. The ways in which the roles and responsibilities of journalists altered in 
part depended on the role that a person had to start with. Other elements that might 
affect a person’s use of UGC and changes in their role might include the department, 
their existing skillset and the remit of the programme or platform they worked for. 
But at the core, social media platforms have become important newsgathering 
sources for most journalists, whether it be to gather information about an incident in 
Syria or elsewhere, or to find eyewitnesses or footage. This means journalists have 
had to become more flexible and adaptable in digital spaces, perhaps having a greater 
presence on certain social media platforms, as well as becoming more proficient in 
understanding user behaviour, including the actions of activists. They must also 
question the motivation for people uploading this content, as well as considering how 
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it should be used in any broadcasts. As Steve Buttry, who contributed to the 
Verification Handbook, outlined: 
Our job is not to parrot sources and the material they provide, but to 
challenge them, triangulate what they provide with other credible sources 
and verify what is true, weeding from our work (before we publish, map 
or broadcast) what is false or not adequately verified. 
(Buttry 2014:17) 
With regard to UGC specifically, journalists had to quickly adapt and learn 
how to treat this content and refer to more knowledgeable colleagues - in areas such 
as BBC Arabic and BBC Monitoring - when trying to find UGC and then qualify 
whether it could be used. Within BBC News roles also changed, as journalists 
became more accustomed to using UGC in broadcasts, with or without the necessary 
caveats. Other journalistic roles changed significantly, as they engaged in the delicate 
process of verification on a level not previously seen at the BBC, where 
understanding and being able to use digital tools such as Topsy, FotoForensics and 
TinEye) became more important. Here, as well as asking basic journalistic questions, 
journalists have had to examine content in a much more forensic way - looking at 
metadata and other technical elements - rather than just focusing on what the footage 
shows from a storytelling perspective. 
Verification failings 
A significant finding of this study, backed up by the content analysis results, 
was that the BBC systematically failed to advise its audience about the inclusion of 
UGC in its reports. That lack of advice included failure to use verification warnings 
when this content was used in reports throughout the three-year period being 
investigated. In fact, only 8% of the reports coded during this research had any kind 
of warning on them. That finding is similar to results reported in other literature, 
such as Juliette Harkin’s study in 2012 that was previously mentioned in the 
Literature Review (Chapter 1). That content analysis of BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera 
Arabic broadcasts found that neither outlet explained whether sources or content had 
been vetted; “The common on air explanation of ‘this footage cannot be verified,’ 
was absent in all the content evaluated for this study” (Harkin et al 2012:31). 
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The fact that there were few warnings used in the news reports analysed in 
this study was surprising, given the perceived care that the BBC takes over its 
content as detailed in its Charter and Editorial Guidelines (BBC 2015). The results 
also contradicted the findings from the BBC Trust’s updated report on the Arab 
Spring (BBC Trust 2013) to a certain degree. The report from August 2013 stated 
that, following a review of the way content had been labelled, “the BBC has adopted 
new wording for all user-generated footage where independent verification has not 
been possible” (BBC Trust 2013:2). While the warnings may have been provided ‘in-
house’ from the UGC Hub to other BBC outlets, the reality is that, based on the 
results encountered in this content analysis research, they were not making it to air. 
This particular finding is significant for media scholars interested in the field 
of UGC, but is also problematic, particularly for media practitioners and their 
audiences. One risk is that if something is not labelled, the viewer may assume that 
the content is the BBC’s own footage. This links into the concepts of accuracy and 
transparency which were touched on as part of the sociology of news in the theory 
chapter. Moreover, when considering newsroom and journalistic routines, the failure 
to include warnings further highlights that journalists rather than audiences fully 
understand what the complexities of working with UGC, agency footage and BBC 
footage involve. It is up to the journalist to ensure the audience is informed. 
Therefore it is a recommendation of this research that journalists’ duties should 
extend to labelling content when it is not from a traditional agency with whom a 
subscription model has been agreed, such as Reuters. However, this in itself poses 
challenges, as Reuters is among the agencies which now has a social media feed, and 
some UGC will be part of that subscription model. While interviewees said such 
content would be checked by the UGC Hub, this does not mean it will automatically 
get credited on air, again highlighting variations in the findings from the different 
data collection methods used in this research. 
Given that journalists have been working with UGC in various guises for ten 
years at the UGC Hub, warnings would be expected to be second nature to those 
dealing with this content ‘at the coal face’.  Many of the internal ENPS documents 
scrutinised for this research did contain some kind of caveat, such as, “this content 
could not be independently verified”, meaning that, while checks were made, it could 
not categorically be said the content was what it claimed to be. One development 
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throughout the conflict, as outlined in Barot 2013, is that the ENPS alert for Syrian 
videos on which the UGC Hub made checks was amended to state:  
Caution: We are confident this footage is genuine, but because of its 
nature and source, we cannot be certain. Any use MUST include 
cautionary wording in cues/scripts/captions, such as: 'The BBC has not 
been able to fully authenticate this footage, but based on additional 
checks made on it, it is believed to be genuine'. 
(Barot 2013:online) 
Interviews confirmed this more detailed disclaimer was seen as more positive 
by journalists engaged in checking content, compared to a blanket caveat, as it made 
clearer the work they had undertaken. But they also reported that outlets aired 
content without any kind of warning, which respondents described as ‘annoying’. 
Therefore, findings suggest the issue of lack of verification detail in on-air content 
did not come from lack of information via the UGC Hub. It may have been down to 
those creating the news reports, the gatekeepers of what detail is finally broadcast, 
failing to include such warnings in their coverage. There could be a number of 
reasons for this, and one explanation for the lack of warnings that emerged during the 
interviews was fatigue around UGC. Producers said they thought warnings were very 
repetitive and made BBC coverage look ‘unreliable’ or unofficial (senior story 
producer, June 2013).  
Verification analysis 
Results from this research showed that, in other situations, a blanket 
disclaimer might be used at the start of a BBC report in a script. This would be 
instead of a specific ‘Syria disclaimer’ for each clip. The disclaimer would be 
inserted once in a report, highlighting that UGC was used in the piece. There would 
be no other mention of the use of UGC, regardless of the number of clips used in the 
report. Moreover, UGC may or may not be labelled as ‘unverified footage’, which is 
different to identifying the content as UGC. Labelling ‘unverified’ content says more 
about the checking and verification process which has been undertaken by staff, and 
therefore the veracity of UGC. Sometimes the term, “this content cannot be 
independently verified”, would be used, indicating to the audience that the BBC was 
not 100% sure whether the content was an accurate portrayal of events, or checks had 
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been done as much as was possible but journalists had to inform the audience the 
content was not being reported as fact. 
In other scenarios, scripts did not use a warning or the term ‘unverified’, but 
instead alluded to the fact that footage was not original BBC content and it wasn’t 
100% clear what it showed. For example, Jeremy Bowen’s report into the chemical 
attacks in August 2013 coded in the content analysis referred to ‘videos posted on the 
internet’, but at no time used the term ‘unverified’ in labels or in scripts. A report by 
Ian Pannell into a massacre in Baniyas also didn’t use the term ‘unverified’ but 
talked about ‘activist video’, which ‘appears to show’ when referring to UGC 
(Pannell 2013). All these reports used big chunks of UGC as part of their coverage 
but didn’t use warnings which would likely would have been sent out by the UGC 
Hub. Again, this highlights the problems first outlined in the Literature Review 
(Chapter 1). Practices varied from journalist to journalist when it came to crediting or 
labelling UGC. This research makes a significant contribution to the research field 
and goes further than some existing literature by questioning the journalists about 
those decisions. This revealed tensions between what journalists should do, or 
thought they did, and the actual use of warnings on air. 
Overall, the use of warnings about the veracity of content was rare in the 
research sample, and the inclusion of such information was influenced by an 
individuals’ own perspective, personal knowledge and experience. This seemed to be 
particularly the case with journalists writing scripts and gathering the footage for a 
news report. One correspondent said he didn’t feel the need to include warnings, 
because for every piece of video he had used in a report, he had seen probably ‘at 
least three others’ (interview June 2015) which showed the same thing, and these had 
been scrutinised by him and his connections. He didn’t put ‘unverified’ on content, 
as he believed that with his knowledge of the region and connections he had done 
enough checking, and was satisfied that the content accurately portrayed events on 
the ground. 
Source, check and stay on top of technology 
While not all journalists engage in verification checks - or are not seen to be 
undertaking that role - these findings and the literature highlight another key issue, 
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which became apparent during the course of the research. The issue is in part linked 
to the results which have already been discussed. There were discrepancies between 
what was seen in observations and what interviewees claimed took place during the 
verification process undertaken by the UGC Hub. Some interviewees reported that 
the Hub was the centralised point for UGC and all footage should be processed 
through them. However, as Wardle et al outlined in 2008, in such a large 
organisation there is no ‘catch-all strategy’ for harnessing UGC, and other 
interviewees contradicted these claims. Moreover, observations suggested some 
people would find content themselves and go through their own process, without 
alerting other outlets. This included, but was not limited to, staff who had become 
proficient at checking content due to spending time within the UGC Hub, and those 
who had a working knowledge as a result of their own experience in covering the 
Syria conflict for outlets where there was a large demand for UGC. For example, it 
was a team from BBC Trending (a new service dubbed ‘The BBC bureau on the 
Internet’ (BBC 2015b)), rather than the UGC Hub, which uncovered that the Syria 
Hero Boy video posted online (McPherson 2014) was in fact a fictional film posing 
as UGC. However, the UGC team had been going through a process of verifying that 
particular content, which other outlets had already aired, before it was revealed it was 
the creation of a Norwegian filmmaker. The UGC Hub then advised outlets it should 
not be run (see Hamilton 2014).  
Therefore, while the UGC Hub is a very important department, rich in skills 
and aspiring to provide a centralised service, it is unrealistic to expect every piece of 
footage to be routed through them. This is due, not least, to outlets’ deadlines and 
limited resources - there is only so much one team can have demanded of it. 
UGC in London vs UGC in the field  
The research findings also uncovered interesting views on UGC and its use 
from journalists covering events in Syria, when they are deployed to work outside of 
the newsroom, usually as a foreign correspondent or producer. For journalists 
working ‘on the ground’ after 2011 - either in Syria’s neighbouring countries, on the 
borders, or within Syria itself - the work was less about going through processes or 
being aware of where to use verification warnings, and was more concerned about 
197 
 
 
working with trusted teams to ensure their content was accurate, while 
simultaneously working in a newsgathering capacity. As one foreign correspondent 
outlined, in his view, different UGC had different values: 
All UGC is not equal and I think that is key for me. There are different 
layers. There’s UGC that is filmed by people we know, UGC that’s 
filmed properly and professionally by networks of people who we can 
meet or have met. Versus UGC found online, or from an activist website 
where you don’t know who filmed it or why. 
(Foreign correspondent, May 2015) 
In this respect, some journalists - be they producers or correspondents - felt 
they didn’t always need to give verification warnings, so confident were they that the 
footage used had been checked and was accurate, or at least congruent with what 
they had seen and heard themselves and what their teams had picked out. 
They were great because they were also very plugged in, in terms of 
accessing material. Again with the Al-Bayda [attack] there were 
questions over it and they were instrumental in being able to verify 
locations that otherwise we wouldn’t have been able to do and I’m not 
sure anyone in London could have done – they were quite a specialised 
group of people who probably watched the vast majority of videos on a 
daily basis, it’s the line of work they are in. 
(Foreign correspondent, May 2015) 
Therefore, while the research findings from the results sections in Chapters 4 
and 5 indicated that the UGC Hub played a major role in checking and verifying 
UGC, there were always going to be journalists who didn’t go through this process. 
Journalists, whether working in the field or in the newsroom, formed their own 
circles of contacts. In the field these were more likely to be people on the ground, 
often activists working with links across Syria. In some cases these contacts became 
trusted over time and provided content both inside and outside of Syria which would 
be used in news reports. Therefore, when a finished package recorded in the field 
was fed to a centralised point, it would be unlikely that individual clips which 
featured in that report would be sent in to be verified. Journalists engaging with these 
activists and trusted sources in the field acted as curators of existing content, and 
were still picking and choosing what to use without putting it through the established 
process in place within the newsroom environment. 
 For those covering events in Syria remotely, Skype conversations, LCC 
newsletters and social media contacts were frequently used to gain information and 
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to access footage. For correspondents working in London, they would often write a 
‘track’ or voiceover to go with footage selected by a producer working in the 
newsroom, with easy access to pictures coming in from agency services and the 
UGC Hub. If this was for a major outlet such as the BBC News at Ten, copyright 
information about footage used in the report would be stored. Reporters said this 
often meant a reliance on UGC found on social media and agency footage, and while 
it would be hoped this content would go through checks, they did not have the same 
connection to the content creator as they would have had they got it via contacts or a 
trusted group. 
I am pretty sure I did a piece in London on the Al Houla massacre and I 
have never been there and I didn’t know who filmed it and couldn’t 
verify any of it so I was completely reliant. So I have sympathy with 
those who don’t have the luxury of those networks.   
(Foreign correspondent, May 2015) 
From a cataloguing perspective, the self-selection and quasi-verification 
processes around UGC collected in the field and then entered into the BBC’s systems 
are challenging, not least because of the number of platforms and channels UGC can 
be used by within BBC News, from Language Services to online, domestic and 
international TV news. The BBC, as an international broadcaster, may be realising 
this for itself now with the piloting of the UGC database being carried out at BBC 
Arabic, discussed in the Chapter 5 results and in the Conclusions chapter. In 2015, a 
certain amount of overnight staff were trained in ‘basic verification’ while on shift, 
in addition to the BBC Academy (formerly the College of Journalism), giving an 
option for journalists to register - with managerial approval - for a specific 
verification course. This is just one of a number of courses linked to social media and 
citizen journalism that the BBC has run since 2011. The introduction of such a 
course may to some be seen as a dilution of the specialist skills the UGC Hub team 
poses, but it is being sold as an opportunity to share knowledge and to allow UGC 
Hub staff to focus on the key material best served by their expertise. This hypothesis 
was echoed in Harrison’s ethnography (2010), which proposed that UGC was not 
always taken seriously as a type of footage, but became more accepted as it was used 
more frequently. This may also be why, since 2015, UGC staff have been embedded 
on the daytime shift from 8am to 5pm at the News Channel, World and within 
newsgathering, as part of newsroom restructuring.  
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Overall, the content analysis, document analysis, qualitative interviews and 
observations outlined that the need to use UGC created challenges and resulted in 
major structural and editorial changes within the BBC. Examples of this were seen 
during periods of newsroom observation, particularly at the UGC Hub, where people 
on the team were appointed specific roles depending on the rota of the day. However, 
at the same time, the department had to remain flexible enough to transfer staff to 
another role should breaking news happen and there be a demand for a certain type 
of content or contributor.  
 
Section 2: Links to literature  
These content analysis findings and subsequent concerns around footage use 
are also congruent with the results of, and subsequent discussion on, the large-scale 
content analysis carried out by Wardle et al (2014) across multiple TV channels that 
use UGC. Part of their focus was on verification practices and associated risks. For 
them “…the amount of UGC being broadcast on air and integrated online was not 
necessarily surprising. What did surprise us was the amount of UGC that was not 
labelled or credited. UGC was treated like any other footage” (Wardle et al 
2014:120). Similar to this study, they were alerted to a lack of crediting, lack of 
advice for the audience as to what UGC was, and also an absence of labelling of 
UGC in broadcasts. This finding suggest journalists they felt warnings undermined 
trust and “suggests that verification checks have been completely inadequate” 
(Wardle et al 2014:60). In relation to crediting, Aday et al (2013) noted that often 
content was sourced as being from YouTube; this was also problematic as it didn’t 
say anything about the uploader of the content, and so this crediting information 
might not be used.  
All newsrooms evolve, but the situations presented when dealing with UGC 
from the Arab uprisings particular situation meant that staff had to adapt even more 
quickly; those journalists at the front line in engaging with UGC also became more 
savvy and developed new skillsets to carry out what has been dubbed ‘social media 
newsgathering’ (Hughes 2011). This could involve going onto various platforms to 
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find content, particularly in breaking news scenarios. In this respect, two aspects 
related to using UGC are worthy of discussion: firstly, the task of going out and 
finding content with the help of social media technology and, secondly, verifying 
that with different tools.  
Verification is critical to the success of what the UGC team produces. 
Technology has moved on considerably since 2005, bringing an 
exponential rise in the use of social networks and the power of mobile 
phones. These changes offer great benefits in our newsgathering 
processes, particularly on breaking news; they also bring great 
challenges. 
(Barot 2014:36) 
Journalists spoke about trialling different software in order to do both tasks, 
something that is backed up by former UGC assistant editor Trushar Barot’s 
overview of the ‘new’ newsgathering process across social media, in which he lists 
some of the different online tools used by journalists harvesting content (Barot 
2013). Indeed, particular software packages - such as Geofeedia, Topsy, NewsWhip 
and Banjo - were named by multiple interviewees as ‘go to’ tools when trying to 
source content. 
Overall, dealing with UGC was rarely straightforward, whether it be sourcing 
or verifying. Journalists initially had concerns about using UGC and this was 
followed by a change in approach which saw producers then ‘harvesting content’ 
online rather than relying on audiences sending it in. Therefore, this “rapidly 
changing user behaviour has meant the team has had to be agile and constantly 
rethink the way it works, as well as test and adopt new tools to help us” (Barot 
2013:online). This hypothesis could extend to the way the BBC actually structures 
itself and trains its staff in using UGC. 
This development, outlined in the research results and echoed in Barot’s blog, 
is also congruent with Hänska-Ahy and Shapour’s (2013) research which showed 
journalists became more comfortable dealing with UGC over time; something 
journalists involved in this study found out for themselves over the period they were 
processing content from Syria. In this respect, the research findings contribute to the 
field of journalism studies which earmarks UGC and the associated challenges for 
journalists working with the footage as a major concern and issue for future 
consideration (see also Wardle et al 2014, McPherson 2014, Silverman et al 2014). 
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UGC was regularly included in news broadcasts and, arguably, the reliance 
on this content to cover events in Syria has continued throughout the conflict. 
Though overall usage in TV reports pertaining to Syria declined during the time 
period being researched, this type of content has remained crucial to telling the story 
of other international news events. For example, the death of Eric Garner, the rebel 
fighting in Donetsk, and the Canadian Parliament shooting in 2014 are stories which 
would have been much more challenging to tell without the available UGC. These 
developments, alongside the evolution of social media from consumer platforms into 
newsgathering tools, have also influenced the verification processes journalists 
undertake. As technology evolves, so too will the skillsets needed by journalists to 
undertake these important checks and balances.  The research findings showed that 
journalists have become more savvy and developed new skillsets to engage in what is 
now dubbed ‘social media’ newsgathering. Arguably, journalists will need to 
continue to hone these skills, as activists and other media literate ‘produsers’ (Bruns 
2003) find new and more creative ways to showcase content on different platforms 
and disseminate their footage in different ways. 
Duty of care 
A duty of care to the audience in terms of ensuring accurate credit, labelling 
and verification warnings were given with regards to UGC was a key theme 
throughout this research. However, the research findings also highlighted the needs 
of and duty of care to BBC journalists who, if consistently put on the story, might get 
fatigue around processing UGC from Syria, or indeed any place where events which 
are captured by eyewitnesses could be perceived as distressing. Respondents spoke 
about seeking support from the organisation if they felt upset by traumatic footage or 
images they had viewed in the course of their work. This is congruent with literature 
from the fields of conflict reporting and also psychology, which identifies that a 
person viewing eyewitness footage is as at risk of being deeply unsettled by what 
they see as someone witnessing events in the field is. Feinstein et al (2014) surveyed 
journalists working with UGC and live footage from three news organisations and 
found that “frequency rather than duration of exposure per shift, or duration 
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employed on UGC material, emerged as the more robust predictor of depression, 
anxiety, PTSD type symptoms and heavy alcohol intake” (Feinstein et al 2014:4).  
With content such as that being published by the likes of Islamic State being 
circulated on social media, including such images as beheadings, respondents said 
they felt there was a greater risk of coming into contact with such footage as people 
shared content or sent it in to the BBC. This might be done without a graphic content 
warning by people trying to be helpful, but it could inadvertently distress journalists. 
Mechanisms put in place at the UGC Hub to safeguard journalists’ health are further 
detailed in the research results chapters, and they include but are not limited to: 
appointing Trauma risk management (TRiM) trained producers onto teams who can 
identify triggers and signs of PTSD; having sharing sessions to talk about content 
that might have been disturbing; and rotating staff to reduce the frequency with 
which they are in a role that might involve looking at a specific type of footage. A 
further consideration of organisation-wide approaches which could be put in place 
will be given in the Conclusions chapter. 
 
Section 3: Theorising the findings 
This thesis considered both gatekeeping (White 1947, Shoemaker and Vos 
2009) and gatewatching (Bruns 2003) as relevant theoretical approaches to this 
research, which focused on journalistic practices and issues arising when using UGC 
within news output. The sociology of news, which looked in particular at hierarchies 
of influence, journalism routines and workflows from a societal perspective, was also 
applied to the research framework. This approach (Schudson 1989, Reese 2007), also 
took into consideration issues of accuracy, transparency and verification. While the 
Theory chapter (Chapter 3) gave an overview of these theories and the implications 
of applying them to this research, the findings do prompt the need for reflection, 
particularly in relation to those existing theorisations around collaborative working 
and the responsibilities of the producer in terms of gatekeeping and gatewatching. 
Journalists may interact with the audience, but this does not necessarily 
translate into collaborative reporting and, even if the public is encouraged to 
participate in the newsgathering process by sending in content, this will be subjected 
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to checks, as the BBC has editorial standards to maintain in relation to its journalism. 
Regardless of where content has come from, if it is included in BBC news material, 
audiences have a reasonable expectation that this UGC will help contribute to an 
accurate portrayal of events. Therefore, while journalists embraced new techniques 
and coping mechanisms for accessing and processing UGC, they must still continue 
to work towards the same journalistic objectives of truth, accuracy and impartiality 
which they would apply to their own original reporting or when using agency 
footage. The phenomenon of UGC and accessing this content via social media 
platforms has not eradicated the need for producers to engage in a certain amount of 
‘journalistic sensemaking’, while also developing skillsets relevant for journalism in 
the digital age (see also Murray 2011). 
 In relation to applying a theoretical framework, this research found 
journalists were engaging in gatewatching, in terms of informing decisions about 
newsgathering. This ‘gatewatching’ refers to the online activities journalists 
participated in, often in tandem with their audience and also in anticipation of ‘the 
people formerly known as the audience’ (Rosen 2008) being in a mode to share 
content. This scenario could extend to sharing breaking news content or even stories 
journalists wouldn’t have known about otherwise, with the US Airways plane 
crashing in the Hudson River remaining a pertinent example (Beaumont 2009). 
Bruns’ concept and theory of gatewatching is very closely linked to the activities 
undertaken in this particular scenario, which sees journalists making decisions about 
newsgathering based on what they encounter within a new media environment. 
However, as will be argued later, while gatewatching informs the editorial decision-
making process about what to cover, gatekeeping more accurately describes the 
process of deciding what is included when producing news content. And there are 
tensions between the two theoretical frameworks when it comes to deciding how to 
cover events. 
 Therefore, drawing on the research findings, there is rarely the ‘full 
collaboration’ between the producer and the public that Wardle and Williams 
depicted as a category in their research in 2008. For some journalists, as Wardle et al 
(2014) found in later studies, social media was merely another platform to look at 
and UGC was essentially another news source. Therefore the inclusion of UGC and 
content sourced from social media platforms was not a true indicator that journalists 
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were being fully collaborative with the public, though there are certain stories and 
certain projects which do see this happen. For example, the Annual BBC Schools 
Report initiative (now in its 10th year) sees journalists working with school pupils 
aged 13 to 16 to gain a sense of what they would like to see in the news, while also 
teaching them skills around media production news values. Another example is a 
weekly programme on BBC Arabic where audiences film their own reports, which 
then air on the channel. Belair-Gagnon identified an earlier example of this 
‘collaboration’ in the 2008 Digital Storytelling initiative. Run by BBC Wales, it saw 
participants given computers enabled with video editing software set up in their 
home. They were then able to synchronise recorded spoken narratives with scans 
of personal photographs to make their own ‘mini-movies’. The ‘mini-movies’ 
were then aired on the BBC Wales website in a dedicated Digital Stories section 
(Belair-Gagnon 2015, BBC Wales Online). 
 Overall, in terms of their production roles - which can involve creating 
packages, reports and other content to be consumed on TV, online or other mediums 
- journalists still make the decisions about what UGC, if any, they wish to use. At 
times there is a divide between what is known by journalists and what is translated to 
the audience about content, suggesting that the news producer is retaining the role of 
‘gatekeeper’ of news. They are choosing what content to show their audience and 
how to label it, if indeed the UGC is labelled at all; in many cases these research 
findings show that these details were notably absent from news reports which 
included UGC. These decisions are made by journalists in their day-to-day practices, 
despite the fact that those acting as watchdogs for the organisation as a whole argue 
that audiences should be made aware of the nature of content, based on the suggested 
warnings which accompany UGC. For example, in 2012 the BBC Trust found 74% 
of UGC clips used in TV news did not have a warning attached to them. A follow-up 
report a year later advised that when warnings were being used the wording needed 
to change to make the details clearer to the audience (BBC Trust 2012, 2013). 
Tensions related to theory 
From a theoretical perspective, there are tensions between scholars about 
whether journalists engage in gatewatching or gatekeeping. This research found that 
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depending on the role a journalist carried out or the tasks they undertook, they might 
act in a way which could be explained by either process. What was clear was that 
they continued to navigate a path and engage in certain news routines which would 
be influenced by forces beyond that of the individual, be they societal, powers within 
the newsroom (Reese 2007), or outside policy (Breed 1955). These issues are 
important as newsroom structures and routines help define the roles and practices of 
staff. 
The activities undertaken by news staff would dictate which theory 
(gatewatching or gatekeeping) would be more relevant, and in certain contexts, both 
approaches would apply. So, for example, if we were to take a breaking news 
situation such as the Tunisia beach attack in June 2015, a person might have 
uploaded a video to their personal Twitter, Instagram or YouTube account related to 
events on the ground. If this video was shared by people and eventually picked up by 
a journalist, this would not be gatewatching, as it involves the same newsgathering 
processes as it would in the offline world of looking for sources and information. 
 However, if, for example, the day after the beach attack, a news team were 
monitoring what was being said online about the story and made decisions about 
their own coverage based on how popular the story was, that would be categorised as 
gatewatching. This might include looking at whether hashtags were trending or how 
often the story had been shared from BBC sources. Gatewatching here is understood 
as being the result of digital engagement with the audience, which has contributed to 
the decision making of the journalists creating content that day.  
 However, when the final news report tackling a story airs, even it if does 
contain audience material such as eyewitness footage or other UGC, the process of 
selecting which content to use would be better described as gatekeeping. So, a 
journalist on any one story might find themselves flipping between gatewatching and 
gatekeeping processes during the course of their working day, depending on their 
assignments. As journalistic routines and responsibilities evolve, the theoretical 
framework with which newsroom work is approached must also be reconsidered. 
While the sociology of news literature highlights that journalists socially construct 
news (Schudson 1989), changing routines suggest that journalists in a digital age 
have a different, and arguable evolving relationship both with their sources and 
audiences. Newsgathering in itself is also changing. Based on the research findings 
206 
 
 
from this study, journalists are monitoring information flows in both directions – 
information going to the active and engaged audience and also information stemming 
from them.  
Alternating between gatewatching and gatekeeping, when described in a 
practical sense, might not sound unusual to media practitioners who are used to 
working in a multi-skilled way that might see them engaging with different 
stakeholders at different times, depending on the nature of their work. For journalism 
scholars, however, there is some tension between the theories of gatewatching and 
gatekeeping, as was outlined in the Theory chapter (Chapter 2).  
Both approaches are still relevant and a mixed or ‘variegated’ framework that 
blends elements of both theories, and can then be applied depending on the nature of 
the news work being undertaken, works well. While it may seem complex from a 
theoretical perspective, a fusion of the monitoring and decision-making tasks 
ascribed to gatewatching and gatekeeping demonstrates the diverse and evolving 
tasks journalists engage in when providing and creating content, particularly when 
audiences have the power and skills to create their own content, to talk back and to 
choose what they consume and share.  A blended concept is easily understood within 
the modern media landscape and complements the evolving media sociology 
approach where journalists undertake any number of different responsibilities and 
roles - including gatekeeper, digital forensic detective and storyteller - when making 
journalistic decisions. 
For the moment, news audiences are largely seen as consumers before they 
are viewed as contributors by BBC staff and journalists from other newsgathering 
organisations. And, with more and more sources of information available offline and 
online, in most circumstances journalists will use new and established routines and 
skills to gatewatch, but eventually gatekeep, the information they wish to disseminate 
within their own news products. In this respect, what people share might inform 
journalistic decisions about what would be of interest to the audience, but it won’t 
necessarily influence what is included in any news reports. Gatekeeping, media 
sociology and gatewatching in themselves are evolving just as journalists’ 
responsibilities are deemed to have altered in response to UGC and changing media 
behaviours. This can be seen in changing newsroom roles, structures and influences, 
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ranging from editors, to work of competitors to available content within restricted 
timescales. 
 
 
Section 4: Extending understanding of journalism roles 
The research unveiled that social media platforms were used by BBC 
producers as a tool both to curate and disseminate information. They were found to 
be a crucial weapon in the journalists’ arsenal – to the extent that news guidelines 
were developed in relation to the BBC staff use of UGC, as inclusion of this content 
still needed to adhere to core values and editorial standards. This development 
suggests UGC and social media are now intrinsically linked to newsgathering and 
journalistic practice.  
Belair-Gagnon believed that, when used as a journalistic tool at the BBC, 
social media “fostered a more collaborative form of journalism at the public 
broadcaster, with more personal accounts from afar” (2015:116). While this research 
found that content discovered on social media sites was included in the news more 
frequently, and journalists were more engaged and aware of their audience, this 
‘collaboration’ did not extend to situations where the audiences had an editorial role 
in determining what content journalists worked with or ran in their TV bulletins (see 
Singer et al 2011). Belair-Gagnon’s research also depicted senior BBC managers 
highlighting the “blurred boundaries and new possible social networks created for 
journalists reporting crises” (2015:2).  
While they do not directly drive the news agenda in terms of providing 
content, having considered the research findings and other relevant literature, it is 
fair to say that audience behaviour may impact on how journalists approach certain 
stories. For example, journalists check what articles are the most popular online, 
what has most clicks and how long people are staying on stories. This in turn might 
affect what journalists consider covering in news programmes on television. This 
was seen in morning World News meetings at New Broadcasting House, where 
discussions about how to treat long running stories such as the Greek debt crisis were 
directly related to how successful the story was online. They would also identify 
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what viewpoints and voices still needed to be heard. So, collaboration is a reality in 
terms of access to and availability of some content. 
While the responsibilities of the journalists using UGC varied depending on 
the nature of a journalist’s role, there can be little doubt that this footage has become 
increasingly important for news organisations in recent years.  While the content 
analysis confirmed that less UGC content was used in BBC TV news reports as the 
conflict in Syria went on, this content was still used in some ways. For example, to 
inform reportage and as a form of intelligence to allow journalists to cover the story, 
even if it was not used on screen. In this respect, the public were being informative, 
but were not collaborative. In fact, while social media has led to more collaborative 
working, journalists continue to use their editorial judgement when sourcing material 
and engaging in newsgathering. It is just that there are more sources to look at.  
Contribution to knowledge 
This research aimed to provide an outline of what has been learned about 
newsroom structures and workflows during the course of research period, and 
documents changes within BBC News, in relation to journalistic roles, as UGC has 
become a more prominent feature within newsgathering operations. This thesis 
overall contributes to a greater understanding of journalistic practices through a 
mixed methods research approach including a newsroom ethnography over a period 
of months which is triangulated with content analysis and document analysis. 
Newsroom ethnography is a data collection technique that Cottle (2000, 2007) has 
argued was well overdue and believed would add value. This study, and the 
researcher’s background understanding, enable researchers to get a much needed in-
depth insight into the workings of a newsroom and the diverse responsibilities of 
journalists. Moreover, for researchers, this work contributes to refining scholarly 
understandings of the role of the journalist as we enter a period where news is more 
‘social’, i.e. found and disseminated on social media platforms. 
The work done here also expands on existing literature related to the use of 
UGC in news output, an issue which is an important consideration for academics 
who are interested in studying newsroom organisations and their work, particularly 
in relation to breaking news. The thesis also revisits established theories to consider 
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the extent to which journalists continue to be information gatekeepers or 
‘gatewatchers’ when audiences have access to news on numerous social, mobile and 
digital platforms. 
This chapter has focused on critically analysing and discussing the research 
findings while looking at how they fit into the existing research landscape as well as 
evolving journalistic practices. The results and subsequent discussion, particularly 
around the issue of verification risks and practices, demonstrates the contribution this 
research makes within the field of production studies and newsroom ethnography. 
Many of the research findings are significant for journalism scholars studying the 
field of UGC and social media, areas which are of increasing interest to academics as 
well as media practitioners. A final full consideration of the issues outlined here, the 
limitations of the research and recommendations is provided in the Conclusions 
chapter (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This concluding chapter examines the main findings and emerging themes of 
this research. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section draws on 
the Research Results and Discussion chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) and makes 
recommendations for journalism practice. These will be relevant to practitioners such 
as newsroom leaders and journalists, who should be aware of the risks and 
compliance issues related to using UGC in the future. The second section looks at 
recommendations for scholars and those interested in academic research related to 
newsroom studies, ethnography and industry projects concerning journalistic roles 
and responsibilities. The final section reflects on the limitations of the research and 
the position of the researcher while giving recommendations for potential future 
studies.  
 
Section 1: Practitioner recommendations 
Looking to policy 
The research questions asked how journalists had used UGC content to cover 
events in Syria since the first protests in Der’aa in March 2011 up to March 2014.  In 
terms of the use of UGC, the findings about lack of verification warnings suggest 
that there have been systematic failures by BBC News, both in advising the audience 
whether UGC has been checked and in labelling this content, if it was used in news 
reports, to distinguish it as separate to original BBC content or standard agency 
footage.  
One key recommendation from this research for those implementing policy at 
BBC News is that there need to be stronger and clearer rules about how to refer to 
UGC used on air; disclaimers and advisories may be sent out by certain departments, 
but this research found that these guidelines are rarely taken on board. Just 8% of the 
UGC clips sampled were accompanied by a verification warning.  Alongside results 
demonstrating these warning failures, the research findings suggest that the actual 
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verification process needs tightening up and should be more stringent. This would 
both avoid duplication of effort and also be a move towards ensuring that all content 
is checked to a more exacting standard.  
Moreover, while the UGC Hub is a very important department, rich in skills 
and aspiring to provide a centralised service, it is unrealistic to expect every piece of 
footage to be routed through them. This is due, not least, to outlets’ deadlines and 
limited resources - there is only so much one team can have demanded of it. It is 
hoped that a new database or workstream effort, can be realised.   
While a pan-BBC database of ‘verified’ UGC has not yet been established, 
there are efforts going on within BBC Arabic to trial such a venture. Since 2014, a 
pilot - involving the BBC Arabic social media editor liaising with UGC and 
newsgathering - has been taking place, the details of which are in the research 
findings. The creation of a set checklist of Arabic teams and a list of staff who are 
able to verify UGC, and their range of expertise, are just two of the developments 
within this trial. If the above steps were taken at a newsroom level it would hopefully 
mean that, at the very least, BBC staff working with UGC would know if others were 
engaged in similar work, avoiding duplication of effort to some degree. 
Before this can be rolled out, however, BBC News as whole must understand 
the importance and relevance of these processes and why they are so crucial to the 
future of news. They are also hugely important in relation to maintaining the public’s 
trust in BBC journalism. Such steps are not just part of informing the audience about 
the use of content, but are also a way of maintaining the BBC’s values of truth and 
accuracy - two mainstays of BBC journalism (BBC 2015). Ideally, a pan-BBC UGC 
database would not just be used to check UGC or have a list of the processes, but 
also - where possible - detail how and where UGC was used by BBC outlets. Further 
discussions need to be had, but if copies of the footage used by news outlets could 
also be kept this would be useful, as some video footage is routinely used as ‘library’ 
footage. Moreover, content from conflict zones could potentially be considered to be 
depicting war crimes and should be preserved with this in mind, something Wardle et 
al 2014 outlined in their study looking at the importance of labelling and crediting 
UGC.  
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Changing workflows 
The need for newsroom staff to work together has already been realised to a 
certain degree at the BBC, with the previously mentioned involvement of the Arabic 
and Monitoring services.  The reality, however, is that more could be done to 
highlight to journalists not directly working with UGC - rather in output, news 
production or newsgathering - that they should have some understanding of the 
verification processes and the importance of informing the audience, making it clear 
“verification is a team sport” (Buttry 2014:16). 
Since mid-2015, the BBC has moved towards being run in a different way as 
a 24/7 newsroom, with news online, BBC TV News and radio linking up more 
closely and being centrally managed. As a result of this, members of staff from the 
UGC Hub are now embedded on the day shift teams, including one producer with 
BBC World News TV and one with the BBC News Channel. In addition, the Live 
and Social producer continues to work within the daily newsgathering team. It is 
hoped that, by integrating staff in this way, best practice can be shared and non-UGC 
staff can understand the importance of this content, learn how to use it effectively 
and identify the risks associated with such footage. 
Educating staff about UGC risks and compliance 
Overall, there needs to be clearer guidance for BBC News staff about the 
importance of warnings in relation to using UGC in output. This could, perhaps, be 
done through the introduction of a mandatory course to ensure that journalists are 
aware of the risks associated with using this content, while also explaining why 
warnings are important. This would be over and above the existing BBC Academy 
verification course for staff involved in the checking process. Such a course would 
be related to the risks and compliance issues associated with using UGC. Online 
courses for BBC staff working with children and involving data protection are 
mandatory; a UGC awareness course could be rolled out in the same way for anyone 
involved in creating output which might include UGC or similar footage. This would 
ensure staff could not plead ignorance about the need to use warnings when 
including UGC in news output. There are existing courses about social media and the 
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web, but these don’t extend to UGC. Those that do extend to UGC are not targeted at 
all staff.  
Currently, if verification warnings have been used, their presence seems to be 
dependent on the journalist organising the script or sourcing footage to produce a 
news package. In this respect, I believe the most effective way to ensure that 
warnings are used is for the BBC to adopt a blanket policy on applying UGC 
warnings. This policy should make journalists aware that details about verification 
must be translated to the audience when UGC is used by the BBC, with further 
explanation of the processes of verification if need be. As will be discussed shortly, it 
is also important to signpost the use of UGC to the audience, though warnings about 
verification and advisories about labelling UGC are two different issues, something 
that was reflected in the research results.  
 
Changing journalistic roles and skills 
The research questions also sought to identify the ways in which the roles of 
BBC journalists changed as UGC was utilised in news reports during the lifetime of 
the conflict in Syria. The findings from the interviews and newsroom ethnography 
confirmed that decisions made early on in the conflict by editors - on team structures, 
use of content and rotas - had a direct impact on staff. This, in turn, affected their 
roles. While this research confirms that there have been many changes and 
amendments to the working practices around UGC - particularly at the UGC Hub - 
the research results also highlight a need for a clearer overall guide to the use of 
UGC, over and above the previously mentioned verification warnings. The research 
findings here could help inform practice in terms of labelling of content, shared 
access to footage and sourcing, which, as Wardle et al (2014) outline, is different to 
crediting for the benefit of the audience. A BBC-wide policy would take in issues of 
verification warnings as well as labelling content when it is used and should be 
adopted by all platforms using UGC. Any advice on practices should also extend to 
copyright. While the findings suggest the current policy has been relaxed in relation 
to UGC coming from Syria, this seems to be an informal arrangement; officially, the 
online policy remains that journalists cannot use content without permission from the 
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copyright holder (BBC 2014f). Moreover, the findings suggest that there is a greater 
need to educate individuals about the restrictions when using online content, 
particularly from social media platforms. Journalists cannot just use content which 
they have found on YouTube, Facebook or Twitter; this is a copyright infringement, 
which could lead to organisations being sued by the individuals who took the photo 
or filmed the footage. Yet the research suggests this does still occur in newsrooms 
(see Wardle et al 2014). Put bluntly, in order to clearly explain the use of UGC to the 
audience, journalists themselves need to have a clear understanding of how UGC is 
and should be used. 
Implications for duty of care of staff 
The development of the above initiatives, as well as the testimony of 
respondents throughout this research, indicates that UGC is a crucial resource for 
telling stories in hard to reach places, and that best practice regarding verification, 
labelling and crediting should be a major consideration for media outlets when using 
this content. The findings and developments within the wider media ecology also 
point to the importance of recognising the potential risks of processing and 
broadcasting this UGC, not just for audiences but also for the journalists involved in 
the editorial process. Following on from points raised in the Research Results and 
Discussion chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), a recommendation from this research would 
be that any news staff, not just those processing UGC or tasked with sourcing 
material, be made aware of the multiple resources the BBC has at hand to help tackle 
issues of trauma related to eyewitness content. For example, the BBC, as a leading 
broadcaster, has produced educational material related to this topic on its BBC 
Academy website, as well as having counselling available. Therefore, promoting this 
content and these services to all newsroom staff, making them aware that help is 
widely available, would be a good strategy; it would fit into the duty of care to 
employees that any company should subscribe to.  
Furthermore, Feinstein et al (2014) indicated that tactics such as reducing the 
frequency at which staff were exposed to distressing UGC footage (as opposed to the 
duration of the footage) could help minimise upset and stress linked to PTSD. This 
strategy has already been put in place at the UGC Hub and is detailed within the 
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Results and Discussion chapters. However, it is a recommendation of this research 
that Feinstein et al’s findings and the need for ‘duty of care’ should also be 
considered by managers of other newsroom staff when appointing journalists to work 
on certain stories. For example, a week of covering the bombardment of Syrian cities 
such as Raqqa, Aleppo and Hama by Russian airstrikes, or the migrant crisis - two 
stories which used UGC frequently - may allow a news producer to build up 
knowledge and expertise of what content is used on a daily basis. However, 
managers of staff - even those not directly working with UGC - should be made 
acutely aware that being put continually into such a role, particularly if there are 
distressing images, could take its toll on the wellbeing of staff. The impact that 
viewing graphic UGC has on journalists is a topic that should continue to be 
researched as its use becomes more widespread, and this should be a concern for all 
journalists.   
 
Section 2: Recommendations for scholars 
While there have been other BBC newsroom studies (Harrison 2010, Belair-
Gagnon 2015, Bennett 2013) this research enables academics and practitioners alike 
to get a closer insight into news production routines in the 21st century. This is an age 
when producers are as likely to Tweet contributors and eyewitnesses as ring them up 
(Newman 2009, Hermida 2012, Qu 2013). This study aimed to furnish both 
journalism scholars and working journalists with an understanding of the evolving 
roles and responsibilities of staff within the biggest news broadcasting organisation 
in the world - the BBC. The research is relevant for both industry and academia, and 
this section includes recommendations for scholars as the study aims to bridge a gap 
between two spheres which are not always aligned in terms of best practice and 
learning outcomes. 
Content found on social media sites is already the subject of many studies, 
but there is frequently a focus on Twitter (Hermida et al 2014, Vis 2013) to the 
extent that this research field could be considered to be overweight. Scholars looking 
to study how content is harnessed by journalists and travels across social media 
might want to look at other platforms and also potentially other delivery systems 
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such as chat apps. For those undertaking newsroom ethnographies or newsroom 
studies in the forms of interviews, the media landscape is changing and the different 
tools used for newsgathering and delivery are harder to pigeonhole. Different 
platforms will be favoured by different outlets and individual journalists may have 
their own preferences for sites and platforms they use when tracking news stories. 
This was demonstrated in the interview and newsroom observation findings. 
Scholars should come to a consensus about use of the term ‘UGC’ in a 
research context. As outlined in the literature review and in the section relating to 
terminologies and concepts, UGC is used as a catch-all term for most content that has 
not come to news organisations from professional journalists. However, as Wardle 
and Williams (2008) and many others after them have outlined (Allan and Thorsen 
2009, Hermida 2010), this term doesn’t satisfactorily identify the wide range of 
content which falls under this label. Eyewitness videos from conflict zones is very 
different from pictures of the snow or comments, on an online story versus viral cat 
videos. In order to be clearer about the use of UGC in newsgathering and reflect the 
diverse range of content it covers. It would be in the interests of scholars to reclassify 
content and suitable terms to describe it. 
 As outlined in the findings relation to theory in this thesis, conceptualisations 
of gatekeeping and Bruns’ gatewatching (2003) are complex and may vary from 
journalist to journalist, task to task and organisation to organisation. Moreover, the 
behaviours of journalists do not always take into consideration the evolving media 
landscape in which social media content and eyewitness testimony form part of the 
news, and scanning these platforms is now an integrated part of journalism routines 
(Domingo and Paterson 2011, Singer et al 2011). Therefore in considering newsroom 
roles and the sociology of news itself, the acts of the gatekeeping and gatewatching 
should perhaps be reconceptualised in the same way that Coddington and Holton 
(2013) suggested the traditional journalism model needed to be re-examined. 
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Section 3: Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by focusing on UGC and 
social media usage in relation to crisis events in the Middle East, particularly in 
Syria. The findings complement studies carried out by Harkin et al (2012) and the 
BBC Trust (2012, 2012a) on practices around verification. They highlight the unique 
situation Syria poses in relation to newsgathering practices, whereby journalists were 
forced to try and report events inside the country while not having a presence there 
for large parts of the research period.  It also charts the use of UGC by the 
organisation when covering the conflict in Syria. However, the scope of the research 
is, in some respects, narrow. Therefore, it is appropriate to recognise some of the 
limitations of this study and suggest where more work can be done. 
For various reasons outlined throughout the thesis, the research was restricted 
to focusing on journalists working within the BBC, and the content analysis sample 
only looked at BBC news reports which aired on BBC World News TV. As the BBC 
is the world’s biggest broadcaster - with a presence on TV, radio and online, as well 
as social and mobile platforms - there is certainly more than enough material 
available from the different services and departments within the organisation to base 
any research on. However, in terms of looking at the wider journalistic framework, a 
comparative study focusing on how different outlets have used UGC - for example, 
BBC World News TV and Al Jazeera English TV - might elicit interesting results. 
Indeed, research by Harkin et al (2012) and Barkho (2007, 2011) into both outlets 
have been included in the literature in this thesis. As the conflict in Syria continues 
and evolves, with international involvement by Russia, the US and the UK, this is a 
story that may still be relevant for researchers to investigate.  
The time period for BBC news reports which were coded in the content 
analysis spanned three years, 2011-2014. In that time and since there have been very 
interesting developments in terms of content used by the BBC to depict conflicts in 
general – not least the prevalence of video created and circulated by Islamic State in 
Syria and Iraq. While some of this content was catalogued as UGC by the BBC prior 
to the formal establishment of the group in its current form in 2014, Islamic State 
footage - described by one interviewee as ‘cinematic propaganda’ - cannot be said to 
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fit into the mould of UGC as was defined in this study in the Literature Review 
(Chapter 1) and Methodology chapter (Chapter 3). Footage which later transpired to 
be of Islamic State al Al-Nusra Front fighters was labelled by BBC News as 
‘extremist fighters’ and ‘rebel footage’. This has happened in a media landscape 
where there are more than 1,000 Syrian opposition groups, making it a complex 
subject to understand and navigate when reporting (BBC 2013b). As a result, such 
content was only really labelled as ‘Islamic State’ footage from 2014 onwards, when 
it became apparent that footage containing the flag logo was in fact from that 
organisation. Islamic State footage is not agency footage, but it is very different from 
some of the wobbly mobile footage seen from the likes of Ugarit and Shaam News 
Network, which is also shared on social media (Quilliam Foundation 2014, Winter 
2015). This also raises questions as to whether content from Islamic State can be 
categorised as coming from an ‘official’ source, even if that source is a terrorist 
organisation. A fuller discussion of the classification of Islamic State footage is 
beyond the remit of this research, but a study specifically looking at how Islamic 
State and associated content has been accessed, used and labelled by media outlets 
would be interesting. 
The data collection methods used in this research were quantitative content 
analysis of reports broadcast on BBC World News TV, an additional document 
analysis, in-depth interviews with BBC News staff and periods of observation within 
the UGC Hub and parts of BBC Arabic. A broader BBC study or, as previously 
suggested, a comparative study, might yield interesting results. At the time of writing 
(2015), the BBC is currently preparing to negotiate the next licence fee settlement 
with the UK government in 2016, and this thesis also details the many new services 
and programmes being launched in a bid to strengthen the BBC’s digital offerings 
both commercially and elsewhere. While decisions on programming and products 
can change rapidly, a study with more focus on how the BBC uses social media 
platforms - both in its own programming and also as a way to disseminate news - 
would be interesting, as this study only briefly touched on the topic. 
The quantitative content analysis carried out in this research took in 20% of 
the packaged content aired on BBC World News TV relating to Syria within the 
research period. As was detailed in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 3), these 
reports were selected using the search term ‘Syria’ in Jupiter, the main database for 
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broadcast material used and created by the BBC. I believe 20% to be a representative 
sample of the available data, but further investigation during data collection 
suggested not all reports would be saved using the term ‘Syria’; terms such as 
‘Kobane’ or ‘Damascus were also used. Therefore, a study which took in wider 
search terms might be relevant, though I would suggest that the case study might 
relate to a specific time period or a specific incident. For example, studying coverage 
of the December 2014 battle for Kobane between Islamic State and Kurdish forces 
would be interesting, and would result in cleaner data than a longer-term content 
analysis using multiple search terms, which could yield unwieldy results. 
Changing media marketplace 
In a fast-paced environment such as a newsroom, researching practices and 
processes which might change daily has been a challenge, and these practices will 
continue to develop as the conflict in Syria continues. There are also new processes 
and mechanisms being employed by journalists responsible for covering other stories 
which are beyond the scope of this research. These processes should be investigated 
as using UGC remains a key way to illustrate events. There are also new digital news 
products being launched every month by media organisations: for example, BBC’s 
Newstream, YouTube Newswire and CNN on Snapchat Discover. These 
developments highlight that journalistic practices are continually evolving as is the 
marketplace. These include new social tools and platforms to disseminate news 
organisations’ own content, and UGC, will most likely be a key part of this 
evolution. It is hoped that the findings and conclusions of this thesis will provide 
useful insight and relevant recommendations, for academics and media practitioners 
alike, beyond the research period. 
Researcher reflections 
This thesis outlines ways in which newsrooms and individual journalists have 
overcome challenges associated with covering events in Syria when it has been 
impossible to access the country safely. This was important work to do, as the 
situation in Syria has continued to evolve and has become increasingly more 
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complex, involving fragmented jihadist groups as well as international intervention 
in the form of outside powers arming different factions and carrying out airstrikes. 
International journalists have had to continue to report events happening inside of the 
country in spite of these many developments and in the face of many challenges 
linked to logistics, ethics and accuracy of content. Overall, there has been sparse 
access to the country. Understanding the evolution of journalistic practices and the 
strategies and processes used to report helps shape our understanding of 
newsgathering, in a space where social media and UGC are sometimes the only 
sources of footage and intelligence available to help chart developments in an 
‘unreportable’ place such as Syria.    
 This has meant researching an ongoing conflict in tandem with studying the 
methods used by BBC News to covering this moving story. During the time period 
researched there have been many changes in management, structures, teams and the 
deployment and embedding of individual journalists in relation to UGC. Journalists’ 
skills have also developed and changed as they have had to become more digitally 
and social media literate. In some cases they have had to learn how to use different 
platforms. At other times they have had to become proficient at navigating new 
technologies and tools in order to cover the conflict effectively, while still 
undertaking ‘journalistic sensemaking’. While nothing beats ‘boots on the ground’, 
the findings suggest that the BBC has tried to keep abreast of developments in Syria 
by using voices and sources which have become more trusted over time, as well as 
adopting innovative tools to help make the verification process more effective and 
more streamlined.  
The final point to outline here in terms of limitations is the role of the 
researcher. I carried out this study while working at the BBC as a senior producer for 
BBC World News TV, and I continue to be a member of BBC staff. The main issues 
and coping mechanisms around this aspect of the research have been covered in the 
Methodology chapter (Chapter 3), but as a ‘visible researcher’ with a role within the 
company, it is important to be clear about my position and how it could potentially 
relate to the research findings. Another researcher might have interpreted the data 
collected differently, which was one of the reasons to engage in a mixed methods 
approach in which all content was not based on qualitative interpretation. However, 
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it is always important to state that all researchers come to the table with different 
approaches. 
 
Concluding summary 
What is clear is that UGC and eyewitness footage are now used by news 
organisations to depict events across the globe. This thesis has sought to demonstrate 
how this content has been used, in particular by BBC News to depict the conflict in 
Syria - a country which remains, for many journalists, simply too dangerous to report 
from. The research findings have identified both the numerous risks and the many 
benefits of using UGC, which has become an easily available source of information 
as citizens, journalists and activists are armed with the power of a smartphone. This 
enables them, at times, to capture moments that journalistic crews cannot. What this 
content does not do in isolation, however, is provide the analysis, context and 
storytelling power possible when UGC is incorporated into a journalistic product in 
the form of a news report. 
The research has also outlined the ways in which journalistic roles and 
processes have changed throughout the lifetime of the conflict, as journalists have 
learned more about how to source, verify and distribute UGC using new tools and 
newsgathering techniques. There are now more sources, or ‘gates’, of information, 
but these sources often need more checking than traditional sources, such as 
agencies. This means that journalists have had to develop more skills and 
understanding about the technical aspects of checking content, as well as 
understanding the digital and social media landscapes. This is the case even if their 
work is still predominantly broadcast on ‘legacy’ media such as television. Structures 
have altered within the BBC; new roles have been created and teams have been 
merged to share ideas and best practice.  
Ultimately, for journalists covering events in Syria, the work undertaken in 
relation to UGC and social media newsgathering may be more lengthy, challenging 
and complicated to process than that of their counterparts reporting other stories. The 
lessons learned from that process, however, can benefit all journalists across the 
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BBC and other international newsrooms. It is hoped that the findings and 
recommendations from this research can help build on those foundations. 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of events in Syria from 2011 onwards  
2011 March - Security forces shoot dead protestors in southern city of Deraa 
demanding release of political prisoners, triggering violent unrest that steadily spread 
nationwide over the following months. 
2011 April - President Assad announces conciliatory measures, releasing dozens of 
political prisoners, dismissing government, lifting 48-year-old state of emergency. 
2011 May - Army tanks enter Deraa, Baniyas, Homs and suburbs of Damascus in an 
effort to crush anti-regime protests. US and European Union tighten sanctions. 
President Assad announces amnesty for political prisoners. 
2011 June - The government says 120 members of the security forces were killed by 
"armed gangs" in the northwestern town of Jisr al-Shughour. Troops besiege the 
town, more than 10,000 people flee to Turkey. President Assad pledges to start 
"national dialogue" on reform. 
2011 June - The IAEA nuclear watchdog decides to report Syria to the UN Security 
Council over its alleged covert nuclear programme reactor programme. The structure 
housing the alleged reactor was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in 2007. 
2011 July - President Assad sacks the governor of the northern province of Hama 
after mass demonstration there, eventually sending in troops to restore order at the 
cost of scores of lives. 
2011 October - New Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of 
internal and exiled opposition activists. 
 2011 November - Arab League votes to suspend Syria, accusing it of failing to 
implement an Arab peace plan, and imposes sanctions. 
2011 December - Twin suicide bombs outside security buildings in Damascus kill 
44, the first in a series of large blasts in the capital that continue into the following 
summer. 
2012 February - Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities. 
2012 March - UN Security Council endorses non-binding peace plan drafted by UN 
envoy Kofi Annan. China and Russia agree to support the plan after an earlier, 
tougher draft is modified. 
2012 May - France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada and Australia expel senior 
Syrian diplomats in protest at killing of more than a hundred civilians in Houla, near 
Homs. 
2012 June - Turkey changes rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish 
plane, declaring that if Syrian troops approach Turkey's borders they will be seen as 
a military threat. 
2012 July - Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes 
Aleppo in the north.2012 August - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defects, US President 
Obama warns that use of chemical weapons would tilt the US towards intervention. 
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2012 October - Syria-Turkish tension rises when Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish 
border town kills five civilians. Turkey returns fire and intercepts a Syrian plane 
allegedly carrying arms from Russia. 
2012 November - National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces formed in Qatar, excludes Islamist militias. Arab League stops short of full 
recognition. 
2012 December - US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognise 
opposition National Coalition as "legitimate representative" of Syrian people. 
2013 January - Syria accuses Israeli jets of attacking a military research centre near 
Damascus, but denies reports that lorries carrying weapons bound for Lebanon were 
hit. Unverified reports say Israel had targeted an Iranian commander charged with 
moving weapons of mass destruction to Lebanon. 
2013 March - Syrian warplanes bomb the northern city of Raqqa after rebels seize 
control. US and Britain pledge non-military aid to rebels. 
2013 June - Government and allied Lebanese Hezbollah forces recapture 
strategically-important town of Qusair between Homs and Lebanese border. Rebel 
commanders complain that arms supplies taper off over international concerns about 
Islamists in the opposition camp. 
2013 July - Saudi-backed Ahmed Jarba becomes leader of opposition National 
Coalition, defeating Qatar-backed rival.  
2013 August – Alleged chemical attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus. UGC shows 
victim gasping for breath. Nearly 300 people are reported to have been killed.  
2013 September - UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were 
used in an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed about 300 
people, but do not explicitly allocate responsibility for the attack. 
2013 October - President Assad allows international inspectors to begin destroying 
Syria's chemical weapons on the basis of a US-Russian agreement. 
2013 December - US and Britain suspend "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern 
Syria after reports Islamist rebels seize some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian 
Army. 
2014 January-February - UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, largely because 
Syrian authorities refuse to discuss a transitional government. 
2014 March - Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces recapture Yabroud, the last rebel 
stronghold near the Lebanese border. 
2014 May - Hundreds of rebels are evacuated from their last stronghold in the central 
city of Homs. The withdrawal marks the end of three years of resistance in the city. 
2014 June - UN announces removal of Syria's chemical weapons material complete. 
2014 June - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria militants declare "caliphate" in territory 
from Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala. 
2014 August - Tabqa airbase, near the northern city of Raqqa, falls to Islamic State 
militants, who now control entire Raqqa province. 
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2014 September - United States and five Arab countries launch air strikes against 
Islamic State around Aleppo and Raqqa. 
2015 January - Kurdish forces push Islamic State out of Kobane on Turkish border 
after four months of fighting. 
2015 March -Opposition offensives push back government forces. New Jaish al-
Fatah (Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance, backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, captures provincial capital of Idlib. 
2015 May - Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria, 
raising concerns that they might destroy the pre-Islamic World Heritage site. They 
also capture last border crossing to Iraq. Jaish al-Fatah takes control of Idlib 
Province, putting pressure on government's coastal stronghold of Latakia. 
2015 June - Islamic State and Kurdish fighters intensify fighting between Raqqa and 
Turkish border. Kurds take Ain Issa and border town of Tal Abyad, Islamic State 
attacks Kobane and seizes part of Hassakeh, the main city in north-eastern Syria. 
2015 September - Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria, saying it targets the 
Islamic State group. But West and Syrian opposition say it overwhelmingly targets 
anti-Assad rebels instead. 
Information sourced from BBC. (2015g). Syria Profile – Timeline. BBC News 
online, 4 October 2015. Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
14703995 (Accessed 5 October 2015). 
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Appendix 2: Consent form 
Consent Form 
 
Title of Study:  Reporting Atrocities on Television: how citizen generated content has 
shaped BBC TV news coverage of the Syria conflict.  
 
 
Please initial box 
1
. 
I agree to take part in the above City University London research 
project. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the 
participant information sheet, which I may keep for my records.  
I understand this will involve: 
 being interviewed by the researcher 
 allow the interview to be videotaped/audiotaped 
 make myself available for a further interview should that be 
required                                                       
 
2
. 
This information will be held and processed for the following 
purpose(s):  as part of PhD research project. The identifiable data 
will not be shared with any other organisation.  
I understand that should I wish to be anonymous during this 
research, coding will be put in place to protect my identity from 
being made public.  
Otherwise I understand that I have given approval for my name 
and/or the name of my workplace to be used in the final report of the 
project, and future publications. 
 
3
. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not 
to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at 
any stage of the project without being penalized or disadvantaged in 
any way. 
 
4
. 
I agree to City University London recording and processing this 
information about me. I understand that this information will be used 
only for the purpose(s) set out in this statement and my consent is 
conditional on the University complying with its duties and 
obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
5
.  
I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
____________________ ____________________________ _________ 
Name of Participant  Signature   Date 
 
 
____________________ ____________________________ _________ 
Name of Researcher  Signature   Date 
 
When completed, 1 copy for participant; 1 copy for researcher file. 
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Appendix 3: List of sources of UGC clips used in BBC World News TV 
packages which broadcast March 2011 to March 2014. 
UNKNOWN 
SHAAM NEWS NETWORK 
FACEBOOK 
YOUTUBE 
CITIZEN (VOICE OVER) 
REBEL GROUP 
PICTURES FROM YOUTUBE 
INTERNET 
REBEL GROUP TV 
ACTIVISTS  
UGARIT NEWS 
DPN  
SYRIA NEWS 
AGENCY 
INTERNET FOOTAGE 
PICTURES TAKEN BY OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME AND SENT OUT ON THE 
INTERNET 
DETAILED INFROMATION ON UGC VERIFICATION AND SOURCE 
SYRIA IS FREE  
UGARIT NEWS/YOU TUBE 
SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE 
AMATEUR VIDEO VIA SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE VIA REUTERS 
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
FOOTAGE POSTED ON THE INTERNET BY OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS 
UGARIT NEWS VIA REUTERS 
DOUMA CITY 
PANORAMA FOOTAGE FROM BBC 
YOUTUBE VIA REUTERS 
AMVID FROM YOUTUBE  
AMATUER VIDEO VIA REUTERS 
BAMBUSER 
UNKNOWN VIA REUTERS 
UNKNOWN VIA APTN 
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UGARIT NEWS VIA YOUTUBE 
SECRETLY FILMED\ACTIVIST VIDEO 
MOBILE PHONE 
OMAWI NEWS 
UGC VIA REUTERS 
APTN 
UNKNOWN VIA AP 
UNKNOWN VIA EVN 
YOUTUBE  
UNKNOWN VA EVN 
RAQQA MEDIA CENTRE VIA YOUTUBE  
RAQQA MEDIA CENTRE VIA AP  
HMC SYRIA  
ISLAMIC STATE 
IDF VIA YOUTUBE 
UGC TEAM, UNKNOWN 
UNKNOWN VIA UGC 
ERBIS CITY VIA OPCW  
ISIS VIA UGC 
SHAHBA PRESS  
SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITES/SHAHBA PRESS 
AMC 
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Appendix 4: List of descriptions used for UGC clips used in BBC World News 
TV packages which broadcast March 2011 to March 2014. 
AMATEUR FOOTAGE 
MOBILE PHONE 
AMATEUR VIDEO 
SHAKY VIDEO AND MOBILE PHONE FOOTAGE 
PICTURES FROM YOUTUBE 
UNVERIFIED INTERNET FOOTAGE 
UNVERIFIED FOOTAGE 
AMATEUR FILMING 
UNVERIFIED PICTURES 
LIBRARY PICTURES 
THESE PICTURES CANNOT BE INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED 
UNVERIFIED VIDEO 
MADE BY ACTIVISTS 
PICTURES TAKEN BY OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME AND SENT OUT ON THE 
INTERNET 
INTERNET PICTURES 
SECRETLY FILMED ACTIVIST VIDEO 
ACTIVIST FOOTAGE 
PICTURES FROM YOUTUBE 
UNVERIFIABLE AMATEUR VIDEO 
INTERNET VIDEO 
UNVERIFIED FOOTAGE POSTED ON THE INTERNET 
AMATEUR VIDEO FOOTAGE 
NUSRA FRONT VIDEO 
REBEL VIDEOS 
VIDEOS POSTED ON THE INTERNET 
MOBILE PHONE FOOTAGE 
EXTREMIST FIGHTERS  
MODERATE REBELS  
JIHADIST VIDEO 
ACTIVIST VIDEO  
